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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the post-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals era in which 
federal trial courts have been assigned the gatekeeping responsibility 
concerning the admissibility of scientific expert testimony,1 the confluence 
of two trends is affecting expert testimony in cases involving business 
damages2 in ways that are presenting new challenges for the courts and 
enhancing the risks for damages experts.3  One trend, the increasingly 
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 1. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. In this paper, we define the word "damages" in a general sense to mean a potential 
monetary award stemming from litigation in cases involving businesses.  In this context, 
damages can arise from tort, breach of contract, divorce, infringement, and tax actions.  The 
word "valuation," as used herein, is generally intended to mean the actual process of 
estimating damages. 
 3. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000-2006 Financial Expert Witness Daubert 
Challenge Study 5 (2007) (“In the Ninth Circuit, 68 percent of financial expert witness 
testimony challenged under Daubert between 2000 and 2006 were excluded in whole or in 
part.”) 
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sophisticated content of expert testimony, stems, in part, from the changing 
nature of business in the U.S., which is becoming intellectual-capital 
intensive.4  This intellectual-capital intensity is increasing both the amount 
of litigation associated with this capital5 and the complexities associated 
with estimating damages in civil litigation involving commerce.6 
 4. See Lutz Kaufmann & Yvonne Schneider, Intangibles:  A Synthesis of Current 
Research, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 366, 373-74 (2004).  The authors note that there is no consensus 
on one set of terms and definitions for intellectual capital, which includes such categories as 
intangible assets, intangible capital, intellectual assets, and intellectual property.  The term 
“intellectual capital” is used herein to refer to a wide variety of assets that have no physical 
existence.  These include assets traditionally defined as intellectual property (including 
copyrights, patents, and licenses) and also such “assets,” used here in an economic as 
opposed to an accounting context, as customer accounts.  The term “intellectual capital” has 
been defined as the difference between the market value and financial capital of that 
enterprise at a given date.  See Indra Abeysekera, Intellectual Accounting Scorecard—
Measuring and Reporting Intellectual Capital, 3 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. 422 (2003).  We, 
however, follow Contractor in defining intellectual capital to include intellectual property 
that is registered (such as patents, copyrights, and brands), intellectual property that is 
unregistered but codified (such as drawings, software, blueprints, written trade secrets, 
databases, and formulae), and uncodified organizational capital (such as customer accounts, 
collective knowledge, skills, and knowledge).  See Farok J. Contractor, Valuing Corporate 
Knowledge and Intangible Assets:  Some General Principles, 7 KNOWLEDGE & PROCESS 
MGMT. 242, 245 (2000).  Further, Abeysekera notes that “[a]lthough there is ambiguity as to 
whether intellectual capital represents all intangibles, the more popular definitions indicate 
that they refer to intangibles not recognized in the financial statements.”  Abeysekera, supra, 
at 422.  It is also important to make a clear distinction between intellectual capital and 
human beings.  “[P]eople are not assets, but the services which people are expected to 
provide for an organisation comprise the asset.”  Michael Litschka et al., Measuring and 
Analyzing Intellectual Assets:  An Integrative Approach, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 160, 164 (2005) 
(citing ERIC FLAMHOLTZ, HUMAN RESOURCE ACCOUNTING 32 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 
2001)). 
 5. See, e.g., John E. Jankowski, Measurement and Growth of R&D Within the Service 
Economy, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 323, 327, 330, 335 (2001), for data on the growth of 
research and development (R&D) in U.S. industry and evidence that the trend toward 
greater concentrations of R&D in service businesses has a higher development component.  
See also Gregory Tassey, R&D Investment Trends:  U.S. Needs More High Tech, 46 RES. 
TECH. MGMT. 9, 11 (2003).  A 2002 survey conducted by Kroll, Inc. led to the following 
conclusion:  “‘Intellectual property is at the heart of modern business, everything from 
technology to pharmaceuticals to music,’ said Michael Cherkasky, president and CEO of 
Kroll.  ‘With more than half our survey respondents estimating the value of their company’s 
intellectual property in excess of $5 million, and nearly half reporting at least one incident 
of unauthorized use in the past year, IP infringement is clearly a multi-million dollar global 
problem.”  Press Release, Kroll Inc., Kroll Survey Highlights Corporate Vulnerabilities to 
Growing Billion-Dollar Problem of Intellectual Property Abuse (Apr. 16, 2002), available 
at http://www.kroll.com/news/releases/index.aspx?id=151. 
 6. “The greatly increased importance of intellectual property rights in worldwide 
business has, not surprisingly, been accompanied by a steady increase in the number and 
complexity of disputes concerning the use and value of such rights.”  Robert Goldscheider, 
Measuring the Damages:  ADR and Intellectual Property Disputes, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 55 
(1995).  See Manuel Garcia-Ayuso, Factors Explaining the Inefficient Valuation of 
Intangibles, 16 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 57, 59 (2003), for an assertion that 
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A second important trend—growing partisanship in damages expert 
testimony7—is creating greater difficulty on the part of judges in 
determining what expert testimony meets the threshold of admissibility and 
is resulting in more frequent rejection of testimony by the courts.8  
Evidence of this partisanship can be found in recent court decisions, with 
Daubert hearings on expert qualifications becoming the norm and 
increasing allegations of bias being aimed at business valuation 
professionals.9  Partisanship goes to the heart of the reliability of expert 
testimony, and is alleged to be contributing to what one commentator has 
described as an explosion of successful Daubert challenges over the past 
five years, with a success rate of 30-60%.10  Combined with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases bearing upon the admissibility of 
scientific evidence in federal and some state courts11—in contrast with the 
adherence of other states to the older Frye standard or to neither Daubert 
nor Frye12—these trends portend growing difficulty for the courts in 
assessing the reliability of expert testimony and growing uncertainty for 
testifying experts about courts’ reactions to their reports and testimony.13  
the failure of accounting-based financial reports to capture the underlying values of 
intellectual capital has contributed to a growing body of securities-related litigation.  See Nir 
Kossovsky, Fair Value of Intellectual Property:  An Options-Based Valuation of Nearly 
8,000 Intellectual Property Assets, 3 J. INTELL. CAP. 62 (2006), for the comment that 
existing financial reporting is not responsive enough to capture the value of volatile 
intellectual assets; and Kaufman & Schneider, supra note 4, for the fluctuating differences 
between market and book [accounting] values as indicative of the rising importance of 
intellectual capital. 
 7. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3; Robert James Cimasi, BV on Trial 
in Bankruptcy—Exclusive Insights from the In Re Med Diversified, 47 BUS. VALUATION 
UPDATE 3 (Aug. 16, 2006); Gary L. Freed, When Will It Stop?—The Sequel, 6 NAT’L LITIG. 
CONSULTANTS REV. 7 (2007). 
 8. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (citing a study, “Daubert Challenges to Financial Expert Witnesses in Federal 
and State Courts, 2000-2005,” by Price Waterhouse Coopers, a leading public accounting 
firm). 
 11. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
 12. J.A. Keierleber & T.L. Bohan, Ten Years after Daubert:  The Status of the States, 
50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1 (2005).  The Frye standard referred to in the text came from Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  It contemplated that expert evidence of a 
scientific nature would be admissible only if the methodology or technique employed by the 
expert reflected general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.  Id. at 1014.  For a 
discussion of Frye, its current applicability in some states, and its former applicability in the 
federal courts, see infra text accompanying notes 26-39. 
 13. Although court decisions in patent cases have an obvious focus on intangible assets 
and intellectual capital, we do not specifically address damages issues associated with patent 
cases because patent law is a specialized area of law that has been deemed sufficiently 
complicated to have its own appellate venue with specialized judicial expertise.  
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Past remedies for partisanship have proven largely unsuccessful,14 and 
given partisanship’s intersection with the increasing complexity of business 
damages cases, a fresh approach is needed to curb its adverse effects. 
Pre-Daubert, experts were introducing novel analyses that even other 
experts had difficulty understanding, thereby presenting serious issues for 
the courts.15  In Daubert,16 the first piece in what has been termed “the 
Supreme Court’s trilogy on the admissibility of expert testimony,”17 the 
court provided basic criteria with respect to the admissibility of expert 
scientific testimony.  The Daubert criteria, however, represent only general 
guidelines and fall well short of providing definitive guidance with respect 
to the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the use of particular 
scientific methodologies.18  In the second piece of the trilogy, General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner,19 the Court rejected the notion that lower courts 
should apply a standard more stringent than Daubert in excluding expert 
testimony.20  A major import of Joiner for purposes of this study is that in 
the future courts are unlikely to establish a more complex, well-defined, 
universally applicable set of rules for admissibility of expert scientific 
testimony in cases involving computation of damages related to intellectual 
capital. 
In the third piece of the trilogy, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,21 the 
Court rejected the notion that there is a dichotomy in expert testimony 
between experts who rely upon science versus those who rely upon 
personal experience.22  Further, the Court said that the pertinence of certain 
factors set forth in Daubert depends upon the nature of the case, expertise 
involved, and topic of the testimony.23  In combination, Daubert, Joiner, 
and Kumho therefore create the potential for both considerable flexibility 
and concomitant ambiguity with respect to decisions by the courts 
regarding the appropriate use and admissibility of expert scientific 
evidence.24 
Nonetheless, we occasionally draw what we believe to be useful analogies to the manner in 
which patent cases are handled in the U.S. system. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 483-514. 
 15. Michelson Stephan, The Expert and Law, NAT’L FORENSIC CENTER, Apr. 29, 1983, 
at 5. 
 16. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. 
 17. Berger, supra note 11, at 9. 
 18. Id. at 38. 
 19. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 20. See Berger, supra note 11, at 13. 
 21. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 22. See Berger, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
 23. See id. at 19. 
 24. See id. at 21.  Moreover, “[n]othing the Supreme Court said in Kumho is explicitly 
inconsistent with what it said in Daubert.   As Justice Breyer’s opinion stated, Daubert 
described the Rule 702 inquiry as ‘a flexible one,’ and made clear that factors it mentions do 
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This study proceeds as follows in exploring the intersection of these 
trends in the post-Daubert era and in proposing a new trial regime for 
dealing with complex business damages cases.  Part II reviews the 
requirements for the admissibility and management of expert testimony 
established by the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho courts.  It then examines 
several recent court decisions related to the admission of expert testimony 
at the federal and state levels and the inconsistencies presented in some of 
these decisions.  Part III deals with damage experts’ backgrounds and the 
enhanced risks for these experts that accompany the provision of expert 
damages testimony in the post-Daubert era, including a discussion of 
increasingly expansive discovery and its adverse implications for attorney-
expert communication.  Part IV explores the art and the science of 
valuation and provides examples of the types of technical issues with which 
courts have had to deal—issues that have on occasion, like admissibility 
issues, been dealt with inconsistently.  This discussion provides a sense of 
the illusion of objectivity in business damages estimation and the 
complexities that have challenged both courts and damages experts who 
must anticipate various courts’ positions on technical issues.  Part V relates 
the business environment dynamics giving rise to increased complexity in 
business damages cases and explores how these dynamics, in turn, are 
affecting the complexity of expert testimony and necessitating the use of 
increasingly sophisticated methodologies to provide the most accurate 
estimates of damages.  In addressing this business complexity trend, we 
briefly discuss some of these methodologies to foster an understanding of 
the types of problems courts are increasingly likely to face in assessing the 
reliability of expert testimony in the future.  We also provide illustrative 
examples from recent cases that involved these methodologies. 
Part VI discusses the problem of growing partisanship on the part of 
some damages experts, together with an analysis of remedies that have 
been proposed in the past and reasons for their ineffectiveness.  Part VII 
presents a novel approach for dealing with the sour fruits of expert 
partisanship through the bifurcation of the trial regime, augmented by the 
selective, tightly controlled use of independent experts to temper opposing 
parties’ expert testimony.  Part VIII summarizes our arguments and 
conclusions regarding their future impact on the quality of jurisprudence. 
not constitute ‘a definitive checklist or test.’  Nevertheless, Kumho may indicate that the 
Court has somewhat backed away from laying down guidelines for particular categories of 
expert testimony . . . .  The Court seems less absorbed in epistemological issues, in 
formulating general rules for assessing reliability . . . .  It appears less interested in a 
taxonomy of expertise and more concerned with directing judges to concentrate on the 
particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.” Id. 
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II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Courts must inevitably decide whether to exclude expert testimony, 
which is almost always flawed in some respects, or to admit it and rely 
upon opposing counsel to draw out the testimony’s weaknesses.25  The 
requirements for expert testimony to be admissible have evolved at the 
federal level from the Frye standard to new standards established by 
Daubert and its progeny.26  Some states have embraced the Daubert 
standard while others have clung to Frye.27  Still others have attempted to 
meld the two in various ways, at times giving rise to hybrid case law.28  
Further complicating this cluttered landscape of conflicting rules for 
admissibility of expert testimony are conflicting decisions by courts 
regarding such admissibility matters as whether all potentially relevant 
variables have been considered by the expert and whether applications of 
financial methodologies are admissible in various contexts.29 
A. The Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Trio 
Prior to three landscape-changing Supreme Court decisions during the 
1990s,30 most federal courts subscribed to a several-decades-old test for 
determining admissibility of expert testimony on scientific matters.31  
Under that test, enunciated in Frye v. United States,32 an expert witness 
would be permitted to furnish opinion testimony employing a particular 
scientific methodology or technique only if the methodology or technique 
had earned “general acceptance” in the appropriate scientific community.33  
The Frye approach remained dominant among federal courts even after the 
mid-1970s adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), though some 
courts and commentators had begun to question the general acceptance 
test’s soundness and viability.34 
In a 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,35 
 25. Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits After Daubert:  Five Questions Every Court 
Should Ask Before Admitting Expert Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 379, 421 (2007). 
 26. Berger, supra note 11, at 10. 
 27. Keierleber & Bohan, supra note 12, at abstract. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 113-42. 
 30. The three cases are Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  The cases will be discussed at infra text accompanying 
notes 35-100. 
 31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. 
 32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 33. Id. at 1014. 
 34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 586-87 & nn.4-5. 
 35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Daubert was the first of the three Supreme Court decisions 
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the Supreme Court resolved the viability issue by holding that Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the general acceptance test.36  
Frye’s “austere” test struck the Court as incompatible with Rule 702,37 
which read this way at the time of Daubert:  “If scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise.”38  Having cast Frye aside, the 
Daubert majority turned its attention to what Rule 702 contemplates 
regarding expert evidence of a scientific nature.39 
The Court stressed that even though the FRE did not call for 
application of the general acceptance test, the FRE still placed limits on the 
admissibility of expert testimony.40  Reading Rule 702 alongside other 
provisions of the FRE, the Court concluded that the trial judge “must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.”41  The “reliab[ility]” requirement stemmed from 
Rule 702’s reference to “scientific . . . knowledge,”42 which the Court read 
as contemplating expert testimony that was grounded in the scientific 
method and reflective of scientific validity rather than mere speculation.43  
alluded to earlier.  See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 36. 509 U.S. at 587, 588-89 & n.6; see FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 37. 509 U.S. at 589. 
 38. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. In 2000, an amendment to Rule 702 
changed the concluding period to a comma and added the following language:  “if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably 
to the facts of the case.”  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 39. See 509 U.S. at 589-97. 
 40. Id. at 589.  The plaintiffs sought to offer expert opinions that a mother’s ingestion 
of Bendectin during pregnancy could cause birth defects in her children.  The district court 
excluded such testimony because it did not appear to have been based on a generally 
accepted principle or technique.  Id. at 583-84.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 584.  
Because the lower courts had applied the discredited general acceptance test, the Supreme 
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further consideration 
under the guidelines set forth in Daubert.  Id. at 587, 597-98. 
 41. Id. at 589.  The court noted that its interpretation of Rule 702 was informed by Rule 
402’s provision that relevant evidence is generally admissible and by Rule 401’s “liberal” 
standard of relevance.  Id. at 587; see FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.  In addition, the Court noted 
the “’liberal thrust’” of the Federal rules of Evidence and their “general approach of relaxing 
the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.” 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft 
Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 702; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90. 
 43. 509 U.S. at 590.  Because Daubert involved scientific testimony, the Court limited 
its discussion to that context and offered no view on whether the same relevance and 
reliability requirements would govern admissibility determinations regarding opinion 
testimony that would rely on “‘technical or other specialized knowledge.’”  Id. at 590 n.8 
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). In a later decision, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1999), the Court would address the question reserved in Daubert.  For discussion of 
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An expert’s opinion, therefore, would not be admissible unless it had “a 
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the expert’s] 
discipline.”44 As foundation for the further requirement that the expert 
testimony be relevant, the Daubert majority pointed to Rule 702’s 
statement that such testimony must be capable of “assist[ing] the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”45  Such 
assistance could only be provided by relevant expert testimony-testimony 
that holds “a valid scientific connection to [a] pertinent inquiry” at issue in 
the case.46 
With Daubert having identified a trial judge’s “gatekeeping” 
responsibility47 to allow expert testimony of a scientific nature only if it 
would be relevant and reliable,48 Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion 
proceeded to furnish guidance for courts attempting to discharge this 
responsibility.  The Court offered a nonexclusive list of factors bearing 
simultaneously upon the relevance and reliability requirements.49  First 
among the listed factors was whether the theory or technique the expert 
seeks to employ “can be (and has been) tested.”50  The Court also noted the 
importance of considering whether the expert’s proposed theory or 
technique had been “subjected to peer review and publication.”51  In 
addition, the error rate associated with the expert’s proposed theory or 
technique qualified for the nonexclusive list of factors to consider, as did 
Kumho, see infra text accompanying notes 79-100. 
 44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91. 
 46. 509 U.S. at 592; see id. at 591-92. 
 47. Id. at 597; see id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 48. Id. at 590-92.  FED. R. EVID. 104(a) calls for courts to make preliminary 
determinations on matters such as evidentiary admissibility and the qualification of a person 
to serve as a witness.  FED. R. EVID. 104(a).   Noting this provision, the Court stated that 
“the trial judge must determine at the outset” whether an expert’s proposed testimony would 
be admissible.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.  In doing so, the judge would need to make “a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony 
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied 
to the facts in issue.”  Id. at 592-93. 
 49. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-97. Giving the “general observations” label to its list 
of factors, id. at 593, the Court noted that various considerations would be relevant to the 
discharge of the trial judge’s gatekeeping responsibility and that “we do not presume to set 
out a definitive checklist or test.”  Id. 
 50. Id.  According to the Court, scientific methodology depends upon the generation of 
hypotheses that can be tested for apparent truth or falsity.  Id. 
 51. Id.  Although peer review and publication are traditional aspects of “submission to 
the scrutiny of the scientific community,” id., the Court recognized that some scientific 
knowledge may not have led to publication because it was too new or of interest to too small 
an audience.  Id.  Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he fact of publication (or lack 
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal . . . will be a relevant, though not dispositive, 
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on 
which an opinion is premised.” Id. at 594. 
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any professional standards applicable to the operation of the theory or 
technique.52  Finally, the Daubert majority noted that even though the 
general acceptance test no longer controlled the inquiry into admissibility 
of expert testimony,53 “[w]idespread acceptance” of a theory or technique 
is a factor that may help point toward admissibility.54  The Court concluded 
its discussion of the gatekeeping responsibility by emphasizing the 
“flexible” nature of the trial judge’s inquiry into admissibility55 and by 
stressing that the inquiry must be focused “solely on principles and 
methodology [to be employed by the expert], not on the conclusions that 
they generate.”56 
General Electronic Co. v. Joiner57 was the second of the Supreme 
Court’s expert testimony decisions during the 1990s.  The district court had 
disallowed the proffered scientific testimony of the plaintiff’s experts 
concerning a critical causation issue and had gone on to grant summary 
judgment to the defendants.58  However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed after 
concluding that “a particularly stringent standard of review” should apply 
to lower courts’ exclusion of expert testimony, especially when the 
exclusion was outcome-determinative.59  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the standard-of-review issue.60 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 586-87, 588, 594.  Answering expressions of concern by the respondent and 
by certain amici curiae that elimination of the general acceptance test’s controlling effect 
would result in the admission of expert testimony based on “absurd and irrational 
pseudoscientific assertions,” id. at 595, the Court noted that effective cross-examination, the 
presentation of opposing evidence, and appropriate jury instructions on the burden of proof 
would be appropriate ways to attack “shaky but admissible evidence.”  Id. at 596.  
Moreover, the directed verdict or summary judgment options could be further checks in the 
event that opinion testimony admitted under the new standard amounted only to a mere 
scintilla of evidence in support of a party’s position.  Id.  The Court also noted a concern of 
the petitioners and other amici that the screening role envisioned for the trial judge could 
lead to “a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy.” Id.  In response, the Court did not 
deny that opinion testimony based on “insights and innovations” that could prove 
“authentic” over time might sometimes be excluded because they seem at the time to be so 
starkly different from conventional wisdom.  Id. at 597.  However, the Court pointed out the 
flexible nature of the gatekeeping inquiry and expressed confidence in trial judges’ ability to 
discern whether proffered opinion testimony would be scientifically valid and pertinent to 
the case at hand.  See id. at 594-95, 596-97. 
 54. Id. at 594. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 595. 
 57. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 58. Id. at 140.  The plaintiff sought to offer expert testimony that exposure to PCB’s 
had caused or contributed to the development of his lung cancer.  Id. at 139-40. The district 
court rejected this proposed testimony because, in the court’s view, it was based on animal 
studies and epidemiological studies that did not furnish sufficient support for such 
testimony.  Id. at 140, 143-44, 145-46. 
 59. Id. at 140, 141. 
 60. Id. at 138-39, 141. 
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Writing for the Court in Joiner, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by 
noting the familiar rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard controls the 
review of district courts’ rulings on evidentiary matters.61  He recited 
Daubert’s holding that trial courts must play a gatekeeper role in screening 
expert testimony for relevance and reliability62 and observed that nothing in 
Daubert addressed the standard to be employed in the review of district 
courts’ gatekeeping rulings.63  The Court saw no reason to depart from the 
usual abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing rulings on admissibility 
of expert testimony, regardless of whether the testimony was being allowed 
or disallowed and regardless of whether the disallowance of the testimony 
would prove outcome-determinative.64 Accordingly, the Court concluded 
that the Eleventh Circuit erred in calling for a more stringent review.65  The 
Joiner majority did not stop there, however.  It thoroughly reviewed the 
record and concluded that the testimony the plaintiff’s scientific experts 
would have offered on the critical issue of causation was based on studies 
that did not sufficiently support their opinions.66  Hence, there was no 
abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in its decision to exclude 
the testimony of the plaintiff’s scientific experts
Near the end of the majority opinion in Joiner, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the district court’s 
exclusion of the experts’ testimony had been premised more on the court’s 
disagreement with the experts’ conclusions than on a concern about the 
methodology the experts would have employed.68  This argument rested on 
Daubert’s statement that the trial court’s gatekeeping inquiry was to be 
focused “solely on principles and methodology [utilized by the experts], 
not on the conclusions that they generate.”69  The Chief Justice responded 
 61. Id. at 141-42. 
 62. Id. at 142; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-92, 597. 
 63. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142. 
 64. Id. at 142-43.  The Court noted that when a party’s summary judgment motion is 
granted—as it was in favor of the defendants in the trial court—disputed factual issues are 
to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.  Id. at 143.  The Court emphasized, 
however, that “the question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact, 
and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard.”  Id. 
 65. Id.  In applying a stringent standard of review to the trial judge’s exclusion of the 
expert testimony, the Eleventh Circuit “failed to give the trial court the deference that is the 
hallmark of abuse of discretion review.”  Id. 
 66. Id. at 143-46.  Justice Stevens, who had joined with the other eight members of the 
Court in the portion of the decision holding that abuse of discretion was the appropriate 
standard of review, id. at 137, would have remanded the case to the court of appeals for a 
review of the record under the abuse-of discretion standard.  Id. at 150-51 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 67. Id. at 143, 146-47. 
 68. Id. at 146. 
 69. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 
(1997).  
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by observing that 
conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one 
another.  Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing 
data.  But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence 
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert.  A court may conclude that there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.70 
Through this language and the holding that the abuse-of-discretion 
standard controls the review of trial courts’ gate-keeping decisions,71 
Joiner extended district judges greater latitude than Daubert might seem to 
have given them concerning preliminary rulings on expert testimony’s 
relevance and rel
Justice Breyer’s Joiner concurrence offered useful insights on 
procedural techniques for trial judges to employ as they fulfill the 
gatekeeping responsibility identified in Daubert and further elaborated on 
in Joiner.73  Noting the “inherent difficulty of making determinations about 
complicated scientific, or otherwise technical, evidence,”74 Justice Breyer 
commented on the use of pretrial conferences to narrow the disputed issues 
and pretrial hearings in which the court could examine the experts each 
side wished to offer.75  He also suggested the potential usefulness of 
appointing special masters and “specially trained law clerks.”76  Finally, 
Justice Breyer noted that courts might want to opt for appointing experts 
under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or under the courts’ 
inherent authority.77  All of these methods, Justice Breyer observed, should 
 70. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.  Unpersuaded by this statement, Justice Stevens would 
have preserved a “categorical . . . distinction” between methodology and conclusions.  Id. at 
155 (Stevens, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He asserted that “Daubert quite 
clearly forbids trial judges to assess the validity or strength of an expert’s scientific 
conclusions, which is a matter for the jury.”  Id. at 154. 
 71. Id. at 142-43. 
 72. See id. at 146-47; id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 73. Id. at 147-50 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 149. 
 75. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (setting authority to conduct pretrial conferences); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (providing that court may order “a separate trial of one or more 
separate issues”); FED. R. EVID. 104 (stating that “[p]reliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness . . . or the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined by the court). 
 76. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J., concurring).  FED. R. CIV. P. 53 furnishes federal 
courts the authority to appoint special masters. 
 77. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Rule 706 provides that a court 
may appoint an expert on its own motion or on a party’s motion, and that the expert may be 
chosen by the court or pursuant to an agreement between the parties.  See FED. R. EVID. 
706(a). 
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help keep courts’ Daubert-based responsibilities from becoming 
excessively difficult to discharge.78 
Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael,79 the third of the Supreme Court’s expert testimony decisions 
during the 1990s.80  The case presented two primary questions:  first, 
whether the gatekeeping responsibility identified in Daubert applies not 
only to expert evidence of a scientific nature but also to expert testimony 
regarding technical or other specialized matters, and second, if the 
gatekeeping responsibility so applies, whether the factors identified in 
Daubert constitute an exclusive list that trial judges must use in seeking to 
determine the relevance and reliability of the proposed expert testimony.81  
The Court unanimously answered “yes” to the first question82 and “no” to 
the second.83 
Justice Breyer began the analysis in Kumho by noting that Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence furnished the basis for the Daubert holding 
that the trial judge has a gatekeeping obligation to determine the relevance 
and reliability of expert evidence on scientific matters.84  Rule 702 refers to 
an expert’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”85  
Justice Breyer observed that the Daubert majority opinion had spoken in 
terms of expert evidence of a scientific nature only because the expert 
testimony at issue in the case was of that nature.86  The same reasoning 
calling for trial judges to screen scientific expert testimony suggested a 
need for a similar gatekeeping responsibility regarding other types of 
expert testimony.87  Hence, the Court held that trial judges must also 
determine whether proposed expert testimony of a non-scientific nature 
would meet the necessary requirements of relevance a
Next, the Kumho Court turned to the factors listed in Daubert as 
 78. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 79. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 80. Id. at 141. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 141, 147-49. 
 83. Id. at 141-42, 149-53.  In a later portion of the opinion subscribed to by eight 
Justices, the Court reviewed the record and concluded that the district court had properly 
disallowed the testimony of the plaintiff’s technical expert.  Id. at 153-58, 159 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The proffered opinion testimony pertained to 
causation of a tire failure.  Id. at 142-46. 
 84. Id. at 147.; see FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting expert witnesses to testify); Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 589. 
 85. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 86. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 147-48 (1999); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
590 n.8 (stating the discussion was limited to the scientific context because it was the nature 
of the expertise at issue). 
 87. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-49. 
 88. Id. at 149. 
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relevant to the trial judge’s screening role.  Those factors were whether the 
expert’s theory or technique had been tested, whether it had been the 
subject of peer review and publication, whether it was susceptible to a high 
rate of error, whether standards governed the operation of the theory or 
technique, and whether the theory or technique was widely accepted.89  
Stressing that Daubert called the reliability inquiry “flexible,”90 Justice 
Breyer noted in Kumho that some or all of the Daubert factors may be 
helpful when the trial judge assesses expert testimony of a non-scientific 
nature.91  However, not every Daubert factor will be relevant in every case 
and other factors or considerations not specifically listed in Daubert may 
prove to be useful to the judge exercising the gatekeeping duty.92  The 
Daubert list “was meant to be helpful, not definitive.”93 
To bolster the conclusion that the list of factors in Daubert was neither 
mandatory nor exclusive, the Kumho Court pointed to the Joiner holding 
that the abuse-of-discretion standard controls the review of trial judges’ 
gatekeeping decisions regarding expert testimony.94  In Kumho, Justice 
Breyer noted that Joiner’s adoption of the abuse-of-discretion standard 
extended latitude to trial judges when they determine “whether or not [an] 
expert’s relevant testimony is reliable.”95  He reasoned that trial judges 
“must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s 
reliability.”96  The “how” latitude would include not only the freedom to 
employ some or all of the Daubert factors—perhaps in combination with 
other considerations97—but also the discretion to “decide whether or when 
special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability.”98 
Kumho concluded with the Court’s examination of the record and a 
ruling that the district court had correctly disallowed the testimony of the 
plaintiff’s expert, who would have offered the opinion that the tire failure at 
issue in the case resulted from a design or manufacturing defect.99  The 
expert’s proposed methodology was insufficiently reliable because it added 
 89. Id. at 149-50; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94. 
 90. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 91. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150-51. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 151. 
 94. Id. at 152 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39). 
 95. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152; see Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39 (holding that the abuse-of-
discretion review is the appropriate standard to review a trial court’s decision to admit 
expert testimony). 
 96. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. 
 97. Id. at 150-51, 152-53. 
 98. Id. at 152. 
 99. Id. at 153-58.  See id. at 142-46 (describing the testimony given by the expert in 
deposition).  Justice Stevens did not join this portion of the Court’s opinion.  See id. at 159 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from the portion of the 
Court’s opinion disallowing the expert testimony). 
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unsupported components to what might otherwise have seemed a more 
conventional methodology and because it relied on assumptions that 
ignored, or were inconsistent with, facts in the record.100 
Following the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trio of cases, Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence was amended in an attempt to codify key 
components of those decisions.101  After the 2000 amendment, Rule 702 
took its current form, stating:   
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.102 
B. Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Federal Courts, Post-Daubert 
As one source notes, “Daubert gives every appearance of having 
affected the judicial approach to handling expert evidence in federal civil 
cases.”103  Despite arguments that the courts have too frequently admitted 
misleading expert testimony,104 there is little doubt that district courts are 
taking their gatekeeper role seriously in the post-Daubert era.  Although 
judges rarely raise questions of admissibility not disputed by the parties,105 
a 2002 Federal Judicial Center study of post-Daubert cases indicated that 
41% of experts were excluded on motions in limine during 1998, up from 
25% in 1991.106 
The Federal Rules of Evidence require a complete statement of all of 
the opinion,107 and a substantial number of judges indicate the requirement 
to submit expert reports improves the quality of jurisprudence by limiting 
the need for other testimony and discouraging testimony outside of the 
 100. Id. at 154-57. 
 101. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 103. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns 
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 329 
(2002). 
 104. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 380. 
 105. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 321. 
 106. Id. at 322. 
 107. See Bill Zimmerman, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, Conference on Effective 
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, 
Complying with Standards for Expert Work Product (March 20, 2006) (conference materials 
and notes on file with authors); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
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potential witness’ area of expertise.108  The admissibility of damages expert 
reports based upon accepted valuation standards and methodology109 is 
rarely denied absent some disconnect involving assumptions, analysis, or 
fit with the facts of the case,110 and courts have increasingly accepted the 
applications of the financial theory in damages estimation in litigation such 
as shareholder lawsuits.111  In attempting to exclude opposing opinions, 
astute attorneys will cite all known instances involving the type of situation 
represented by the case at hand in order to “give the judge the backbone” 
for exclusion.112 
In keeping with Daubert’s mandate to maintain experts within their 
proper scope lest they mislead juries,113 various courts have struggled with 
key admissibility issues that sometimes lead to inconsistent outcomes.  
These issues include:  a) the experience qualifications necessary for an 
expert to meet the Daubert criteria, b) whether the reliability of expert 
testimony is a question of fact or must be decided by a judge, and c) 
whether the particular valuation methods used by an expert are relevant as 
long as the methods reasonably reflect the value of the capital in 
question.114 
Courts have at times wrestled with the issue of exactly what 
background and experience is necessary for a damages professional to be 
considered an expert in the context of a particular case, but seemingly favor 
some latitude in this regard.115  In Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto 
 108. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 323 (maintaining that reports encourage parties to 
stipulate to facts and issues more often). 
 109. For a discussion recognizing that the labels “methods” and “methodology” can be 
confusing, mean different things to different people, and lack standards for their practical 
application to context in the realm of valuation, see D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert:  
Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit In Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1933, 1978 (2001).  With respect to estimating damages, we define “methods” as general 
approaches, such as the income method (which, for example, attempts to determine what the 
income of a business would have been but for a breach of contract), which can be 
distinguished from a discounted cash flow “methodology” (one technique by which the 
income method can be implemented). 
 110. Thomas J. Wiegand, Winston & Strawn LLP, Conference on Effective 
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, 
Challenges to Expert Testimony (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file 
with authors). 
 111. Jon Koslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule 
10B-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811, 811 (1991). 
 112. Wiegand, supra note 110. 
 113. See DePaepe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 1998) (vacating and 
remanding a case in which an expert was deemed qualified by the trial court but unqualified 
by the appellate court). 
 114. See generally John J. Stockdale, Jr.'s excellent series of business valuation case 
summaries entitled Business Valuation Cases in Brief, published monthly in BUSINESS 
VALUATION REVIEW. 
 115. A similar issue to that of industry experience is whether prior testimony on a given 
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Co., the court affirmed the use of a business damages expert who admitted 
that he was not an expert in all the fields of study upon which he relied in 
preparing his testimony.116  In Supply & Building Co. v. Estee Lauder 
International, Inc., a case involving sole distributorship rights in Kuwait, 
the court approved a CPA as an expert despite his lack of experience in 
law, sociology, cultural anthropology, demographics, international affairs, 
and knowledge of the region.117  While excluding the testimony of a 
technical expert on other grounds, the appellate court in DaPaepe v. 
General Motors Corp. noted that “[t]he question is not whether the expert 
has hands-on experience but whether his testimony meets scientific 
standards.”118  In Dekker v. Topcon American Corp., the court rejected 
arguments that a damages expert was unqualified due to the lack of a CPA 
designation, an accounting degree, and industry experience, because the 
expert held a valuation certification and had been admitted as an expert by 
lower courts.119  The court in Physicians Dialysis Ventures, Inc. v. Griffith 
deemed a business valuation expert competent to testify even though the 
case was her first involvement with dialysis centers.120  In James Medical 
Equipment, Inc. v. Allen, the court allowed the testimony of an expert who 
had never previously testified.121 
Conversely, in In Re Med Diversified, Inc., the court noted that an 
accountant’s 20 years of experience in his profession and as a bankruptcy 
trustee were insufficient to qualify him as a damages expert in light of his 
issue is required for one to qualify as an expert.  In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, the court, 
in excluding his testimony for a variety of reasons, noted that a valuation expert had not 
previously provided testimony with respect to valuing a company in the brewery business.  
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (1996).  Application of such a stringent experience criterion would 
beg the obvious question of how an expert obtains the required testimony experience the 
first time.  One can only assume that any court insisting upon a prior-testimony-on-case-
point requirement must presume that some other court with laxer admissibility criteria ruled 
in error.  This, in turn, begs the logical follow-on question of why a prior court's mistake 
would qualify an expert in the first place. 
 116. 684 F.2d 1226, 1241 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 117. 95 Civ. 8136 (RCC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20737, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. December 
13, 2001). 
 118. 141 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1998).  The court also stated  that “a judge does not 
automatically abuse his discretion in concluding that an expert can offer useful information 
without having dealt previously with the product at issue in the case," id.(citing Cummins v. 
Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996)), and that “practical experience is not 
essential to expert testimony and sometimes gets in the way of scientific detachment" (citing 
Minasian v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, 109 F.3d 1212, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 119. Dekker v. Topcon Am. Corp., No. G027150, 2002 WL 1046005, at *4-5 (Cal.App.4 
Dist. May 24, 2002). 
 120. No. 06-2468(MLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78879, at *19-27 (D.N.J. October 23, 
2007). 
 121. James Med. Equip., Inc. v. Allen, Nos. 2005-CA-000128-MR, 2005-CA-000272-
MR, 2006 WL 2788435, at *8-9 (Ky. App. Sep. 29, 2006). 
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lack of formal education and credentials in business valuation.122  
Similarly, in In re Imperial Credit Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation, the 
court held that a report by an accountant who was not well-versed in stock 
price reaction studies was inadmissible.123  In Rosvold v. LSM Systems 
Engineering, Inc., the court rejected an expert as lacking in business 
valuation credentials despite a graduate degree from a prestigious school 
and prior experience in acquiring businesses, in part because he did not 
belong to any organizations issuing business valuation credentials.124  An 
expert was excluded in M.S. Distributing Co. v. Web Records, Inc. because 
the court determined that experience in rock-and-roll music was 
insufficient to qualify him as an expert in other types of music.125 
Another admissibility issue addressed by courts is whether the 
reliability of expert testimony is a question of law or fact.  Numerous cases 
exist where courts have excluded testimony for reasons of unreliability.  
For example, the appellate court in Children’s Broadcasting Corp. v. The 
Walt Disney Co. reversed the district court’s exclusion of a damages 
expert’s testimony and stated that “[t]he jury was entitled to sort through 
the evidence presented at trial and to arrive at what it considered to be the 
damages . . . .”126  In Gross v. Commissioner, the tax court found that the 
question was not of appropriate methodology but rather whether it had been 
appropriately applied:  “‘The choice of the appropriate valuation 
methodology for a particular stock is, in itself, a question of fact.’”127 
In Popham v. Popham, the court held that the choice of valuation 
method went to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.128  
Similarly, in Downeast Ventures, Ltd. v. Washington County, deciding a 
Rule 702 issue, the court found that the reliability of a damages expert’s 
income projections again went to weight, not admissibility.129  Conversely, 
 122. Chartwell Litig. Trust v. Addus Healthcare, Inc. (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 334 
B.R. 89, 96-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 123. In re Imperial Credit Indus. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). 
 124. Rosvold v. LSM Systems Engineering, Inc., 2007 WL 3275107, at *3 (E.D. Mich., 
Nov. 6, 2007). 
 125. M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8078, at *31 (N.D. 
Ill. May 12, 2003). 
 126. Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1017 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 127. Gross v. Comm’r, 272 F.3d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Estate of Newhouse, 
94 T.C. at 245).  Other cases cited on point were O’Malley v. Ames, 97 F.2d 256, 258 (8th 
Cir. 1952) and Riss v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 388, 430 (1971), aff’d sub nom.  Comm’r v. Transp. 
Mfrs. & Equip. Co., 478 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 128. Popham v. Popham, 607 S.E.2d. 575, 576 (Ga. 2005). 
 129. Downeast Ventures, Ltd. V. Washington County, No. 05-87-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14733, at *4-*7 (D. Me. March 1, 2007); see also Clement v. Clement, No. W2003-
02388-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3396472, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2004) (holding 
that the fact that an expert gave a “limited” opinion of value was a matter of weight, not 
admissibility). 
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in DOT v. Rogers, the appellate court declared the admission of business 
damages reversible error as a matter of law because of state law restrictions 
on business damages in eminent domain cases.130  In Mathew Headley 
Holdings, LLC v. McCleary, Inc., the court excluded an economic expert’s 
testimony for lack of adequate foundation.131  The appellate court in Jarrell 
v. Miller ruled expert testimony inadmissible because of errors, with one 
judge dissenting and arguing that the errors went to weight, not 
admissibility.132 
A third related issue with which the courts have seemingly struggled is 
the issue of how seriously flawed damages expert testimony can be and still 
be admitted.133  Although courts do not require that damages be proven 
with absolute precision,134  testimony not supported by evidence in the 
record should be excluded.135  Testimony that constitutes mere personal 
belief is said “to invade the province of the fact finder,”136 and courts do 
not allow damages experts to substitute principles and methods in order to 
fill an evidentiary vacuum.137  In Lippe, et al. v. Bairnco Corporation, et 
al., the appellate court decided that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding expert damages testimony concerning which it 
found no less than eighteen serious flaws.138  The court in Audobon 
Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. refused to strike 
an expert’s report it found seriously flawed and not in compliance with 
 130. DOT v. Rogers, 705 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 131. Matthew Headley Holdings, LLC v. McCleary, Inc., No. 02-0654-CV-W-FJG,  
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78017 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2007). 
 132. Jarrell v. Miller, 882 So. 2d 639 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 133. A related issue is whether the particular valuation methods used by an expert are 
relevant as long as the methods reasonably reflect the value of the capital in question.  As 
with several other questions arising in valuation testimony, courts are not always entirely 
consistent in answering this question.  Compare Hamby v. Hamby, 547 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2001) (court criticized valuation expert for failure to apply certain methods) with 
McCarthy v. McCarthy, C3-00-1650, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 679 (June 19, 2001) 
(reasoning that valuation methods are not relevant so long as method reasonably reflects 
value of assets in question). 
 134. See, e.g., Colorado ex rel. Woodard v. Goodell Bros., Inc., No. 84-A-803, 1987 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14549 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 1987); Law v. NCAA, 185 F.R.D. 324 (D. Kan. 
1998); Busy Bee, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 97 CV 5078, 2006 LEXIS 238 (Pa. D. 
& C.Feb. 28, 2006). 
 135. Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 136. Chemipal LTD v. Slim-Fast Nutritional Foods Int’l, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. 
Del. 2004) (citing McGowan v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 863 F.2d. 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987)) 
(excluding court testimony of valuation expert for failure to meet Daubert requirement that 
expert's conclusions be based upon reliable scientific knowledge). 
 137. See, e.g., Downeast Ventures LTD v. Washington County, No. 05-87-B-W, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14733, 10 (D. Me. Mar. 1, 2007).  There, the judge stated, “I am not 
simply concerned that that the evidence is weak.  I am concerned that there is not sufficient 
data upon which to base a projection.” Id. 
 138. Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 99 Fed. Appx. 274 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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FRCP 26(a)(2) due in part to the absence of an opinion, but imposed 
sanctions in requiring the production of the appropriate report content in 
order for the report to be admissible.139  In Chartwell Litigation Trust v. 
Addus Healthcare, Inc., the court expressed concern over a number of 
perceived flaws in the damages expert’s report, including:  the lack of 
reasonable convergence among the various methods used by a damages 
expert to value damages, the literature cited in the report, the exclusion of 
nonrecurring events from some but not all of the analysis, the absence of 
support for weighting one valuation method more heavily than others, and 
the need for mor
In certain types of cases, courts have come to expect particular 
methodologies, as is the case with securities litigation wherein statistical 
events studies are the norm, and have excluded evidence in the absence of 
these methodologies.141  These court-imposed standards of reliability 
notwithstanding, some courts have demonstrated a willingness to accept 
damages testimony that might normally be considered substandard when 
circumstances beyond the control of the expert prevented the use of optimal 
methodology.142 
Despite the courts’ having wrestled with the foregoing matters of 
admissibility, among others, considerable confusion remains about 
implementing the Supreme Court’s trilogy and about further questions said 
to outnumber those answered.143  In order to place this confusion in its 
proper context, it is helpful to know something about the growing market 
for damages experts as well as their backgrounds and concerns.  The 
following part discusses the demand for damages experts, their 
qualifications, and the risks they face. 
III. DAMAGES EXPERTS 
Experts usually fall into two general categories—industry/technical 
and damages—and it has become increasingly important for attorneys to 
 139. Audobon Veterinary Hosp., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co., No. 06-5875, 2007 
WL 1853369 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 140. Chartwell Litig. Trust v. Addus Healthcare, Inc. (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 334 
B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 141. See, e.g., In re Executive Telecard Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997).  Also, in securities fraud cases, damages experts are generally expected to be able to 
distinguish between fraud-related stock price changes and change unrelated to the fraud.  
See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 142. See, e.g., RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5587, 2000 
U.S. Dist LEXIS 3742 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000) (allowing a valuation expert's testimony to 
be admitted despite her failure to use the accepted events methodology due to a lack of a 
control period, when she instead chose an acceptable but less compelling alternative 
methodology). 
 143. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 3. 
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pair damages experts with technical experts in a way that presents case 
themes effectively.144  The choice of a damages expert is a nontrivial matter 
because expert testimony presents an excellent opportunity to bring home 
case themes and can make or break a case.145  Further, an expert’s summary 
can be a useful conduit for introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence.146  
Survey research conducted by the Federal Judicial Center indicates that 
21.4% of all experts providing expert testimony in federal circuit civil trials 
in 1998 were accountants, economists, and other financial experts.147  
Further, experts can function as either testifying experts or consulting 
experts, the purpose of the latter being to advise attorneys on case 
development rather than to provide independent damages estimates.148  
Although the use of consulting experts in addition to testifying experts may 
enhance the quality of a client’s case, it obviously also raises the client’s 
cost of litigation.  Although there is little evidence on how often attorneys 
use consulting experts, approximately one-third of attorneys responding to 
a survey regarding federal circuit cases in 1998 reported using consulting 
experts.149 
A. A Growing Market for Damages Testimony 
In what has been termed a boom of financial expert testimony,150 the 
demand for expert testimony is growing rapidly.151  A 2002 Federal 
 144. Steven G. Jones, Marten Law Group, Conference on Effective Development & 
Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Is an 
“Independent” Expert Necessary? (Mar. 20, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file 
with authors); see also Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 12 (stating that a financial expert can 
be the difference between winning and losing a case). 
 145. Jones, supra note 144. 
 146. Honorable Marvin E. Aspen, C.J., U.S. Dist. Ct. No. Dist. Ill., Conference on 
Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for 
Success, Special Address:  A View from the Bench on Do’s and Don’ts from Expert 
Witnesses (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with authors). 
 147. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 12. 
 148. See, e.g., Peter B. Frank, et al., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation 
Services, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK (Roman L. Weil et al. eds. 4th ed. 2007), at 
1.18; Bill Schuurman & Nicole Stafford, The Art of Using Experts, MANAGING INTELL. 
PROP., May 2002, at 17. Consulting experts who do not testify receive special protection 
from discovery under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(4)(B), which is designed to prohibit a party 
from using its opponents' own experts to prepare its own case. 
 149. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 3, 18. 
 150. See Michael J. Mandel, Going for the Gold:  Economists as Expert Witnesses, 13 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 2, 113 (Spring 1999) (noting that the past several years have seen 
explosive growth in litigation support consulting and estimating a 60% growth over a three-
year period in revenues for three large litigation support firms). 
 151. One survey showed that for federal civil trials involving experts, the number of 
experts testifying rose from 1.85 to 2.47 during the period 1991-1998.  Krafka et al., supra 
note 103, at 11. 
  
2009] BUSINESS DAMAGES EXPERT TESTIMONY 317 
 reasons.158 
 
 
Judicial Center study indicated that of 299 trials in 1998, 45% were tort 
actions involving experts, and 98% of plaintiffs were likely to use 
experts.152  This burgeoning demand is due to a large extent to court 
decisions suggesting that expert testimony is highly desirable in cases 
involving business damages.  For example, the absence of expert testimony 
has resulted in courts refusing to accept damage estimates, as is apparent in 
divorce cases.  In Kelly v. Kelly, neither party presented damages expert 
testimony.  The appellate court determined that both parties’ opinion 
testimony was insufficient to support the lower court’s valuation regarding 
a business and remanded the case for appointment of a damages expert.153  
In Camp v. Camp, the court refused to consider tax consequences 
emanating from a court-ordered buyout of a business because the husband 
had presented no expert testimony calculating such tax ramifications.154  
The appellate court in Markowitz v. Markowitz affirmed the lower court’s 
rejection of the husband’s no-evidence argument and acceptance of a 
valuation supported by expert business damages testimony.155  In Schwartz 
v. Schwartz, the court affirmed the assignment of no value to a business and 
noted that neither party had proffered expert testimony.156  In Zeptner v. 
Zeptner, the appellate court reversed the lower court award against the 
husband and ruled that the wife had not presented evidence of an increase 
in value in a business she alleged existed.157  A similar result was obtained 
in Franks v. Franks for similar
The court-driven need for experts is not restricted to divorce cases, 
however.  For example, the court in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj 
International Inv. Corp., affirmed a lower court award that it found vastly 
in excess of the company’s historical profits because of a failure of one of 
the parties to provide rebuttal expert testimony.159  The court in Unger v. 
Amedisys, Inc. suggested the use of expert testimony in a stock price 
reaction situation.160  In Faris v. Stone, an attorney was found negligent for 
not advising his client of her right to have a business valued by a competent 
 152. Zimmerman, supra note 107. 
 153. Kelly v. Kelly, No. 19263, 2003 WL 264342 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2003). 
 154. Camp v. Camp, No. A-02-832, 2003 Neb. App. LEXIS 320 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 
2003). 
 155. Markowitz v. Markowitz, No. 14-00-01505-CV,  2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 3318 
(Tex. App. Apr. 17, 2003). 
 156. Schwartz v. Schwartz, No. 231266, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Mar. 20, 2003). 
 157. Zeptner v. Zeptner, No. 2-01-254-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2388 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Mar. 20, 2003). 
 158. Franks v. Franks, 571 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) 
 159. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj Int’l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 
2003). 
 160. Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005) 
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business appraiser.161  In Tinnell v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held 
a taxpayer liable for accuracy-related penalties following his failure to use 
expert testimony,162 and the court in Snavely v. Smith noted that the 
plaintiff did not present valuation expert testim
The demand for expert testimony has grown historically even in the 
face of complaints about abuses, and no one has seriously suggested its 
elimination.164  At the same time, this demand is helping to drive what one 
commentator has termed “an explosion of new entrants to the field.”165  
The damages expert market is splitting into commodity and differentiated 
segments, in part because of the economics of the provision of expert 
testimony and in part because the costs of a less than cutting-edge expert 
can be high in terms of case outcomes.166  It is not unusual for a damages 
expert to cost $50,000 to $100,000 for producing a valuation report and 
providing several days of testimony in deposition and trial.167  Moreover, 
expert fees are rarely, if ever, handled on a contingency basis because of 
prohibitions by the American Bar Association and many state bar 
associations, as well as the obvious implications for bias.168  In return for 
their fees, however, experts face professional risks that are increasing in the 
 161. Faris v. Stone, 103 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2003). 
 162. Tinnell v. CIR, T.C.M. 2001-106. 
 163. Snavely v. Smith, No. A097912, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 12085 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 23, 2003). 
 164. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts:  An Intellectual 
History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 784 (2007). 
 165. 2007:  A Year of Simplifying, Standardizing—and More Fair Value Statements, 
BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC, Portland, OR), Jan. 2008, at 6 
(quoting business valuation expert Nancy Fannon). 
 166. Interview with Ronald Seigneur, Partner and Valuation Specialist with Seigneur 
Gustafson Knight, LLP, in Denver, Colo. (March 13, 2008) (notes on file with authors).  Mr. 
Seigneur, who holds CPA, ABV, and CVA certifications, has over 25 years experience as an 
expert witness and has published more than 75 articles on related topics.  He is past 
chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Credential Committee 
and a past member of its Consulting Services Executive Committee.  Mr. Seigneur currently 
serves as a member of its Business Valuation Education Task Force.  He is a fellow of the 
College of Law Practice Management and an adjunct professor at the University Denver 
College of Law.  With respect to the potential cost of questionable expert testimony, see 
Brown v. Ruallam Enterprises, Inc., CA01-1423, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 477 (Ark. Ct. App. 
Sept. 4, 2002), in which the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s rejection of 
both parties’ experts for failure to calculate net profits. 
 167. Vern Krishna, The Risk Of ‘Hired Gun’ Experts:  The Existing System Must Be 
Improved, NAT’L POST’S FIN. POST & FP INVESTING (CAN.), Feb. 1, 2006, at FP9. 
 168. Peter B. Frank, et al., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation Services, in  
LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK 1.23  (Roman L. Weil ed., 2007) (noting that contingency 
fees should be avoided by testifying experts even in jurisdictions that permit such fees 
because of the appearance of bias).  Also, a former damages expert recently pleaded guilty 
to perjury for testifying that his fees were not based on case outcomes.  Amanda Bronstad, 
Former Milberg Weiss Expert Witness Agrees to Plead Guilty to Perjury, LAW.COM, Feb. 
29, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1204287427247. 
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post-Daubert era, as related later in this part. 
B. Who are the Business Damages Experts? 
As a foundation for better understanding the risks borne by damages 
experts, it is helpful to understand who the experts are and the 
qualifications they typically bring to litigation.  One source notes that the 
ideal expert is someone who has never previously testified (to rule out 
conflicting past testimony) and has no relationship with the retaining 
attorneys (to avoid the appearance of bias), but who nonetheless possesses 
substantial experience in litigation analysis, testimony, and response to 
cross-examination—an obvious non sequitur.169  Increasingly, experts are 
professional “‘hired guns’ who have a reasonably high level of expertise in 
a substantive area or a particular type of business.”170  Testifying experts 
must be deemed qualified by the courts, a matter of increasing concern in 
the post-Daubert era.171  After Daubert, as challenges to experts have 
increased,172 taking a risk on an inexperienced expert—or relying on an 
improperly prepared report by an inexperienced expert—seems imprudent 
to many attorneys because of the danger of not surviving a Daubert 
hearing.173  Perhaps the most important considerations for selecting a 
damages expert from an attorney’s perspective are as follows:  Will the 
expert’s testimony assist the judge and jury?  Is the expert qualified to 
provide the required type of damages testimony in light of the facts of the 
case?  Will the expert appear objective and credible?  Is the testimony 
relevant and reliable?  Does the expert have good communication skills, 
since it is often the case that the best story teller wins?174 
 169. See Frank, supra note 148, at 1.4. 
 170. Bart A. Lazar, Watch Words Around Potential Witnesses, AM. MKTG. NEWS, Jul. 15, 
2005, at 6. 
 171. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3 (showing evidence of growth in the 
number of Daubert hearings); see also In re the Marriage of Buruga, No. G034472, 2005 
WL 2224967 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2005) (noting that valuation experts are expected to 
testify and that their reports may be excluded if they do not testify); Phase 2 Developers 
Corp. v. Citicorp Real Estate, No. B160111, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 117 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jan. 8, 2004) (stating that valuation expert testimony must involve meaningful 
responses as to the basis for the expert’s valuation). 
 172. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3. 
 173. It should be noted that Daubert challenges are not without their risk to attorneys 
who bring them because Daubert motions give cross-examination strategies away in a 
manner similar to the way in which many attorneys show their hand in depositions.  In this 
regard, the conventional wisdom of "save it for the cross" is often observed in the breach.  
Harry Susman, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  
Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Preparing a Cross Examination (March 21, 2006) 
(conference materials and notes on file with authors). 
 174. Craig T. Elson, LECG, LLC, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation 
of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, The Role of the Expert:  What 
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Some attorneys maintain that an ability to teach jurors without 
appearing condescending is more important than credentials.175  Juries are 
said to relate better to credible experts who are good teachers and simplify 
complex topics,176 and judges are said to be weary of boring and biased 
experts.177  Consequently, some judges and attorneys prefer academics as 
experts, feeling that academics appear to have greater credibility and an 
ability to relate complex subject matter clearly.178  In addition, damages 
experts who have performed independent research that corresponds to their 
opinions in cases are perceived as more believable than experts the juries 
perceive as hired guns.179  There is far from universal agreement, however, 
on using academics as damages experts.  One concern is whether 
professors have the time and staff support to dedicate to cases to properly 
prepare reports and testimony.180  Also, using inexperienced academic 
damages experts can be risky because of unknown attitudes toward a 
variety of matters.181  Professors have sometimes been known to argue with 
themselves,182 an unfortunate tendency given that wavering on an opinion 
Does an Expert Bring to the Table (March 20, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file 
with authors); see also Susman, supra note 173 (proposing that 90% of testifying is how an 
expert says something as opposed to what is said); Leslie A. Gordon, Technology, 
Translated, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2006, at 24 (stating that twenty years ago lawyers would settle 
for an expert who knew the subject matter, but today they need an expect who can connect 
with the jury); James G. Atkins, Effective Courtroom Testimony, NAT’L. LITIG. 
CONSULTANTS' REV., Oct. 2006, at 11 (discussing the mechanics of effective communication 
in courtroom testimony by valuation experts). 
 175. Bill Ibelle, Commentary:  Credentials Not As Important As Expert’s Ability To 
Teach, LAW. WKLY. U.S.A., May 9, 2005. 
 176. Jones, supra note 144. 
 177. Daniel J. Furniss, Townsend and Townsend and Crew LLP, Dave E. Everson, Jr., 
Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, and Harry P. Susman, Susman Godfrey LLP, Conference on 
Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for 
Success, Before and at Trial (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with 
authors). 
 178. Margaret M. Duncan, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Conference on Effective 
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, 
What Kind, and How Much, Expertise is Required? (March 20, 2006) (conference materials 
and notes on file with authors). 
 179. Jones, supra note 144; see Theodore T. Herhold, Townsend and Townsend and 
Crew LLP, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  
Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Effective Development & Presentation of Expert 
Testimony (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with authors) (stating 
that professors are also sometimes preferred as technical experts by plaintiffs' attorneys, 
because they are not subject to countersuit inasmuch as they have no affiliation with 
companies whose products that compete with the defendant's products). 
 180. Duncan, supra note 178. 
 181. Jones, supra note 144. 
 182. Mandel, supra note 150 (noting the natural tension between the academic mindset 
that "one should always be open to the possibility that someone else has a better argument" 
and a legal environment that encourages experts to stick with positions even if they might 
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is usually a fatal flaw to expert testimony.183  Professors without practical 
business experience may appear too theoretical to juries,184 and some legal 
commentators believe that juries are less impressed than attorneys with 
professors.185  Consequently, although the notion of the academic damages 
expert appeals to some attorneys and judges because of a perception that 
such experts are less biased,186 selection of such an expert is not without its 
added risks.  Some commentators believe that a balance of academic 
background and real-world experience is desirable.187 Certain valuation 
firms offer the best of both worlds—providing highly qualified academics 
who have testimony experience supported by substantial firm resources to 
include purely professional experts, capable staff, and tight quality-control 
policy and procedures.188 
Well-qualified professional damages experts typically have a variety 
of credentials that include some or all of the following:  1) advanced 
degrees in business or economics; 2) professional licenses and 
certifications such as bar membership and certified public accountancy 
(CPA); 3) valuation designations such as ABV, ASA, and CVA;189 4) 
relevant real-world experience; 5) a knowledge of econometrics and 
statistics; 6) a knowledge of sampling techniques; 6) specialized course 
work in business valuation; 7) experience in financial analysis, financial 
forecasting, and applications of business valuation methods; and 8) relevant 
publications in leading academic and practice journals.190  Sometimes, 
given the need for specialized expertise to support defensible valuations, 
more than one expert may be needed.  This occurs often when a 
specialized, technical set of procedures such as statistical analysis is needed 
as support for the more usual valuation methodology.191  In such situations, 
attorneys may be faced with a tradeoff between a relatively inexperienced 
expert with excellent technical skills versus an experienced expert with 
excellent general valuation skills, and occasionally may choose the more 
otherwise change them given fresh evidence). 
 183. Jones, supra note 144. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Elson, supra note 174. 
 186. Aspen, supra note 146. 
 187. Elson, supra note 174. 
 188. Examples include Clifton Gundersen, LLP and The Analysis Group. 
 189. See JAMES R. HITCHNER, FINANCIAL VALUATION:  APPLICATION AND MODELS 551-63 
(2d ed. 2006) (discussing valuation designations and organizations granting these 
designations). 
 190. Id. at 359-60, 559-61; Robert E. Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide on 
Estimation of Economic Losses in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 277, 282-283 (2d. ed. 2000). 
 191. Mohan Rao, LECG, LLC, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of 
Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, What Experts Should Fear Most 
(March 20, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with authors). 
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experienced expert to the detriment of their case because opposing counsel 
will attempt to exploit any weakness in the experienced expert’s technical 
knowledge.192 
C. Attorney/Expert Communication and Expansive Discovery 
Effective communication between attorneys and experts is essential in 
litigation, as evidenced in this statement:  “For good economics and other 
reasons, the analyst needs to communicate proactively, clearly, and often 
with the attorney on many aspects of the engagement.”193  From an ethical 
perspective, attorneys may do the following in communicating with 
experts: 
• Ask the expert to reconsider an opinion in light of additional 
information; 
• Suggest ways in which the expert’s opinion may be 
strengthened or supported; 
• Ask direct questions to ensure that the expert’s opinion is 
well-founded; 
• Assist the expert in preparing for deposition or trial by 
advising on likely questions; and 
• Advise the expert when testimony  is confusing.194 
 
On the other hand, attorneys should avoid pressuring experts and not 
attempt to pressure the expert to extend an opinion, exaggerate credentials, 
or provide opinions outside of the expert’s expertise.195 
Despite the need for experts to know where attorneys are proceeding 
with various lines of questioning,196 independent experts may not invoke 
 192. Id.; see also Seigneur, supra note 166 (proposing that it is best to use a separate 
technical expert's report as an input to the experienced valuation expert's report, and then to 
firewall the two experts so that the potential for opposing counsel to elicit conflicting 
testimony from the two experts decreases greatly). 
 193. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1027. 
 194. Dean B. Brown, Beermann Swerdlove LLP, and Stephen G. Pawlow, Managing 
Director Litigation Support/Corporate Finance, RSM McGladrey, Inc., Conference on 
Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for 
Success, Ethical Issues for Lawyers and Experts (March 21, 2006) (conference materials 
and notes on file with authors). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Jones, supra note 144.  At times opposing experts attend each other’s depositions.  
Although a joint decision may allow this to occur, the decision should take place with 
proper notice.  See, e.g., Ledden v. Kuzma, 858 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. App. 2006).  Another issue 
that can arise is whether to have staggered or simultaneous expert report submission.  Some 
argue that staggered reports produce smaller differences in damages estimates, whereas 
others argue that simultaneous submission is more equitable.  See, e.g., Lane v. Cancer 
Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., No. 12207-NC, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 
2001). 
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attorney/client privilege,197 and anything an attorney says to an expert is 
potentially discoverable.198  Savvy experts should assume that all 
communication with attorneys is discoverable.199  Consequently, for 
reasons of both the appearance of bias and potential discovery, it is risky, 
but nonetheless useful, for damages experts to be party to strategizing 
about trial themes.200 
Although experts’ legal obligation to preserve evidence has long been 
established,201 some recent cases suggest that discovery of damages experts 
is becoming more and more expansive and that evidence spoliation202 is 
being more carefully scrutinized by courts,203 with sanctions sometimes 
being imposed.204  Under the doctrine of omnia praesumuntur contra 
spoliatorem, deliberate or negligent destruction usually results in the 
inference that the destroyed materials would be contrary to the interests of 
the despoiler.205  An adverse inference is the least drastic and most 
 197. Jones, supra note 144. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Brown & Pawlow, supra note 194. 
 200. Jones, supra note 144.  It is also incumbent upon experts to safeguard client 
confidences and to refrain from using confidential information for purposes of self-
enrichment. Further, most jurisdictions prohibit attorneys from contacting opposing experts 
outside the formal discovery process.  See Brown & Pawlow, supra note 194 (giving an 
example in which an attorney engaged in misconduct by contacting an opposing party's 
witness ex parte) (citing Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1996)); Campbell 
Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that ex parte contact with 
opposing party's expert in not permitted under federal rules); Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc. 404 
S.E.2d 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that attorneys cannot circumvent discovery 
procedures by engaging in ex parte communications with opposing party's expert); 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §3.4 (2d ed. Supp. 
1994).  But see Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993) (holding that the trial court did 
not err in failing to sanction improper ex parte contact because there was no prejudice to the 
complaining party). 
 201. Robert W. Hayes, Cozen O’Connor, Conference on Effective Development & 
Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Implementing 
Appropriate Document Control and Retention Policies (March 20, 2006) (conference 
materials and notes on file with authors). 
 202. Id. at 1 (“Spoliation is the destruction, loss, or material alteration of potentially 
relevant evidence by the act or omission of a party who was under some duty to preserve 
that evidence.”) 
 203. See, e.g., West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d. 776, 778-80 (2d. Cir. 
1999) (analyzing the lower court’s dismissal of a complaint as a sanction for spoliation of 
evidence); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Townsend, No. 3:04-CV-291, 2007 WL 1002317 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 30, 2007) (striking expert testimony even though spoliation was not done maliciously 
and was done before reports were contested); Trigon Ins. Co. v. U.S., 204 F.R.D. 277, 284 
(E.D. Va. 2001) (discussing punishments for spoliators of evidence). 
 204. Hayes, supra note 201, at 1-2 (noting that sanctions have varied widely across 
jurisdictions) (citing Kippenham v. Chaulk Services, Inc., 697 N.E.2d. 527, 530 (Mass. 
1998) and Donohue v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 515, 519 (M.D. Pa. 1994)). 
 205. Dodson v. Ford Motor Co., No. PC 96-1331, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 113 (noting 
that a demonstration of bad faith is not necessary for an adverse inference due to spoliation) 
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common sanction.206  Others include exclusion of evidence, monetary 
sanctions, and contempt sanctions.207  Courts typically impose more drastic 
sanctions where spoliation is more culpable and where it has a greater 
impact on the adverse party’s ability to prove its case.208  For example, 
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. created 
significant concern in legal and financial circles, not only because of the 
$1.45 billion damages award but also because the jury was permitted to 
draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s destruction of a large
idence.209 
In the late 1980s, some courts began to expand the reach of spoliation 
to include evidence “considered” instead of just evidence “relied upon.”210  
Further, courts have interpreted Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to include drafts of expert reports,211 raising the question of what 
exactly constitutes a draft.  For example, will a court consider a partial draft 
to be a draft?  Must an expert produce a copy of every partial draft to 
include all changes?  There is some belief that copying over something 
typed into a partial draft during editing could be considered spoliation.212  
Questions such as these suggest the need for courts to take a commonsense 
approach in requiring disclosure of documents.  Some experts would prefer 
that only docum
verable.213 
Fortunately, not all courts have required experts to produce everything 
that might represent internal work product.214  For example, in Physicians 
Dialysis Ventures, Inc. v. Griffith, an expert faced with accusations of 
spoliation admitted to destroying notes she had taken throughout an 
engagement, in accordance with her firm’s policy.  The court determined 
(citing Mead v. Papa Razzi Rest., 840 A.2d. 1103, 1109 (R.I. 2004)); Malinowski v. UPS, 
792 A.2d. 50, 54 (R.I. 2002) (citations omitted); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v. E. 
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 674 A.2d 1227, 1234 (R.I. 1996)); see Farrell v. Connetti Trailer 
Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I. 1999). 
 206. Hayes, supra note 201, at 3. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Reversal of Fortune:  $1.45 Billion Verdict Vacated for Lack of Fraud-Free 
Valuation, BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC, Portland, OR), Jun. 
28, 2007, at 14 (citing Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 955 
So.2d 1124 (Fla. App. 2007)). 
 210. Hayes, supra note 201, at 7 (citing Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 
284 (E.D. Va. 2001), and Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 393-94 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 17. 
 213. See Seigneur, supra note 166 (noting one leading expert’s suggestion that a 
commonsense approach would be to make only documents that are transmitted “outside the 
house” discoverable). 
 214. Hayes, supra note 201, at 17. 
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that spoliation had not taken place because the expert had no reason to 
believe that she would be obligated to produce her notes.  She had never 
received a formal document request or any notice that opposing counsel 
wanted the notes until after she submitted her report.  The court stated that 
experts need not produce every scrap of paper created in the course of an 
engagement, but rather what the expert was provided.215  Nonetheless, 
because of a lack of uniformity in decisions, this movement toward tighter 
application of the requirements creates an imperative for parties to know 
the document retention policies of the court early in case development and 
engenders concern that a court might require the production of 
ports and mere thoughts expressed on scraps of papers.216 
Although this trend may hold some nebulous benefit from an 
evidentiary perspective, it also has the potential to impede attorney/expert 
communications and reduce the quality of the evidence presented at trial.217  
Attorneys and experts are now admonished to avoid any unnecessary 
paperwork or electronic communication, and attorneys are well-advised not 
to show a consulting expert’s work to a testifying expert.218  Consequently, 
less and less is being written down by damages experts in the development 
of their reports, and, given the complexity of cases and the limitations on 
human cognition,219 this makes accurate report-writing more difficult.220  
Carried too far, this trend seems likely to result in a burdensome 
impediment to attorney/expert communications in ways that will not serve 
case preparation well,221 and could even lead to increased risk of 
malpractice liability for experts.222  One leading damages expert, noting 
that the biggest change in the damages expert area is the proliferation of 
documents in electronic format, foresees growing document authenticity 
issues with which the moral and ethical standards have yet to catch up.  
This expert also foresees a conflict involving discovery of opposing 
 215. Physicians Dialysis Ventures, Inc. v. Griffith, No. 06-2468, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
78879 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2007). 
 216. Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Aspen, supra note 146. 
 219. See, e.g., George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two:  Some 
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 81 (1956) 
(describing limitations on human cognitive behavior). 
 220. Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 221. Id.  The interviewee noted that experts now are being admonished by attorneys not 
to take notes in meetings for fear of discovery.  This raises the question of how experts can 
remember what is said and creates obvious negative implications for the quality of their 
reports. 
 222. See, e.g., Kranz v. Tiger, 914 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding 
that it was for the jury to determine whether expert witness breached contract to testify in 
underlying action or whether expert witness negligently or intentionally permitted his 
scheduling manager to lead client to believe he was unavailable to testify). 
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D. Damages Experts Increasingly at Risk 
of ris
-stakes undertaking on virtually any field 
and 2006-–the second consecutive annual increase of more than 30 
 
 
counsel’s thought process, theoretically protected from discovery, through 
acquisition of an expert’s notes taken in meetings with counsel—notes that 
are not protected from discovery.223  Going forward, it is to be hoped that 
courts will at least adopt the approach of one federal judge who deems 
common editing of drafts to not be subject to discovery and requires only 
drafts in whi
In addition to the discomfort many potential damages experts already 
feel about stepping into the adversarial  process,225 there is little doubt that 
experts are undergoing greater scrutiny by the courts and that their burden 
k is growing.226  One damages expert has stated: 
From every angle, our profession, our capabilities, and the data 
on which we rely are being examined more closely by the courts, 
IRS, SEC, FASB, and the public and private equity markets . . . .  
Our profession is a high
one chooses to play.227 
A recent study by the international public accounting and consulting 
firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers indicates that “[t]he number of experts 
challenged under Daubert increased by more than one third between 2005 
 223. Interview with Thomas E. Hilton, Co-Director of Valuation and Litigation Services, 
Anders Minkler & Diehl LLP, St. Louis, Mo., (March 21, 2008) (notes on file with authors).  
Mr. Hilton, who holds CPA, ABV, ASA and CVA certifications, has over 31 years of 
professional experience in expert testimony and financial matters.  He has taught various 
courses for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and is a member of that 
organization's Business Valuation/Forensic Legal Services Executive Committee.  He is the 
immediate past chair of the AICPA's Business Valuation Committee and also of the 
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts Executive Advisory Board.  In 2004, 
he was inducted into the AICPA Business Valuation Hall of Fame. 
 224. Aspen, supra note 146; see Stephen Bennett, Taking a Second Bite of the Cherry, 
90 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 42 (1999) (describing how, in 1999, the U.K. adopted new 
civil procedure rules for standard disclosure in an effort to replace large tracts of existing 
procedural rules). 
 225. See Gary L. Freed, Training Experts to Testify, NAT’L LITIG. CONSULTANTS REV., 
Mar. 2007, at 6, 6-7 (“It is not unreasonable for a potential or new testifier to be so 
concerned about learning to testify that [he] question[s] whether [he has] made the right 
decision to practice in this area.”).  The author goes on to cite situations in which he has 
been yelled and lunged at by opposing counsel during a deposition.  He also describes being 
forced to sit under an air-conditioning vent and not being allowed to move even after 
complaining and subsequently becoming ill. 
 226. 2007:  A Year of Simplifying, Standardizing—and More Fair Value Statements, 
BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC), Jan. 2008, at 8.  
 227. Id.(quoting business valuation expert Nancy Fannon). 
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percent.”228  Motions in limine are common,229 occurring in 79% of federal 
court cases in 1998, a figure up from 32% in 1991.230  There are strong 
indications that the frequency of Daubert hearings is increasing231 and that 
experts are being held to higher standards by judges.232  Furthermore, the 
rate of success of Daubert motions varies greatly across both federal and 
state jurisdictions and across the various federal circuits, making venue 
another important issue for those damages experts who routinely operate in 
multiple jurisdictions.233 
One of the greatest fears for most professionals who make their living 
as testifying experts is that they will fail to survive a Daubert hearing, 
thereby rendering their reputations as experts forever tainted.234  Given that 
lack of reliability of damages experts’ testimony is the leading cause for 
exclusion of this testimony under the Daubert criteria,235 this fear can at 
times present experts with the conundrum of having to choose between 
using more accepted valuation methodologies that are safer with respect to 
admissibility versus using more leading-edge methodologies that the expert 
believes will result in more accurate valuations.236  Given that each case is 
 228. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 7. 
 229. Duncan, supra note 178. 
 230. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 14. 
 231. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 7-12. The number of Daubert challenges 
has been rising every year since 2001, with the year 2006 posting a record number of 348 
expert testimonies excluded. This was approximately three times the number in 2000. Id.  
Although most of the Daubert challenges occur in the federal courts, as one might expect 
given that Daubert and its progeny represent federal standards, Daubert challenges do 
occur, albeit with less frequency, in the 17 state jurisdictions that have embraced Daubert. 
Id. The most Daubert challenges occur in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Delaware, and 
Massachusetts. Id. 
 232. Rao, supra note 191.  Interestingly, plaintiffs’ experts are challenged more 
frequently under the Daubert criteria than defendants’ experts in federal courts, but both 
have similar overall exclusion rates. The exclusion rate varies from year to year with respect 
to the party.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 22.  Also, economists, accountants, 
and statisticians are the most frequently challenged, but they are also the most likely to 
survive a challenge.  Id. at 25.  Breach of contract or fiduciary duty lawsuits result in the 
most frequent challenges, but with low success rates.  Conversely, fraud cases have the 
highest exclusion rate.  Id. at 28. 
 233. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 17. 
 234. Rao, supra note 191.  In a recent survey, federal judges reported holding Daubert 
hearings in nearly half of all cases involving expert evidence.  Krafka et al., supra note 103, 
at 19. 
 235. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 31. 
 236. Id. at 34-36.  The list of novel and untested methodologies that various courts 
excluded during the 2000-2006 period included the following methodologies:  the 
“proportional trading model” (Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95 C 1069, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14627 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000));  enhancement of a reasonable royalty rate through 
the application of a multiplier (Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Gennum Corp., No. 3:01-cv-4204-
RS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10604 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 2004)); “consumption theory” (In 
re Perry County Foods, Inc., 313 B.R. 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004)); “straight-line ramp-up 
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unique, opposing counsel may raise a Daubert challenge to the use of 
scientifically acceptable methodologies on the basis that they have never 
been applied before in the context of a particular case.  This can afford a 
means of probing damages analysis prior to trial even if the Daubert 
challenge is unsuccessful.237 
For an example of just such a conundrum, consider the current debate 
over whether experts can quantify the company-specific risk for publicly 
traded companies that are used as comparables in order to value privately 
held companies.238  It has long been held within the business valuation 
community that this risk cannot be objectively quantified, but two damages 
experts recently proposed a rigorous methodology for doing this.  The 
Butler-Pinkerton methodology can result in a substantively higher discount 
rate in valuing a stream of cash flows generated by a business being valued, 
thereby materially lowering the value of the company.239  Consider the 
possible dilemma of an expert choosing whether to use the Butler-
Pinkerton methodology, which would result in a valuation more favorable 
to the expert’s defendant client.  The safer path would be to use an accepted 
methodology which could result in greater damages for the client but have 
a greater chance of not surviving Daubert challenge.240  Is that the best 
choice for the client, however?  The answer may well rest with the client’s 
risk preferences.  Furthermore, suppose the expert chooses the safer path.  
Does this expose the expert to possible risk stemming from a malpractice 
claim later?  Conversely, if the expert chooses the riskier path with a more 
favorable valuation for the client but fails to survive a Daubert hearing, 
does this likewise have implications for malpractice liability?241 
method” (Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d 252 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)); and a novel methodology 
for determining cash flows in computing terminal value (In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 
356 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)). 
 237. Robert Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic 
Losses in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 277, 283 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
 238. See Company Specific Risk Calculator Goes Live, BVWire, 
http://www.bvresources.com/BVWire/November2007Issue62-2.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 
2007) (providing a brief explanation of the controversy regarding an expert’s ability to 
quantify company-specific risk). 
 239. Carole Gailor, The Ethical Conundrum of Attribution:  Plagiarism in Valuation 
Reports, BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC), Feb. 2007. 
 240. Courts typically frown upon novel approaches, as in In re Nellson Nutraceutical, 
356 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (disqualifying a valuation expert's report under Daubert 
criteria for using a "maverick" discounted cash flow analysis). See Rao, supra note 191 
(“This [situation] creates a bit of a dilemma for the damages expert in that new and novel 
approaches to analyzing the existence and extent of damages are often not 'established' in 
prior case law.”). 
 241. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that financial experts are not immune to malpractice liability with respect to 
their clients as a result of their testimony).  However, this question would likely have been 
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Courts will often ask whether a particular expert, though generally 
qualified, is qualified to perform a particular analysis.242  Here, again, as 
with much of expert qualification, the vista becomes a bit hazy because in 
some situations courts have allowed experts to testify on the basis of 
general valuation credentials, whereas in other cases they have deemed 
such background insufficient.243  The nebulous criterion of being qualified 
in a particular analysis presents a judgment problem for both attorneys and 
experts in trying to guess how a court may view some particular facet of 
the qualifications required to render an expert opinion.244  So intent are 
some opposing counsel on discrediting expert witnesses that they, on 
occasion, waste the courts’ time in what might seem to be a search for an 
expert with qualifications that do not exist.245  For example, in Pfizer, Inc. 
moot in years gone by because experts have rarely been sued as a result of their testimony.  
PETER B. FRANK ET AL., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation Services, in ROMAN 
L. WEIL ET AL., LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK 1.28 (4th ed. 2007).  There is evidence 
beginning to develop, however, that this may not be the case in the future and that experts 
will be well served to consider the implications of their decisions regarding methodologies 
with respect to their own liability.  For example, in Nanovation Techs., Inc. v. BearingPoint 
Inc., 364 B.R. 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), an international consulting firm that included a 
valuation practice was sued by its client for negligence and breach of contract concerning 
common stock valuations that it provided for tax purposes but the client used for other 
purposes.  Although the lawsuit did not arise as a result of BearingPoint’s involvement as an 
expert in litigation, it shows that some clients are willing to sue their valuation experts when 
events turn sour.  In Kranz v. Tiger, 914 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), the 
court ruled that negligent communication between a client’s medical expert and his 
attorneys, which resulted in the client’s acceptance of a settlement solely because the 
attorneys wrongly informed the client that the expert was unavailable to testify, may provide 
grounds for a professional malpractice action against the expert.  Also, in Hoffman v. 
Gaglio, No. B181356, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9655 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005), 
the court held that a real estate appraiser could be held liable for malpractice under a 
negligent misrepresentation theory even though the third party was not in the class of 
persons intended to benefit from reliance on the expert’s report.   Further, at least one court-
appointed expert has been sued for malpractice, albeit without success.  See Riemers v. 
O’Halloran, 678 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 2004).  Cases such as these suggest the possibility of a 
growing risk of malpractice liability for valuation experts.  One leading business damages 
expert has noted that malpractice insurers are becoming more concerned about experts’ 
liability for malpractice and that malpractice liability is growing, especially for casual 
experts such as professors unaffiliated with forensic services groups.  Seigneur, supra note 
166.  This could be one reason for the aforementioned trend toward full-time professional 
experts.  Lazar, supra note 170. 
 242. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 386-87; see, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, 72 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (T.C. 1996); In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 
2d 1005 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 243. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 386-87. 
 244. Seigneur, supra note 166 (stating that the interviewee noted that this issue is driving 
experts to specialize more and specialists to become subspecialists). 
 245. Hilton, supra note 223 (providing an account from a qualified expert about how he 
recently spent an entire day in voir dire during which opposing counsel unsuccessfully 
attempted to establish that he was not an expert on some minute aspect of his report). 
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v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., the court deemed a financial expert with 
exemplary qualifications unfit to make a twenty-year sales forecast because 
he had never developed a twenty-year sales forecast.246  Development of 
sales forecasts is a topic routinely taught in business schools such as the 
prestigious school where the expert was a professor.247  The fact that a 
court concerned itself with the length of a sales forecast might be viewed as 
either naiveté or extreme pickiness, inasmuch as basic valuation techniques 
often assume implicitly a constant growth sales forecast when valuing 
damages by capitalizing a cash flow stream.248 
Some would argue that the issue of experts’ qualifications often boils 
down to a question of the magnitude of damages at stake and that cases 
involving damages of large magnitude should call for a national search for 
the very best expert for a given situation, whereas a similar search would 
impose an unfair burden on the parties in cases where the magnitude of the 
damages is small.249  This argument, however, has the logical flaw of 
assuming that a given magnitude of damages has the same importance to 
large and small parties; in reality, $1 million in damages may be more 
meaningful to a small party than $10 million to a large one. 
Once past the common motion in limine challenge, damages experts 
are likely to be challenged in deposition and in court on three basic points:  
their assumptions, their analyses, and whether their results make sense 
within the context of the case.250  An expert opinion “is no better than the 
 246. Pfizer Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., C.A. No. 97C-04-037-WTQ, 1999 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 330 (Sept. 2, 1999), at 15. 
 247. See, e.g., Clyde P. Stickney, Paul R. Brown & James M. Wahlen, FINANCIAL 
REPORTING, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS, AND VALUATION:  A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
730-36 (6th ed. 2007) (including sales forecasting as part of the curriculum). 
 248. See, e.g., HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 116. 
 249. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 391 (inferring that the choice of an expert who is not 
preeminent in the field should lead courts to suspect that such an expert was chosen as a 
result of willingness to provide more favorable testimony).  This position implicitly involves 
various assumptions:  a) a preeminent expert exists; b) the expert's identity can be learned 
with reasonable effort; c) the expert is available; d) the expert is willing to take the case; and 
e) the expert is affordable to the prospective client.  Perhaps more importantly, from the 
perspectives of both the quality of jurisprudence and the client's best interests, it is important 
to have an expert who can work well with client's counsel. This may not always be a 
characteristic of the preeminent expert, however.  Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 250. Jeffrey H. Kinrich, Analysis Group, Law Seminars International:  A Comprehensive 
Two Day Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony, 
Ensuring Quality Control in Expert Reports (Mar. 20, 2006) (materials and notes on file 
with authors).  Valuation experts are usually required to provide support for their 
assumptions, and courts sometimes take a dim view of an expert's assumptions if they are 
based upon someone else's assumptions.  See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 405.  See, for 
example, Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1040-
41 (8th Cir. 1999), where a valuation expert's uncontroversial accounting methodology was 
excluded for a failure to consider all relevant variables that could affect his conclusion. 
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soundness of the reasons supporting it.”251  In this regard, it is important 
that damages experts know the facts of the case, partly to avoid an inability 
to defend assumptions used in valuation models.252  Such assumptions can 
be quite problematic for experts,253 and courts have sometimes been 
 251. Perreira v. Sec’y of Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 33 F.3d. 1375, 1375 n.6 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
 252. See Susman, supra note 173.  It is common for assumptions to be provided by the 
client or client's counsel, and testimony has been frequently excluded for a failure on the 
part of experts to adequately vet such assumptions.  See, e.g., Browning v. Smea, No. 
B172371 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Neb. Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Americas, Inc., 408 
F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that testimony of an expert could be excluded because it 
failed to take into account important facts at issue); see also Nancy J. Fannon, Expert 
Testimony in the Courtroom:  Is Vigorous Cross-Examination Enough, FINANCIAL 
VALUATION & LITIGATION EXPERT, 13, 14 (2007).  Also, valuation experts are often forced 
into making assumptions because some key documents are never requested in discovery or 
never produced by opposing counsel.  Further, there is a risk that some assumptions will be 
shown to be false because of documents that were never requested.  Experts will sometimes 
also engage in additional analyses at additional costs to the client because of missing 
documents in an effort to shore up their valuation conclusions.  Asserting an assumption that 
is inconsistent with, or not corroborated by, facts is a frequent reason for criticism, or even 
exclusion, by the courts.  See Rao, supra note 191.  Directly related to this issue is the 
matter of reliance upon management forecasts.  Although reliance upon data verified by 
third-parties such as independent auditors is certainly preferable, such data is frequently not 
available, either because it does not exist—perhaps due to the small size of the client—or 
because it involves prospective information that cannot be verified.  For a discussion of such 
data concerns and related cases, see Lloyd, supra note 25, at 396.  More generally, courts 
have rejected forecasts they found to be speculative.  See, e.g., Weissberg v. Peinado, No. 
A097102, A097232, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3541, at *3 (Cal. App. Apr. 10, 2003) 
(holding that damages supported by speculative expert testimony were unforeseeable and 
thus not recoverable); Haff v. Augeson, No. C1-02-1652, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 460 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2003). 
 253. Roy Weinstein, President, Micronomics, LLC, Conference on Effective 
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, 
The Science of Economics Challenges to Expert Testimony (March 21, 2006) (conference 
materials and notes on file with authors).  At this conference, Mr. Weinstein stated: 
Although the correct application of economic theory yields one correct answer 
from any given set of facts, economists often disagree outside the courtroom as 
to what that answer is.  The reason for such disagreements is that modern 
economic systems are extraordinarily complex, such that the problems 
economists are asked to address often encompass thousands, if not millions, of 
moving parts.  This leaves the economist with the daunting task of predicting 
each of those movements and determining the outcome associated with all of 
them.  Given this kind of complexity, it is not surprising that economists often 
disagree. 
Id.  Another commentator notes, "[e]xperts may be asked to make assumptions or rely on 
the client's representation in lieu of developing the appropriate underlying analyses.  The 
resulting opinion is subject to criticism, especially if there are countervailing facts."  Rao, 
supra note 191.  A failure on the part of a valuation expert to adequately explain the analytic 
assumptions in a valuation can also be cause for exclusion of expert testimony.  See, e.g., 
Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 99 Fed. Appx. 274 (2nd Cir. 2004) (affirming trial judge’s 
exclusion of expert testimony on the ground that the testimony was based on assumptions 
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inconsistent with respect to what is allowed in the way of such inputs,254 a 
matter that may depend upon the predilections of individual judges.255  For 
example, in Robert Billet Promotions, Inc. v. IMI Cornelius, Inc., the court 
stated that the damages expert’s model must not only be appropriate and 
acceptable but must also conform to the facts and be properly applied to the 
facts.256  In Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, the expert’s 
assumptions regarding future duration of the business, market share, and 
consumption patterns were deemed not credible.257  In Children’s 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., the court stated that the expert had 
relied upon inaccurate and unreliable financial projections and had offered 
projections that went far beyond realistic optimism.258  Conversely, in In re 
Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the court allowed 
the most contemporaneous management projections to be utilized as inputs 
to the damage calculation.259  Similarly, in In re Commercial Financial 
that failed to consider a host of factors vital to the case).  Assumptions that form the inputs 
to valuation models are the most likely aspect of a damages expert's report and testimony 
that opposing counsel will attack.  This stems from such assumptions being the part of the 
testimony that opposing counsel is most likely to understand and also because "garbage in, 
garbage out" is a principal strategy for negating expert testimony.  See Fannon, supra note 
252, at 12-14; see also Lloyd, supra note 25, at 409-11 (suggesting that expert testimony 
relying on numerous assumptions should be suspect).  Damages estimates based upon a 
hierarchy of assumptions are typically viewed with more skepticism by the courts, and 
ignorance of the existence of data that might have made a difference in the valuation is 
generally not an acceptable excuse for the expert not having used such data.  This presents 
yet another risk for damages experts because clients may withhold, from the expert, 
knowledge of the existence of information and data unfavorable to the client's case in the 
hopes that it will not be discovered.  See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 (1977) 
(indicating that the drastic simplifications often made in economists’ hypothetical models 
generally must be abandoned in the real world (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)). 
 254. One leading valuation text notes the following: 
Business plans (or [a] litigant’s financial projections) sometimes are used as a 
foundation for damage calculations because business plans and projections 
created prior to the wrongful actions are independent of the litigation motives of 
the parties.  However, since some courts have ruled that unproven business 
plans and financial projections are not adequate to provide the base assumptions 
for damages calculations, the expert should consider evaluating the business 
plan or projection. 
HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1030-31. 
 255. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 408. 
 256. Robert Billet Promotions, Inc. v. IMI Cornelius, Inc., No. CIV. A. 95-1376, 1998 
WL 721081 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1998). 
 257. Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, No. CIV. A. 96-1949, 179 F.R.D. 
450, 455 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 258. Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 3-96 CIV 907, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17507, at *21 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 1999). 
 259. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
70, at *68 (Aug. 30, 2004). 
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Services, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court held that criticisms of the 
assumptions made by a financial expert went to weight and not 
admissibility.  In In re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., the court concluded 
that a damages expert had sufficiently controlled for externalities such as 
competition, weather, and industry financial condition in a statistical 
analysis, but that the expert’s failure to consider factors causing a rising 
sales trend made the testimony questionable at best.260 
Although some commentators suggest that damages experts should 
avoid engagements when relevant economic phenomena cannot be 
explained,261 one difficulty with this is that experts may not know what 
data are and are not available until after an engagement is accepted and 
discovery is well underway.  At that juncture, it may be difficult to escape 
the engagement without damaging the client’s case.  Considered in light of 
the contention that it is best to engage damages experts early in the case, 
the possible predicament presented by discovering gaps in data well into 
discovery becomes apparent.262 
Inasmuch as courts as gatekeepers under Daubert must exclude 
testimony that does not fit the facts of the case,263 one of the biggest issues 
encountered with expert testimony is a lack of fit between the testimony to 
be given and the basis for that testimony—a problem more often caused by 
the attorney than by the expert.264  Since experts are often the last witnesses 
in trials, it is crucial to align their testimony with the case themes inasmuch 
as this testimony may be the last opportunity to sell triers of fact on a 
particular position.265  Another recurring problem in damages expert 
testimony is that of experts attempting to testify beyond the scope of their 
reports when under direct examination.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
26(a)(2) and 37(c) limit experts to opinions contained in their reports,266 
and courts increasingly enforce these rules.267  With regard to both of these 
 260. In re Elder Beerman Stores Corp., 206 B.R. 142, 165-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).  
The failure to subject valuation results to sensitivity analysis in order to determine how 
sensitive models are to their assumptions has also been criticized.  See, e.g., Kay v. First 
Cont’l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 775-77 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting an expert opinion 
where the assumptions relied upon were not tested with sensitivity analysis). 
 261. Weinstein, supra note 110, at 14-10. 
 262. See Jones, supra note 144, at 2; Rao, supra note 191 (noting that it is desirable to 
bring experts into the case early on because they usually have the best idea of the data 
needed to perform a valuation).  The worst time to hire experts is after discovery is closed, 
for obvious reasons.  See Analyst Convinces Court to Reject Stock Value as “Fair”, 
BUSINESS VALUATION REVIEW, Mar. 2006, available at http://www.bvlibrary.com 
(discussing the hazards of taking a client’s documentation at face value). 
 263. Aspen, supra note 146. 
 264. Zimmerman, supra note 107. 
 265. Jones, supra note 144. 
 266. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c). 
 267. Duncan, supra note 178.  If cross-examination opens the door, however, experts 
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problems, the damages expert is largely at the mercy of the attorneys with 
whom they work because attorneys are the weavers of the story of a case.  
The expert testimony represents a thread, commonly an important one, that 
must be carefully woven into the story to effect a favorable outcome268 and 
survive possible appeals.269   
To summarize, the foregoing suggests that the nature of damages 
expert testimony increasingly requires a level of sophistication and quality 
control that is often best supplied by professionals who specialize in this 
testimony.  Such experts are increasingly at risk of exclusion and attendant 
damage to their reputations as a result of a growing trend of Daubert 
hearings and a tendency by federal courts to exclude more and more 
testimony.  Many of the issues around which the admissibility of testimony 
revolves are subjective, and courts have not always been consistent in 
resolving this subjectivity.  Making matters worse, damages experts are 
often at the mercy of the attorneys with whom they work in terms of 
ensuring a fit of their testimony with the facts of a case.  To better 
understand these concerns, it is helpful to have a feel for the art versus the 
science of damages estimation. 
IV. ART VERSUS SCIENCE IN BUSINESS DAMAGES ESTIMATION 
Business damages estimation may be most accurately described as an 
art that relies on methods borrowed from science—methods that sometimes 
create an illusion of objectivity when, in fact, much of the expert’s 
valuation decision stems from subjective judgment based upon what 
evidence the expert can develop using science.270  Disagreement over the 
may go beyond their reports on cross- examination or redirect, and the requirement to 
remain within the boundaries of the report may also be relaxed by stipulation by all sides.  
See Jones, supra note 144. 
 268. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1045 (“Business damages are part of a lawsuit and are 
subject to statutes, case law, local judicial practice, and legal interpretations.  The expert 
should look to the attorney to give direction in these areas.”). 
 269. Assuming valuation testimony survives at the trial court level, experts still face the 
possibility of an appeal based upon abuse of discretion.  Wiegand, supra note 110.  
Although admissibility of expert testimony is often reviewed at the appellate level, the 
standard of review places a premium on good decisions at the district court level; 
furthermore, federal appellate courts have shown a reluctance to call district courts to task, 
affirming 99% of district court decisions.  Zimmerman, supra note 107.  Valuation experts 
are nonetheless at risk of having their reputations tarnished in appeals, however, and there 
are instances of appellate courts finding damages to be excessive and unsupported by 
evidence.  See James Malackowski, Business and Management Practices, BUS. BRIEFING 
(LexisNexis Acad., Bethesda, MD), May 13, 2004. 
 270. Given the complexity of valuation, it is helpful for courts and attorneys to have 
some understanding of basic, traditional approaches and methods used by valuation experts 
in order to understand issues related to the art and science of valuation.  We refer readers to 
excellent primers on valuation basics.  See, e.g., HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1-18; Garcia-
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best valuation methods has a long history that continues today.271  It has 
been said that judges and the legal system as a whole have a tendency to 
idealize science and that this is a contributing factor to courts’ frequent 
dissatisfaction with expert testimony.272  The application of science in 
expert testimony often depends upon the context of the case,273 and sorting 
out what is art from what is science is often complicated by numerous 
technical issues that have arisen to challenge the courts.  Examples are 
whether corporate goodwill can be separated from personal goodwill in 
professional practices, what discounts to allow for a lack of marketability 
of companies’ stock and minority ownership of stock, and how to apply the 
so-called “new business rule” when calculating damages.  Precedent 
informs these and similar issues, but inconsistent decisions across 
jurisdictions complicate the expert’s task and increase the risk that the 
expert’s testimony will be found flawed.274  In this part, we discuss these 
technical issues after first considering the art and science of damages 
estimation. 
A. Damages Estimation:  Art, Science, or Both? 
The mere basics of business damages estimation are sufficiently 
complex that special efforts have been made to provide simplified 
educational tools for those in the legal profession.275  One appellate court 
has summarized the business damages estimation process as “a fiction—the 
purpose of which is to determine the price that the stock would change 
hands from a willing buyer and a willing seller” and as “a fact specific task 
exercise.”276  This suggests that damages estimation is the art of applying 
Ayuso, supra note 6.  For more in-depth discussions of specific valuation, see HITCHNER, 
supra note 189, and SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, 
VALUING A BUSINESS:  THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES (4th ed. 
2000). 
 271. See generally Michael O. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple 
Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980). 
 272. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 766 (discussing judges’ general fascination with 
science). 
 273. See Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799, 827-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) 
(affirming trial judge’s decision to admit expert testimony to prove damages in a class 
action). 
 274. See James A. DiGabriele, An Empirical Walk Down Valuation Way:  Are the 
Valuation Methods of Closely Held Companies Chosen by the Courts a Function of the Type 
of Case and Level of Court?, 13 J. LEGAL ECON. 39 (2006) (analyzing comparatively 
whether the valuation methods of closely held companies are a function of the level of case 
and the type of court). 
 275. See, e.g., Garcia-Ayuso, supra note 6 (discussing the inefficient valuation of 
intangible determinants in business financial forecasting). 
 276. Gross v. Comm’r, 272 F.3d 333, 356 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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science to context,277 a position with considerable intuitive appeal. 
Other courts have not always taken such a discretionary perspective, 
however, with valuation matters, seemingly preferring greater certainty in 
determinations of that nature.  For example, in JCM Const. Co. v. Orleans 
Parish School Bd., the court preferred an expert who used generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to one who had not despite the 
arguments about GAAP’s inadequacies with respect to capturing value.278  
Judges may gravitate toward methodologies with which they are more 
familiar.279 
This search by the courts for certainty in an uncertain frame is 
consistent with judges wrestling with the question of when accepted 
financial models can be appropriately applied, a matter sometimes referred 
to as model risk.280  Most often, judges are not experts in financial theory or 
valuation methodologies.  This had led to frequent compromises in order to 
make decisions in a reasonably efficient manner that sometimes results in 
“splitting the baby” between high and low damages estimates.281  Recently, 
however, some courts have recognized that this practice “has no 
 277. A frequent cause of valuation testimony being excluded is the expert’s misuse of 
accepted methodologies. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 34. 
 278. JCM Const. Co. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 860 So. 2d 610, 631 (La. Ct. App. 
2003).  In valuation, the use of GAAP based upon the accrual method of accounting may not 
always render the most accurate valuation, and valuation analysts are not responsible for 
attesting to or certifying that information contained in financial statements is correct.  
HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 99.  GAAP are designed for financial reporting purposes and 
not necessarily for valuation purposes; consequently, they are often adjusted in a process 
called normalization.  Id. at 100.  Testimony has been excluded for a failure to normalize.  
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Robinson, No. CX-00-1063, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 233 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2001).  Also, mere conformity to GAAP does not assure reliability.  
See Marc A. Siegel, Accounting Shenanigans on the Cash Flow Statement, THE CPA 
JOURNAL, Mar. 2006, at 38.  For an example of how cash flows reported in accounting 
statements can be manipulated, see id. 
 279. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 40 (illustrating that Delaware judges prefer staying 
within a familiar framework to make the valuation process less arbitrary). 
 280. The term “model risk” as it relates to valuation expert testimony occurs when a 
valid model is used inappropriately, when the data inputs to the model are incorrect, or 
when the model is under or over-specified (meaning that there are important variables 
missing or too many variables in the model to be properly supported by the data).  It should 
also be noted that there are no perfect models when it comes to valuation.  Some are better 
or worse than others in a given situation.  See, e.g., Susan M. Mangiero, Model Risk and 
Valuation, Valuation Strategies, Mar.-Apr. 2003.  Another example of model risk issues can 
be found in the contrast between Estate of Heck v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181 (T.C. 
2002), in which the tax court affirmed the use of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to 
compute a cost of capital in the valuation of a closely held company, and Estate of Hoffman 
v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1588 (T.C. 2001), in which the tax court specifically rejected 
the use of the same model to value a closely held company. 
 281. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 41 (citing Stephen J. Leacock, The Anatomy of 
Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations:  Pursuing The Phantom of Objectivity Into the 
New Millennium, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 161, 168 (2001)). 
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conceptual, theoretical, or intellectually convincing basis and tends to be 
grounded, quite simply, in expediency,” thereby tending to “transform the 
quest for substantive principles into essentially a form of mediation 
conducted by attorneys, seeking to resolve the differences between parties 
on a pragmatic and opportunistic basis.”282 
Development of data through surveys and sampling, perhaps the most 
commonly used expert testimony in trademark and unfair competition 
cases,283 is one point at which art and science intersect to challenge courts.  
For example, in Rowe Entm’t v. William Morris Agency, the court, noting 
that necessity sometimes dictates the use of a less-than-optimal sample, 
nonetheless held that a damages estimate was unreliable because the 
expert’s sample was improperly developed due to reliance on anecdotal 
sampling techniques.284  In Muise v. GPU, Inc., the court wrestled with the 
issue of whether customer surveys are a reliable means of obtaining data on 
the cost of interruptions of utility services.285 
Those experts who find it useful to utilize samples collected through 
surveys are well-advised to follow some basic rules of survey research.  
These include choosing the appropriate population from which the sample 
is to be drawn, choosing a sample that is representative of the population, 
following proper interview or mailing procedures, asking questions clearly, 
accurately reporting what data were gathered, analyzing the data in 
accordance with accepted procedures, and ensuring the overall appearance 
of objectivity.286  Thoughtful examination of these criteria reveals 
numerous opportunities for subjective judgment in deciding such matters as 
the appropriate trade area to be sampled in a breach-of-non-compete-
contract case, or whether to ask redundant questions that may help 
demonstrate reliability but reduce the response rate due to lengthening the 
survey.287 
In the realm of damages, experts must deal with a host of other 
 282. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 41; see Richard M. Wise, Objectivity and Credibility 
as a Valuation Expert, BUS. VALUATION REV., Jun. 2005, at 83 (“Rather than, as was more 
common in the past, a judge attempting to find a point somewhere between the two extreme 
positions of the opposing experts, the tendency now is to totally reject the evidence of one 
expert in favor of the other.”). 
 283. H. Jonathan Redway, The Use of Survey Evidence in Trademark and Unfair 
Competition Cases:  Insights and Practice Tips, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Oct. 2005, at 11. 
 284. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 (RPP), 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15976 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).  Some commentators argue that it is 
better not to use survey data if the data are flawed.  Redway, supra note 283, at 11. 
 285. Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 286. Redway, supra note 283. 
 287. For a discussion of survey methods, see JULIAN L. SIMON, BASIC RESEARCH 
METHODS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES:  THE ART OF EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 193-99 (2d ed. 
1978); see also JAMES L. PRICE & CHARLES W. MUELLER, HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
MEASUREMENT 6 (1986) (containing a brief explanation of reliability in measures). 
  
338 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
 
potentially complicated and frequently subjective issues that are 
fundamental to valuation.  These might include the standard of value by 
which to measure damages,288 various levels of value frameworks that can 
result in radically different values,289 what discounts to use in reducing the 
value of a privately-held business,290 what discount rate to use in 
determining the value of a stream of cash flows,291 and whether the effects 
of events subsequent to the date for which a value is being determined 
should be incorporated into their analyses, thereby creating a sort of 
hindsight bias.292  These complexities serve to illustrate the difficulties 
 288. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 939-40.  Consider, for example, whether the standard 
of value is that of fair value or fair market value.  The two differ in that fair value, as 
defined under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, considers synergies and attributes 
of specific buyers, whereas fair market value, as defined by the Internal Revenue Service, 
contemplates hypothetical buyers and sellers.  Moreover, the definition of fair value, in a 
legal context of business damages, differs across state jurisdictions.  DiGabriele, supra note 
274. 
 289. Robert F. Reilly, Valuation Adjustment in Business and Securities Valuations, VAL. 
STRATEGIES, Jul.-Aug. 2005, at 4, 5. 
 290. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 60-67.  Consider, for example, the following excerpt 
from an internal memorandum from a leading valuation forensic services group at a national 
public accounting and consulting firm.  The excerpt is indicative of the subjectivity inherent 
in business valuation with respect to matters that would seem to be primarily quantitative in 
nature to the superficially informed: 
I did talk with [three leading business valuation experts outside the firm] about 
the use of the Asset Approach in situations where you are valuing a minority 
interest and the Income Approach resulted in a lower value that the Asset 
Approach and what the appropriate DLOM [discount for lack of marketability] 
would be.  As you might expect I received 4 different answers. . . .  I didn’t tell 
them I had spoken to the others so as not to color their responses. 
E-mail from Ed Morris, to Timothy Muehler (Jan. 7, 2008, 22:53:00 CST) (on file with 
authors).  Among the experts polled by Ed Morris, the potential range of discounts for lack 
of marketability was 10% to 40% of the value.  This is obviously a broad range with 
potentially significant differences in the magnitude of values.  This illustrates the difficulty 
courts face in appraising the quality of business valuation when leading experts disagree. 
 291. An example of such technical issues is the debate over the meaning of “discount 
rate,” the rate used to discount future expected cash flows of a business to their present 
value.  This rate has several different meanings and has caused confusion among experts 
and the courts.  This issue is summarized in the following statement: 
There is little guidance in the finance literature or case law to direct the expert 
in selecting the appropriate discount rate for future lost-profit damages.  In a 
few business damages cases, a risk-free rate has been applied as a matter of law.  
However, most courts favor the discount rate as a question of fact instead of a 
matter of law. 
HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1038. 
 292. Id. at 1043-44.  An ex ante date, the most common date of measurement, measures 
damages as of the date of injury.  An ex post date measures damages through the date of the 
trial or the closest practical date.  This represents another issue regarding which the courts 
are not always consistent.  Compare Holden v. Holden, 544 S.E.2d 884, 888 (Va. Ct. App. 
2001) (using the most recent evidence of value as opposed to divorce date after determining 
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associated with separating art from science, a distinction that is important 
for the courts “[i]f scientific evidence must clear a hurdle that does not 
block the path of other expert testimony.”293 
B. Contrasting Positions across Jurisdictions 
To better understand the difficulties courts face in the demarcation 
between the art and science of valuation, it is useful to consider some 
recent cases that illustrate the courts’ struggles.  For example, valuation of 
goodwill in professional practices has received disparate court treatment.294  
Three different approaches have been developed in determining whether 
goodwill is an asset that can be considered marital property.  Some 
jurisdictions make no distinction between business and personal goodwill, 
some find neither to be a marital asset, and the majority view differentiates 
between the two.295  In Rolfe v. Rolfe,296 In re Schneider,297 and Moretti v. 
Moretti,298 the courts determined that personal goodwill should be excluded 
from the value of the practice.  Conversely, in Singley v. Singley,299 the 
courts determined that goodwill should be included in the value of the 
practice.  In In re Watterworth300 and In re Ceilley,301 two states’ appellate 
courts refused to rule that goodwill should always be included when 
valuing a professional practice. 
Courts have also differed as to the appropriate date at which to value 
damages.  For example, in Tatum v. Tatum, the appellate court reversed the 
that value of stock had declined) with Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30 (1st. Cir. 2003) 
(reversing the damages based upon sale of business sixteen months after event of interest), 
Skokos v. Skokos, 40 S.W.3d 768, 771-72 (Ark. 2001) (declining to consider post-valuation 
date of business even though economic environment of business had changed subsequent to 
divorce) and In re Marriage of Harrod, No. H025876, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9420, 
*34 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2005) (rejecting the use of post-valuation-date financial data). 
Also refer to Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Utah 2001) (finding 
that a trial court is in the best position to determine the date as of which damages should be 
measured). 
 293. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1964. 
 294. Goodwill is defined as the excess in value of a business beyond the aggregate of the 
individual values of separately identifiable assets, less liabilities.  HITCHNER, supra note 
189, at 943. 
 295. Stathakis v. Stathakis, 1 CA-CV 05-0094, Ariz. App., at 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. March 
3, 2006). 
 296. Rolfe v. Rolfe, No. C2-00-19, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 868, *8 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Aug. 15, 2000). 
 297. In re Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2005). 
 298. Moretti v. Moretti, 766 A.2d 925, 928 (R.I. 2001). 
 299. Singley v. Singley, No. 1999-CA-00754-COA, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 456, *23-
*24 (Miss. Ct. App Sept. 26, 2000). 
 300. In re Watterworth, 821 A.2d 1107, 1114-15 (N.H. 2003). 
 301. In re Ceilley, No. 02-0434, *11 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2003). 
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lower court’s valuation of the marital estate at the time of an equitable 
distribution hearing and stated that the valuation date should be the date 
that most accurately reflects the fair market value of the assets.302  In 
contrast, the court in Bidwell v. Bidwell noted that even though the sale of a 
business might be a more accurate measure of its fair market value, the 
appropriate time to measure the value is at the time of a divorce.303  In 
Craig-Garner v. Garner, the court elected to value a closely held business 
as of the date of the marriage.304  In East Park Ltd. Partnership v. Larkin, 
the court stated that post-valuation date evidence that was not known at the 
valuation date was irrelevant to the valuation.305 
The so-called “new business rule” holds that parties cannot rely on 
evidence of lost profits where there is no established record of performance 
for the subject company.306  Here, again, the courts have not always been 
consistent.307  In Hyperoam, Inc. v. Valley Wireless Internet, the appellate 
court held that the damages found in the lower court were too speculative 
inasmuch as the business was new.308  The court in Doft & Co. v. 
Travelocity.com, Inc. ruled similarly.309  In EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., the 
court affirmed the denial of damages for lost profits and reversed an award 
of consequential damages in a new business rule situation.310  However, in 
M.S. Distributing Co. & Congress Financial Corp. v. WEB Records, the 
court upheld the rule while noting that the Seventh Circuit had questioned 
its wisdom.311  The court in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, LLP, 
cited prior case law indicating that the lack of an actual record of past 
earnings should not be an automatic bar to recovery of lost profits.312  In 
Abboud v. Robertson, the appellate court affirmed a lost profits award on 
 302. Tatum v. Tatum, No. 0438-00-3, No. 0443-00-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 789, at *12 
(Va. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000). 
 303. Bidwell & Bidwell, 18 P.3d 465, 465 (Ore. Ct. App. 2001).  Similar contrasts can 
be found in other cases. See, e.g., cases discussed at supra note 292. 
 304. Craig-Garner v. Garner, 77 S.W.3d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 305. East Park Ltd. P’ship. v. Larkin, 893 A.2d 1219, 1233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), at 
*26-27. 
 306. M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., No. 00 C 1436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8078 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003). 
 307. George A. Saitta, Jr., Voluntary Payments Related to Business Decision May Not Be 
Recoverable Consequential Damages (U.S. DATA FORENSICS, LLC, BETHESDA, MD). 
 308. Hyperoam, Inc. v. Valley Wireless Internet, No. 13-04-180-CV, 2005 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 6616, at *24 (Tex. App. Aug. 18, 2005). 
 309. Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., C.A. No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at 
*23 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004). 
 310. EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497, 517-18, 527 (Vt. 2007). 
 311. M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., No. 00 C 1436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8078, at *27-*28 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003) (citing Mindgames, Inc v. W. Publ’g Co., Inc., 
218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 312. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 37 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Utah 2001). 
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business.313  The appellate court in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of 
Southern California reversed a lower court application of the new business 
rule and held that the rule did not apply to a business with an operating 
history of two years.314 
A leadin
of valuation adjustments to stock value for a lack of marketability due 
to the stock not being publicly traded and an absence of control because of 
minority ownership.315  In response to the question of whether courts are 
changing their positions on lack of marketability discounts, one 
commentator stated:  “The tax court holds to a tight standard of fair market 
value, while other courts, particularly in divorce matters, tend to use a more 
flexible standard.”  The commentator noted that family court judges are not 
as well-trained as tax court judges to understand the concept of 
discounts.316  In conjunction with this same issue, another commentator 
noted that discounts tend to be higher in tax court than in family court 
cases.317  In Petersen v. Petersen, the court upheld the valuation of a 
closely held business, including discounts for minority interest and lack of 
marketability.318  The appellate court in Fausch v. Fausch upheld the 
application of a discount for lack of marketability in a divorce situation 
even though no sale of the business was contemplated, but noted that this 
issue has to be approached on a case-by-case basis.319 
On the other hand, in Blitch v. Peoples Bank320 a
courts refused to apply any discounts to the values of a holding 
company and a professional practice.321  Likewise, the court in Gottsacker 
v. Gottsacker affirmed the use of a lack of marketability discount in valuing 
a family limited partnership.322  Courts have sometimes excluded discounts 
because of what they perceive to be flawed reasoning, and, on some 
occasions, applied their own discounts.  In Estate of Adams v. 
 313. Abboud v. Robertson, No. 78028, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3392, at *11-*12, *15 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2001). 
 314. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. California, Super. Ct. No. BC 263071, 2005 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1667, at *30, *49 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2005). 
 315. Reilly, supra note 289, at 6. 
 316. AICPA BV ‘Hardball’ Panel Calls for the End of ‘It Depends’, 14 BUS. VALUATION 
UPDATE, Jan. 2008, at 9, supra note 227, at 9 (quoting valuation expert Bob Duffy of Grant 
Thornton). 
 317. Id. at 9 (quoting valuation expert Gray Trugman of Trugman Valuation). 
 318. Petersen v. Petersen, No. 249176, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 3121 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Nov. 16, 2004). 
 319. Fausch v. Fausch, 697 N.W.2d 748, 752 (S.D. 2005). 
 320. Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 321. In re Zee, No. 1-04/99-1116, 2001 Iowa App. LEXIS 286, at *13 (Iowa Ct. App. 
April 27, 2001). 
 322. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, No. C1-02-615, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 1290, at *14-15 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002). 
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Commissioner, the court rejected the estimated discounts of both experts 
and instead applied its own.323  In Estate of Leichter v. Commissioner, the 
court found what it deemed to be various flaws in three experts’ reports, 
based upon what it believed to be duplicitous discounts.324  Similarly, in 
Estate of Cook v. Commissioner, the court rejected both experts’ analyses 
of lack of marketability discounts and applied its own.325 
Another example of a technical issue that has confo
ed experts is whether S corporations are to be valued as C 
corporations or whether S corporation status makes such corporations more 
valuable.326  For instance, in Gross v. Commissioner, the appellate court 
noted that the essence of the argument before it was a battle of experts over 
how to value the stock of a closely held S corporation and that appellate 
courts have afforded tax courts broad discretion in deciding which position 
on whether the stock is tax affected will render the most appropriate 
valuation.327 
Sometim
oration valuation and the application of discounts.  In Casey v. 
Brennan, in which dissenting shareholders objected to conversion of an S 
corporation to a C corporation, the appellate court affirmed the lower 
court’s rejection of valuations that included lack of marketability and 
minority discounts, but reversed as to control premiums.328  In Pueblo 
Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., the court concluded that conversion of a C 
corporation to an S corporation did not constitute a situation where 
discounts should be applied.329 
The foregoing was intend
ee of subjectivity inherent in valuation issues and the difficulty courts 
experience in wrestling with valuation.330  The reluctant conclusion is that 
few judges and attorneys understand the theoretical underpinnings of 
valuation.331  One commentator has noted that “[a]t times, the expert’s 
 
 323. Estate of Adams v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 19 (2002). 
rickson-Wang” Myth, 9 
. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
th 
xperts:  An Embarrassment to Our 
 324. Estate of Leichter v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 991 (2003). 
 325. Estate of Green v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 758 (2003). 
 326. See Merle Erickson & Shiing-wu Wang, Response to the “E
SHANNON PRATT’S BUS. VALUATION UPDATE, Feb. 2003, at 1, 1-5. 
 327. Gross v. Comm’r, 272 F.3d 333, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 328. Casey v. Brennan, 780 A.2d 553, 559, 570-71 (N.J. Super
 329. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 37 P.3d 492, 494, 499 (Colo. App. 2001). 
 330. For several issues that have recently posed concerns for valuation experts wi
regard to court decisions related to subjectivity in valuation matters, see BVR’s BVWire 
Central, http://www.bvresources.com.  This subjectivity is highlighted by the likelihood that 
pending litigation against a company may itself affect the company's value.  William C. 
Quackenbush, How Does Litigation Affect Value?, E-LETTER (Bus. Valuation Comm. of the 
Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, Herndon, VA), May 23, 2007. 
 331. Joseph N. Hosteny, The Misuse of Patent Law E
Profession, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Oct. 2006, at 1, 3.  The author also notes that judges 
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calculations appear as a black box—it’s hard to tell what’s in there, but it 
sure sounds impressive.”332  The following part discusses how the growing 
complexity of business cases is contributing to this subjectivity. 
V. TRENDS IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING CASES 
INVOLVING DAMAGES 
For some time the U.S. economy has been shifting from a 
manufacturing orientation to a knowledge-based orientation333 
characterized by a focus on financial services334 and research and 
development of new technologies.335  The 1980s witnessed the deregulation 
of financial institutions and the development of new financial products in 
areas such as risk management and asset securitization.336  The 1990s 
observed the rapid growth in the widespread implementation of new 
information systems technologies.337  The beginning of the 21st century has 
been marked by the mapping of the human genome and the subsequent 
interest in molecular medicine and proteomics research.  These 
developments hold great promise for the development of pharmaceuticals 
and diagnostics to combat various diseases.338  In the life sciences alone 
there is an explosion in the number of start-up companies engaged in the 
development of new healthcare technologies.339  Companies are 
 
in bench trials typically permit more latitude in educational testimony regarding valuation 
concepts by experts than in jury trials, “in the belief that jurors will have little, if any, 
knowledge and/or understanding of the technical issues before them."  Id. at 5.  Financial 
concepts are difficult for attorneys and jurors to understand and are often presented toward 
the end of trials, when jurors are weary and feel that they have heard enough.  Albert 
Vondra, Financial Experts’ Experience Vital, CRAIN’S CLEV. BUS., Aug. 7, 2006, at 17. 
 332. Fannon, supra note 252, at 14. 
 333. Kaufmann & Schneider, supra note 4 at 380; see also Dick Crawford & Nicholas T. 
Miller, Commercial Lending Revenue Growth In The Knowledge Economy:  The 
Importance Of Intellectual Property, COM. LENDING REV., Nov. 2002, at 1, 4; and John 
Reynolds, Economics 101:  How Franchising Makes Music for the US Economy, 
FRANCHISING WORLD, May 2004, at 37 (stating that many changes in the U.S. economy are 
due to the growth of franchising). 
 334. The service sector constitutes nearly three fourths of the U.S. economy.  Id. at 37. 
 335. See Jankowski, supra note 5, at 335. 
 336. See generally Bowen H. McCoy, The New Financial Markets and Securitized 
Commercial Real Estate Financing, REAL EST. ISSUES, Spring-Summer 1988, at 6-7; 
Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, Winning Lines:  Which Professions Scored Big in the ‘90s, WALL 
ST. J., April 11, 2002, at B10. 
 337. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, A Technology Recovery in Post-Exuberant Times, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004 at C1; Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, supra note 336, at B10. 
 338. See Rudy M. Baum, Proteomics Builds on Genomics Success, 80 SCI. & TECH. 38 
(March 18, 2002). 
 339. Jonathan D. Root, Patient Capital:  How Life Sciences Investments Touch Us All, 
VENTURE CAP. J., Dec. 2004, at 44. 
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A. Valuation Issues Resulting from the Rise to Prominence of Intellectual 
There is no doubt that intellectual capital is critical to business 
valua
ntellectual 
capit
 
 
aggregations of bricks and mortar.340  The shift to a service-based and 
research-and-development-intensive economy greatly increases the 
frequency with which courts encounter cases involving intellectual 
capital.341 At the same time, there is mounting concern about the legitimacy 
of certain expert testimony as more and more complex damages 
valuations342 evolve predicated upon increasingly sophisticated 
methodologies.343 
Capital 
tion344; likewise, there is ample evidence that extant measures of 
intellectual capital are plagued with deficiencies.345  Although there is 
clearly a growing awareness of the importance of intellectual capital, its 
study is in its infancy in many ways, and much of the research to date has 
been focused upon understanding how intellectual capital affects 
operational performance as opposed to financial performance.346 
Nonetheless, the lack of information regarding the value of i
al can lead to misallocation of resources.347  Over the past several 
years there have been numerous mergers and acquisitions348 in which a 
significant portion of the purchase price was paid for intellectual capital.  
 340. Per Nikolaj Bukh & Ulf Johanson, Research and Knowledge Interaction:  
Guidelines for Intellectual Capital Reporting, 4 J. INTELL. CAP. 576, 582 (2003). 
 341. Goldscheider supra note 6, at 55; see also Intangibles Are the Tangible Assets Now, 
GLOBAL NEWS WIRE—ASIA AFRICA INTELL. WIRE, Dec. 28, 2005, at 1 (stating that 
intellectual capital has become the most important resource for companies); A Market for 
Ideas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2005, at 3 (stating that as much as three fourths of the value of 
publicly traded U.S. companies results from intellectual capital); Kroll Survey Highlights 
Corporate Vulnerabilities to Growing Billion-Dollar Problem of Intellectual Property 
Abuse, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 16, 2002, available at http://www.kroll.com/news/releases 
/index.aspx?id=151 (noting that intellectual capital “is at the heart of modern business”); 
Securitizing the Future, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Sep. 2006, 22, 22 (stating that companies 
are increasingly expecting their intellectual capital to create value). 
 342. For a schematic diagram depicting the complexity associated with valuation of 
technology, see F. PETER BOER, THE VALUATION OF TECHNOLOGY xi (1999). 
 343. Schuurman & Stafford, supra note 148. 
 344. For example, econometric studies consistently indicate a positive and statistically 
significant association between research and development intensity and corporate market 
value.  Bernard Marr et al., Why Do Firms Measure Their Intellectual Capital?, 4 J. INTELL. 
CAP. 441, 448 (2003). 
 345. See Gopika Kannan & Wilfred G. Aulbur, Intellectual Capital:  Measurement 
Effectiveness, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 389, 392 (2004) (providing a list of disadvantages). 
 346. Bernard Marr, Intellectual Capital at the Crossroads:  Managing, Measuring and 
Reporting IC, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 224, 224 (2005). 
 347. Kaufman & Schneider, supra note 4, at 366. 
 348. Mandel, supra note 150, at 115. 
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favor more systematic quantitative 
analy
 
 
An improved and more transparent valuation process is needed to 
understand exactly what acquirers are receiving in return for the purchase 
price.349  “Without correct assessment, measurement and valuation of IC 
[intellectual capital], the acquirers may overvalue it, thus causing value 
destruction for the acquiring firm’s shareholders and other stakeholders.”350  
Given that it is estimated that acquisitions, on average, do not work out 
well for acquirers351 and that failing to adequately understand intellectual 
capital leads to incorrect valuations, inaccurate risk assessments, and 
potential increases in a company’s cost of capital,352 there are obvious 
implications for litigation involving acquisition transactions.  Similarly, 
growth in derivative securities and other new types of financial instruments 
is fueling more and more litigation.353 
Post-Daubert courts appear to 
sis in damages testimony,354 but measurement of intellectual capital is 
difficult.355  Despite the recognition by bodies such as the International 
Accounting Standards Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board 
that financial statements must do a better job of capturing intellectual asset 
values,356 there is no universally acceptable model to measure intangibles.  
“Measuring non-financial data is still [more] an art than a science and in 
intellectual capital the choice of indicators can affect the results 
substantially.”357  The majority of research regarding measuring intellectual 
capital is still in the theory-building stage,358 and existing accounting 
measures have been criticized for failing to give adequate consideration to 
intellectual capital.359  Although the development of universally accepted 
quantitative models of intellectual capital may, at times, seem analogous to 
pursuit of the Holy Grail, there are nonetheless those who purport to show 
that such quantification is possible.360 
 349. Marr, supra note 344, at 452-53. 
, Jr. & P.H.S. Sullivan, Sr., Valuing Intangible 
993), 
 Marr, supra note 344, at 447. 
. 
supra note 189, at 938; see Benjamin P. Foster et al., Valuing Intangible 
426. 
 INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:  NAVIGATING THE NEW 
supra note 6, at 57; Marr, supra note 344 (discussing one 
 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 
.g., Litschka et al., supra note 4, at 161. 
 350. Id. at 447 (citing P.H. Sullivan
Companies—An Intellectual Capital Approach, 1 J. INTELL. CAP. 328, 328-40 (2000)). 
 351. JOSEPH H. MARREN, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS:  A VALUATION HANDBOOK (1
at 31. 
 352.
 353. Mandel, supra note 150, at 117
 354. Id. at 116 
 355. HITCHNER, 
Assets, CPA J., Oct. 2003, at 50, 50. 
 356. Abeysekera, supra note 4, at 
 357. Id. at 422 (quoting ROOS & ROOS,
BUSINESS LANDSCAPE 6 (1997)). 
 358. See, e.g., Garcia-Ayuso, 
study attempting to determine a way to measure intellectual capital). 
 359. Marr, supra note 344, at 447; see Russ Banham, Valuing IP
J. ACCT., Nov. 2005, at 173, 173, available at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/nov2005/ 
banham.htm. 
 360. See, e
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valuation complexities and problems 
of a 
 
 
Intellectual capital poses certain 
magnitude that typically greatly exceeds those associated with valuing 
physical assets when it comes to estimating damages resulting from the 
misappropriation, infringement, or impairment of intellectual capital.361  
For example, it is relatively easy to determine both the lives and values of 
physical assets such as production equipment or inventory, compared to 
what might have been the longevity of a particular type of customer 
account that was terminated prematurely due to breach of contract362 or the 
value of a particular peptide that influences molecular behavior.  Even 
valuing the property rights to certain physical assets can take on new 
complexity when such values are determined to a significant extent by 
developments in underlying intellectual assets.363  Intellectual capital on its 
own is often worthless, and its value must be considered in light of the 
business that possesses it and the context in which it is being utilized.364  It 
is also often difficult to perform comparative analyses of intellectual 
capital365 to arrive at valuations in a manner analogous to traditional 
 361. For a discussion of the difficulties in valuing intellectual capital, see HITCHNER, 
chnology, the more complicated the 
 
r developments in 
ith Intellectual Capital, 1 J. INTELL. CAP. 68 (2000). 
supra note 189, at 936.  “The more complicated the te
resolution of intellectual property disputes.”  Goldscheider, supra note 6, at 57.  Baseman 
and Slottje, in providing an example of such complexity in an actual case, assert that 
although use of econometrics and statistics has been somewhat limited to date in its 
application to cases involving intellectual capital, “[a]s the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights grows globally, issues of the quantification of economic damages will grow 
in importance around the world.”  Robert L. Basemann & Daniel J. Slottje, Copyright 
Damages and Statistics, 71 INT’L. STAT. REV. 557, 557 (2003).  Another source argues for 
the importance of sound evidentiary support in complex cases such as patent infringement 
cases.  James E. Malackowski & Robert M. Hess, Federal Circuit Damages Decision 
Emphasizes the Importance of Sound Economic Models, BUS. MGMT. PRAC., May 13, 2004. 
 362. For a discussion of the relative ease of valuing “hard” assets as opposed to 
intellectual assets, see Crawford & Miller, supra note 333, at 4.  An example of this issue
can be found in a recently settled case in which the damages estimates were the central 
focus of argument, and the magnitude of the damages mainly turned upon how long 
accounts would have survived but for the breach.  Since longer-surviving accounts arguably 
possessed different survival characteristics than shorter-lived accounts, a problem arose in 
determining the appropriate manner in which to estimate lives of accounts that were 
prematurely truncated.  First Am. Real Estate Info. Servs. v. Consumer Benefit Servs., Inc., 
No. 03CV0633-B(NLS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30317 (S.D. Cal. 2004). 
 363. For example, the intellectual property rights associated with an automated sample 
loader used in proteomics research may be dependent, in part, upon furthe
proteomics that make such research more commercially attractive, thereby increasing the 
value of the reduced sample throughout time and waste reduction afforded by the sample 
loader.  Such is the case with one of the products developed by a proteomics-related 
company, Inproteo, LLC, with which two of the authors were involved in an advisory 
capacity. 
 364. Luiz Antonio Joia, Measuring Intangible Corporate Assets:  Linking Business 
Strategy w
 365. Chris D. Adams & Gerald M. Godshaw, Intellectual Property and Transfer Pricing, 
8 INT’L TAX REV. 74, 74 (2002). 
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een valuation of intellectual 
and 
 
 
valuation methods that rely on comparisons.366 
To better understand the differences betw
physical assets, consider the following.  There are several accepted 
methods for valuing physical assets, including depreciated cost, 
replacement cost, fair market value, and the net present value of the future 
cash flows the assets are expected to generate.367  Depreciated cost is 
inappropriate for valuing intellectual capital because its direct acquisition 
cost may be insignificant as a result of its being developed through an 
expenditure of human resources, the cost of which is expensed immediately 
as opposed to being recorded as assets and depreciated.368  Similarly, 
replacement cost is often problematic because, for example, it is unclear 
what cost would have to be expended to replace a flash of insight that leads 
to a new product.369  Further, the fair market value of some intellectual 
capital is extremely difficult to determine in situations where the 
intellectual asset consists of organizational learning such as knowledge of 
manufacturing processes.370  This often leaves the net present value of 
discounted future cash flows as the only viable method for valuing 
intellectual capital.371  A difficulty with using this method, however, is that 
forecasting future cash flows from intellectual capital is fraught with 
uncertainty.372 Courts have not always looked kindly upon experts’ 
uncertain forecasts and their reliance upon client management’s forecasts 
as supposedly reliable roads to accurate valuation.373 
 366. See, e.g., HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 79-82.  Some have questioned whether it 
even makes sense to attempt to perform industry-specific analyses in order to value 
erally HITCHNER, supra note 189, 
CHWEIHS, VALUING INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
ing intellectual capital). 
ital). 
erts’ 
adcasting Corp., 395 F.3d 416 (7th 
st-breach income of 
intellectual capital.  Kaufman & Schneider, supra note 4. 
 367. R. Mark Halligan & Richard F. Weyand, The Economic Valuation of Trade Secret 
Assets, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2006, at 19, 19-20.  See gen
(describing these methods in Chapters 4, 6, and 7). 
 368. Halligan & Weyand, supra note 367, at 19-20. 
 369. Id.; see ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. S
95-117 (2004) (discussing cost-based approaches to valu
 370. Halligan & Weyand, supra note 367, at 19-20; see REILLY & SCHWEIHS, supra note 
369, at 146-158 (discussing the market-based approach to valuing intellectual cap
 371. Halligan & Weyand, supra note 367, at 19-20. 
 372. Courts tend to take a dim view of excessive speculation in valuation exp
reports.  See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Bro
Cir. 2005) (finding an expert’s lost profits testimony unreliable because it was based only 
upon experience and not upon statistical or market analyses); Telxon Corp. v. Smart Media 
of Delaware, Inc., Nos. 22098, 22099, 2005 WL 2292800 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding the 
award for damages speculative, in part as a result of its being based upon a post-valuation-
date business plan); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 
2005) (finding the valuation expert’s damage assessment speculative for failure to analyze 
an acquisition price from the perspective of the factors that drove the acquisition); Phase 2 
Devs. Corp. v. Citicorp Real Estate, No. B160111, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 117 
(finding valuation expert to have relied upon too many contingencies). 
 373. See, e.g., Haff v. Augeson, No. C1-02-1652, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 460 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2003) (affirming a lower court’s finding of a forecast of the po
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ifficulty in estimating 
dama
he capital structure of 
a pr
 
 
This growing complexity, and the concomitant d
ges associated with litigation involving intellectual capital, affects the 
provision of expert testimony in civil actions.374  As enforcement of 
property rights increases globally,375 the need for quantification of 
economic damages associated with the rights is also growing,376 thereby 
exacerbating the courts’ difficulties in assessing the admissibility of such 
testimony.  Where Daubert’s silence—made arguably more deafening by 
Joiner and Kumho—begins, the courts are largely left to case law377 and 
their own judgment in determining whether a particular scientific 
methodology as applied to the facts and circumstances of a case is 
appropriate or inappropriate.  As the nature of the capital being valued 
becomes more nebulous and the methodologies used in valuation become 
more esoteric, the challenge associated with making this determination 
obviously increases.378  Thus, increased complexity in the nature of the 
intellectual capital that forms the basis for civil business litigation makes it 
more difficult for courts to interpret expert testimony and determine 
whether the experts are in fact using good science.379 
Consider, for example, the problem of valuing t
ivately held life sciences company.380  The greater percentage of 
the company too speculative).  In Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. 19734, 2004 
ginbotham, The Right Recipe, THE CORPORATE 
edeal.com/corporatedealmaker/2006/ 
the likely growth in frequency and importance of statistics in 
s
opic.  Id. at 557. 
n turn on the complexities of statistical arguments. 
006). 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch. 2004), the court held that management’s projections were not 
reliable.  On the other hand, in Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 
340 (Del. Ch. 2004), the court held that the valuation expert had deviated from 
management’s forecast without adequately explaining the reasoning behind the deviation. 
See Cede & Cinerama v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146 (Del. Ch. 
2003).  In Dunn v. Matrix Exhibits, Inc., No. M2003-02725-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), the court found that management’s future projections 
were admissible in a but-for analysis. 
 374. See Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 375. For a discussion of the role of globalization in creating legal complexities related to 
intellectual capital, see Stacey Hig
DEALMAKER, (Jan. 2006), http://www.th
02/the_right_recipe.php. 
 376. Robert L. Basmann & Daniel J. Slottje, Copyright Damages and Statistics, 71 INT’L 
STAT. REV. 557 (2003). 
 377. While stressing 
e timating damages in cases involving intellectual capital, Basmann and Slottje also note the 
limited case law on the t
 378. Hilton, supra note 223; see Paloma Sánchez et al., Management of Intangibles:  An 
Attempt to Build a Theory, 1 J. INTELL. CAP. 312 (2000) (discussing measurement issues 
related to intellectual capital). 
 379. See generally Malackowski & Hess, supra note 361.  Basmann & Slottje, supra 
note 376, at 558-563, present an actual case study that demonstrates how a case with 
substantial damages at stake ca
 380. It is estimated that 99.5% of all U.S. companies are privately held. These firms 
require special treatment for valuation purposes.  William P. Dukes, Business Valuation 
Basics for Attorneys, 1 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS 1,  Abstract (2
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 The Need for Increasingly Complex Valuation Methodologies 
As the complexity of business has increased with the rise to 
prominence of intellectual capital, so has the complexity of the 
 
intellectual assets to total assets in privately held companies often means 
high potential returns that, in turn, carry high risk.381  These higher returns 
can be very attractive to private equity groups that have experienced a 
phenomenal growth in recent years.382  Private equity groups frequently 
consist of sophisticated investors who, in turn, employ sophisticated legal 
counsel to assist them in designing capital structures for their investments 
to help mitigate their investment risk.383  As a result, capital structures of 
many privately held companies, even relatively small ones, are complex 
and can contain various combinations of debt, preferred equity, common 
equity, and hybrid securities that have characteristics of both debt and 
equity.384  Common equity can be of various classes and can have various 
forms of derivative securities attached, such as stock options and 
warrants.385  To value a company with such a complex structure, it is 
necessary to value the entire set of claims to the company’s cash flows in 
the descending order in which each class of claimant stands in priority.386  
This requires the use of very sophisticated methodological tools to obtain 
accurate valuations—tools with which few damages experts, much less 
judges, are likely to be familiar.387 
 
 381. Travis Chamberlain et al., Navigating the Jungle of Valuing Complex Capital 
Structures in Privately Held Companies:  An Integrative Simulation Approach, 2 J. BUS. 
VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS 1, 2-3 (2008), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/jbvela/vol2/iss2/art5/. 
 382. John W. Hill & Thomas L. Zeller, The New Value Imperative for Privately Held 
Companies:  The Why, What, and How of Value Management Strategy, 51 BUS. HORIZONS 
541, 542-43 (Nov.-Dec. 2008). 
 383. Chamberlain, et al., supra note 381, at 3. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. at 22. 
 387. Id. at 9.  For additional insight into some of the intricacies of valuing a complex 
capital structure, see Robert E. Duffy & David C. Dufendach, Valuing Components of 
Complex Capital Structures, AICPA/ASA National Business Valuation Conference 
(November 14-16, 2005) (conference materials and notes on file with authors).  As higher-
risk industries increase with growth in intellectual capital and technology, there exists on a 
more micro level the issue of whether company-specific risk, discussed in the previous part, 
is subsumed into the risk of the industry in the case of such higher-risk industries. This issue 
presents complex questions regarding the adequacy of current finance theory to explain the 
manner in which financial markets impound risk into equity prices, and is illustrative of a 
micro-level valuation issue (stemming from macro-level, theoretical concerns and the 
changing nature of business assets) that confounds damages experts.  Gailor, supra note 
239, at 27. 
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tion, in 
general, is a complex undertaking often requiring the projection of future 
finan
ectual capital.394  This challenge is made even 
 
methodologies needed to value this capital.388  Damages valua
cial outcomes and a strong understanding of accounting, financial 
analysis, statistics, and forecasting of business outcomes.389  This, in turn, 
requires careful assessment by the bench of not only the reliability of the 
methods employed by the expert but also the reliability of their application 
in a particular context.390  This matter is made more difficult because many 
such methods have their origin in statistics, the application of which can be 
as much art as science.391  Although there is evidence of some systematic 
trends in courts’ preferences for certain valuation methodologies over 
others, there is a high degree of variability even among cases with similar 
characteristics.392  This suggests difficulty on the part of judges in assessing 
valuation methodologies. 
Statistical reasoning is crucial to most scientific inquiry,393 and there 
are few areas of scientific testimony more daunting for courts than the use 
of advanced econometric and statistical techniques to develop damage 
estimates related to intell
 
 388. Goldscheider, supra note 6, at 62. 
 389. Steven Kam et al., The Valuation of Litigation, 9 VALUATION STRATEGIES 1, 5-8 
Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 431, 448-50 (2000). See 
, at 486.  “The comfort that most lawyers and 
not generally extend to numbers.”  Id.  Basmann & 
(2006). 
 390. See Sofie Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, Kicking The Tires After Kumho:  The Bottom 
Line on 
Interview with Shannon Pratt (Moderator), Alina Niculita & Timothy R. Lee, Business 
Valuation Resources Teleconference (Aug. 31, 2006) (notes on file with authors), for an 
example of a reliability issue that is fairly commonplace in expert valuation:  the adjustment 
of multiples (ratios) used to value a company in question).  These multiples are obtained by 
first selecting publicly traded companies that are believed to be comparable to the company 
being valued and then calculating key financial variables that can be expressed as ratios of 
some measure of the value of the public companies.  Once the ratios are calculated, a value 
for the company being valued can be calculated by inserting the values for the company into 
the ratios.  Adjustment of the ratios comes into play because the public companies are 
rarely, if ever, exactly comparable to the company being valued and therefore must be 
adjusted to compensate for differences.  This valuation issue alone is complex, see, e.g., In 
re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 356 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); Adjusting Multiples 
from Guideline Public Companies, Business Valuation Resources Teleconference (Aug. 31, 
2006) (notes on file with authors), and illustrative of the type of expert testimony morass in 
which courts may become enmeshed, apart from the even more complex issues that attend 
the use of sophisticated statistical methodologies.  For example, in Eckelkamp v. Beste, 315 
F.3d 863, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2002), the court found the expert’s methodology flawed because 
the companies’ use of comparables was unsuitable for this purpose.  This position can be 
contrasted with the conclusion of a number of courts that the preferred way to value a 
closely held company is by the use of appropriate multiples and the acknowledged difficulty 
of finding publicly traded comparables.  See DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 42. 
 391. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1965. 
 392. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 39. 
 393. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1965 
 394. Adrogue & Ratliff, supra note 390
judges have with legal principles does 
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more difficult because of the great propensity for each side to present only 
evidence favorable to its case and to assert flaws in opposing expertise.395  
Estimation of damages in such cases increasingly requires data analysis 
involving advanced econometric and/or statistical methodologies that are 
sometimes not well understood even by experts with extensive 
backgrounds in the use of statistics.396  Because of sometimes subtle 
differences in business settings, the most appropriate methodology for a 
particular context may not be the one used most frequently in similar cases, 
so common usage and precedent are not necessarily reliable from a 
scientific perspective.397  Further, the courts may well hear from experts 
whose credentials seem impeccable and yet whose knowledge of a 
particular technique in question may be errant.398  Critical turning points 
can revolve around issues as seemingly esoteric as the known or potential 
Slottje, supra note 376, comment that even elementary statistical matters can cause much 
adversarial debate.  For example, courts have long struggled to determine whether the 
samples used by experts in performing their analyses were representative enough of the 
population to which experts are attempting to extrapolate.  See, e.g., Currier v. United 
Techs. Corp., 393 F.3d 246, 256 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming a decision to use a broader 
sample); cf. Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 134 (3d Cir. 
2004) (affirming exclusion of a broader sample). 
 395. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1488 (1999). 
 396. Daniel McFadden, et al., The Misuse of Econometrics in Estimating Damages, ABA 
ECONOMETRICS TREATISE (forthcoming). 
(NLS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30317 (S.D. Cal. 
the important distinction of the statistical treatment of 
 397. For example, in First American Real Estate Information Services, Inc. v. Consumer 
Benefit Services, Inc., No. 03CV0633-B
2004), one expert argued that the most appropriate methodology was a sequential 
combination of Cox Regression to estimate past account survival probabilities, followed by 
feasible generalized least squares to forecast future account survival probabilities using two 
different model specifications, and then subsequent smoothing by use of Granger 
Ramanathan Regression.  See id. Report of Plaintiff’s Expert (filed pursuant to Jan. 28, 2004 
Stipulation and Order).  This was a complicated and possibly unprecedented use of the 
subject methodologies in litigation that might have presented a substantial challenge to the 
court in understanding the econometric arguments if the case had gone to trial.  See id. 
Report of Plaintiff’s Expert and Report of Defendant’s Expert (filed pursuant to Jan. 28, 
2004 Stipulation and Order). 
 398. See, e.g., id.  This case represents one such example, as two experts with exemplary 
credentials disagreed over 
involuntarily terminated accounts with respect to the application of the most appropriate 
statistical methodology.  Another recent settled case provides additional evidence that the 
combination of statistical methodology and business context may complicate courts’ 
determination of admissibility of expert testimony.  Experts’ arguments revolved around 
whether a regression analysis could be applied reliably with a relatively small sample size 
and whether the absence of certain variables in the model might affect the damage 
estimates.  Onex, Inc. v. Inrange Techs. Corp., No. 1:03-CV593LJM-WTL (S.D. Ind. filed 
April 23, 2003) (later settled).  Had the case gone to trial, the court would likely have been 
faced with the problem of deciding whether the business context validated the use of the 
particular well-established methodology. 
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erful 
statis
iability of regression models often centers on 
 
error rate when making statistical comparisons using multiple tests.399 
The use of multiple regression analysis, a particularly pow
tical methodology,400 has now become reasonably common in 
business damages cases401 and has gained considerable acceptance by the 
courts.402  Because of its power and complexity, multiple regression 
analysis also carries a significant risk of misleading the courts if its 
assumptions are not met and it is not used properly.  Courts have recently 
had to decide whether damages experts’ regression assumptions were 
reliable prior to rendering a verdict.403  Even if judges achieve a reasonable 
grasp of the complexities of multiple regression in its most basic form 
(ordinary least squares)404 to determine whether it has been applied 
reliably, they have yet to scratch the surface of the more complex 
permutations that include generalized-least-squares, hedonic, weighted-
least-squares, tobit, logit, and probit regressions, among others.405 
The debate about the rel
 
 399. David Tabak, Multiple Comparisons and the Known or Potential Error Rate, 19 J. 
litates the 
ood 
 on Multiple Regression, in 
, 
ness valuation experts themselves often 
E, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMICS:  A MODERN APPROACH 272 
FORENSIC ECON. 231, 231-33 (2006).  The author notes that the likelihood of finding the 
same result in multiple tests at the 5% level is 1-0.95 to the power of N where N is the 
number of tests.  Id.  This is true, however, only if the tests are completely independent, a 
matter that often depends upon the context of the case performed. The point is that it is 
relatively easy for those with only a cursory acquaintance with statistics to be misled 
regarding a finding of significant associations when applying statistical methods. 
 400. Multiple regression analysis is particularly powerful because it faci
assessment of the associations among several possible causal variables with a variable of 
interest such as revenues or profits, by sorting out spurious correlations for non-spurious 
correlations.  See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 
1997) (citing Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 35 (2d. Cir. 1988) and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1065-66 (1985)). 
 401. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2002); Conw
Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 402. See, e.g., DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, Reference Guide
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179-227 (2d ed. 2000) (devoting an entire 
section to regression analysis).  In fact, courts’ acceptance of regression analysis has 
become so commonplace that in some cases the failure to use regression has been a basis for 
excluding expert testimony.  See, e.g., Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 403. Stephen Mahle, Econometric Issues in Business Litigation Testimony
http://www.daubertexpert.com/econometric.html. 
 404. This is no mean feat inasmuch as busi
misinterpret some of regression’s output metrics and uses.  Compare Mark G. Filler, 
Revisiting Regression Analysis and the Market Approach, CPA EXPERT, Summer 2006, at 6 
(correcting various alleged deficiencies in a prior article appearing in the same publication) 
with James A. Digabriele, A Primer in Valuing Closely Held Companies Using the Market 
Approach and Regression Analysis:  Not All Variables and Industries Are Created Equal, 
CPA EXPERT, Spring 2006, at 7 (advising experts on how to use regression in applying the 
market approach to valuation). 
 405. JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDG
(2d ed. 2003) (generalized-least-squares regression), 138 (hedonic regression), 415 
(weighted-least-squares regression), 565 (tobit), 554 (logit), and 555 (probit). 
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variables included or excluded from the models.  The difficulties 
experienced by courts in dealing with this issue have led to inconsistencies 
in decisions, as summed up by one author: 
In almost every case it is argued by t
findings that the results would have been changed significantly if 
additional explanatory variables had been used.  Usually the 
argument is made with respect to qualitative factors that either 
cannot be reflected in quantitative terms, or can be reflected only 
by dubious or even obviously imperfect quantitative surrogates.  
The courts are not consistent in their treatment of this type of 
objection, with the variation in judicial position seemingly best 
explained in each case by the consistency of the regression 
results with the judge’s view of the case as a whole.406 
This suggests that judges have considerable unc rta
 assessments of the reliability of regression models, a difficulty that 
has sometimes resulted in their resorting to the heuristic of deciding on the 
basis of what they believe to be the preponderance of other evidence.407 
In this regard, the courts’ struggles with complex statist
 406. Finkelstein, supra note 271, at 737.  Variables have been found inappropriate for 
 that the issue of omitted variables is not unique to regression 
inclusion in some regression models while other regression models have been found flawed 
for the absence of variables.  In Cullen v. Indiana University Board of Trustees, 338 F.3d 
693, 701 (7th Cir. 2003), an expert used regression analysis in support of a faculty 
member’s claim of salary discrimination.  The defendant university argued that the analysis 
was flawed because of correlated, omitted variables.  Id.  The court found the regression 
analysis admissible while nonetheless awarding summary judgment for the defendant after 
the finding that the regression analysis was insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  Id. at 
701-03.  In doing so, the court cited Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), which held 
that omission of particular variables in regression analysis ordinarily goes to weight, not 
admissibility.  Id. at 701, n.4.  In a discrimination case such as Cullen, a productivity related 
variable that might otherwise be appropriate for inclusion because it normally demonstrates 
a statistically significant association with productivity may be excluded on the ground that it 
may reflect a qualification that has been denied the plaintiff.  See Finkelstein, supra note 
371, at 738.  Other courts have rejected regression analyses for reasons of omitted relevant 
variables or have admitted statistical analysis only because it considered all relevant factors.  
See, e.g., Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 206 B.R. 142 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 407. It should be noted
analysis in litigation and that courts have seemingly achieved a greater degree of 
consistency in cases involving less methodological complexity.  Consider, for example, 
Children's Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2000) (where an 
appellate court affirmed a finding that the expert failed to consider all the variables that 
might affect his conclusion despite having used an uncontroversial accounting method); 
Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Oregon Cardio Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(where an appellate court rejected arguments that a decline in profits was solely due to local 
factors); Fung v. Riemenschneider, No. C6-02-917, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 534 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 6, 2003) (where an appellate court reversed because the expert did not fully 
consider losses stemming from fundamental changes in the practice in determining the loss 
from a breach using the before and after method of damages valuation). 
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odologies have likely only begun.  Consider the example of survival 
analysis, used to analyze time-to-event data.408  Survival analysis, which 
has its origins in medical research, is a sophisticated statistical 
methodology that is likely to appear with increasing frequency in damages 
cases, in part due to advocacy for its use in business damages literature409 
and in part because of the increasing number of cases involving such 
intangible assets as customer accounts terminated through a breach of 
contract.  The lives of these accounts must be estimated to arrive at a 
damages estimate.410  Given the growth of intellectual assets and the 
advocacy for its use,411 survival analysis will likely be used more 
frequently in damages cases because it is often the most appropriate 
statistical methodology for estimating damages when it is necessary to 
estimate the lives of intellectual assets involving censored data.412  
 408. See, e.g., DAVID W. HOSMER, JR. & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED SURVIVAL 
9); First Am. Real 
al analysis has found its way into other types of legal cases as well.  See, 
See Richard K. Ellsworth, Attrition Analysis and Customer-Relationship Life 
 at 173, 173-76; KLEINBAUM, supra note 
ANALYSIS:  REGRESSION MODELING OF TIME TO EVENT DATA 1-2 (199
Estate Info. Servs. v. Consumer Benefit Servs., Inc., No. 03CV0633-B(NLS), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 30317 (S.D. Cal. April 22, 2004).  Survival analysis has its origins in medical 
research.  See Jonathan A Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates:  Using Statistical 
Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317 (2002).  See DAVID 
G. KLEINBAUM, SURVIVAL ANALYSIS:  A SELF-LEARNING TEXT 1-33 (1996), for a basic 
primer on survival analysis.  Survival analysis has been used with some frequency in labor 
relations cases.  See, e.g., Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming a 
district court’s decision to admit an expert’s survival analysis comparing employee 
statuses); Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 770 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing survival 
analysis); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 765 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985); Morgan v. United 
Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (allowing the use of 
survival analysis).  Survival analysis is a statistical technique that is useful when the 
fundamental metric of interest is the time until some event occurs.  For example, suppose 
defendant breaches a contract in which plaintiff was to provide services to defendant’s 
customers for a fee per account each period.  A damages estimate requires calculation of the 
revenue that would have been obtained but for defendant’s breach, and it is necessary to 
determine how long the customer accounts would have survived had not their lives been 
artificially truncated.  If the lives of accounts opened and closed prior to the breach are 
fundamentally different, on average, from those still open at the time of the breach, then a 
problem in estimation using historical lives arises.  Data artificially truncated in such a 
manner are said to be censored.  Censored data mean that the lives of the assets are only 
partially observed thereby presenting estimation difficulties.  Least-squares regression and 
other popular statistical techniques often used in damages estimation are ill-suited to such a 
situation because they make no allowance for censored data. As a result, damages may be 
inaccurately estimated. See KLEINBAUM, supra, at 5-7, 23-25. 
 409. See, e.g., ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
218-237 (1998). 
 410. First Am. Real Estate Info. Servs., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30317 provides one such 
example.  Surviv
e.g., Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts? 39 J.L. & ECON. 241, 254 
(1996). 
 411. See REILLY & SCHWEIHS, supra note 409. 
 412. 
Expectancy, BUS. VALUATION REV., Winter 2005,
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what
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Although expertise in statistics can spring from a variety of educational and 
experiential backgrounds,413 few experts in statistics outside those routinely 
engaged in medical research are likely to be very knowledgeable regarding 
survival analysis.414  So the question arises as to precisely what 
qualifications make one an expert in this methodology:  is a sound 
knowledge of statistics in general sufficient, or is actual experience in using 
survival analysis required? 
This s
 qualifications make a witness an expert when it comes to technical 
matters.  Based upon court decisions, the often unclear answer would seem 
to be both jurisdictionally dependent and a subset of the more general issue 
of necessary relevant experience discussed in Part III.  For example, Davis 
v. Davis, in which the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s rejection 
of expert testimony partly on the basis that the expert had never performed 
a valuation of the type of business in question prior to the engagement,415 
can be contrasted with Dekker v. Topcon American Corp.  There, the 
appellate court affirmed a lower court’s decision to admit expert testimony 
despite the expert’s apparent lack of technical qualifications and industry 
experience, because the expert possessed business valuation experience.416 
Complex methodologies relatively new to the courts do not stop with
nced regression models and survival analysis.  Courts have also 
struggled valuing stock options417 based upon option-pricing theory.418  
Traditional “closed-form” valuation models, such as Black-Scholes,419 have 
408, at 5-7. 
 413. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 86-87 (2d ed. 2000). 
m outside his firm on this issue.  Id. 
k 
 
189, at 1093-1104.  For examples of cases in which stock option 
 414. Seigneur, supra note 166.  The interviewee, a nationally prominent testifying 
expert, noted that he would need to obtain assistance fro
 415. No. B156636, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3405 (Cal. Ct. App. April 7, 2003). 
 416. No. G027150, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1449 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2002). 
 417. See Robert Feder, Marital Dissolution Courts Continue to Struggle with Stoc
Options, DELUXE BVUPDATE, Jun. 2001, available at http://www.bvlibrary.com (discussing
several divorce cases in which the courts have rendered “widely divergent” opinions on 
option valuation); see also Maritato v. Maritato, 685 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) 
(affirming use of intrinsic method for valuing options—a method that values the option 
based upon what it would bring if it were exercised immediately.  Options that are not “in 
the money” can have market value but have no intrinsic value.  The court also upheld a 
decision to exclude unvested options out of the money as having no value at the time of the 
divorce action because they would not vest until after the divorce); FRANK K REILLY & 
KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 812 (8th ed. 2006) 
(defining intrinsic value). 
 418. For a discussion of options and option pricing theory as applied to option valuation, 
see HITCHNER, supra note 
valuation methodology was at issue, see In re Marriage of Harrison, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1216 
(1986) and Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). 
 419. See HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1104-12 (discussing the Black-Scholes model in 
option valuation). 
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attained widespread acceptance in both the finance literature and the courts, 
but these models are sometimes inadequate to accurately value complex 
stock options that contain what are essentially options within options.420  
Accurate valuation of these securities requires the use of more complex 
models such as binomial lattice models.421  For example, in McCarthy v. 
McCarthy, the valuation issue centered on the amount of appreciation that 
had taken place during the marriage and required a valuation of options 
containing reload features acquired at the beginning of the marriage and 
during the marriage.  Valuation using the Black-Scholes model resulted in 
a substantive undervaluation of the entry values and therefore an 
overvaluation of the marital appreciation.422 
Option pricing theory is also useful in valuing 
lex capital structures contain securities such as convertible debt, 
preferred stock, and various classes of common stock.423  Despite their 
sophistication, binomial models are sometimes incapable of accurately 
valuing such businesses, and the use of simulations such as Monte Carlo is 
required.424  This can occur when the value depends upon the probability of 
 420. Chamberlain & Hill, supra note 381, at 4-5 (highlighting the inadequacy that stems 
from the inability of closed-form models to consider the additional value that attends 
n of stock options into a sequence of steps or intervals.  At each interval the 
d 
. Ill. 2007) (involving the novel use of Monte Carlo simulation to value a 
the Value of Executive Stock Options, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
e 
embedded options and results in the potential undervaluation of the basic options containing 
such features). 
 421. See HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1107-12.  A binomial model breaks down the 
time to expiratio
price of the security underlying the option can move up or down, with the magnitude of the 
movement determined by the security’s volatility.  The result is a binomial tree that captures 
the possible price movements over the period of the option.  The resulting set of values is 
then averaged and discounted back to present value to determine the value of the options. 
 422. McCarty v. McCarty, Johnson Co., Kan. Dist Div. 3, Case No. 05CV08547 
(decided Nov. 13, 2006); see Philip H. Dybvig & Mark Lowenstein, Employee Reloa
Options:  Pricing, Hedging, and Optimal Exercise, 16 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 145, 146 (2003) 
(“[A] reload option has the feature that if the option is exercised prior to maturity and the 
exercise price is paid with previously owned shares, the holder is entitled to one new share 
for each option exercised plus new options which reload or replace some of the original 
options.”). 
 423. See Chatz v. BearingPoint, Inc. (In re Nanotechnologies, Inc.), 364 B.R. 308 
(Bankr. N.D
company). 
 424. See Ravi Jagannathan & Jane Saly, Ignoring Reload Features Can Substantially 
Understate 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=110072, at 3, (discussing how ignoring reload features substantially 
undervalues options and the requirement to use other methodologies to appropriately valu
these options); see also Steve Pomerantz & Bruce G. Dubinsky, Monte Carlo Simulation 
Analysis—A Tool for Projecting the Unknown, CPA EXPERT, Winter 2007, at 1, 1-5 
(providing an explanation of Monte Carlo simulation and a discussion of its use in 
predicting the future path of derivative prices, and noting that Monte Carlo techniques allow 
even the most complicated derivative transactions to be valued).  See generally Chamberlain 
& Hill, supra note 381 (describing the process and value of simulations). 
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VI. INCREASING PARTISANSHIP IN DAMAGES EXPERT TESTIMONY 
which issues involving intellectual capital are becoming more complex, 
 
the occurrence of uncertain future events that are endogenous in nature.425  
For example, the value of a business damaged by breach of contract may be 
partly dependent upon the outcomes of future liquidity events such as an 
initial public offering (IPO).426  It follows that, to the extent that a breach 
has diminished the likelihood of a successful IPO, the damages may extend 
far beyond the immediate effects of the breach.427 
In summary, given that it is all too possible to confuse lay persons 
with dubious statistical analyses,428 the combination of the ever-
intensifying complexity of business and sophistication of the 
methodologies necessary to accurately estimate damages is increasing the 
difficulty of making sound judgments about the reliability of expert 
testimony.429  It is becoming more and more daunting for business damages 
professionals, even those in high-end valuation and forensic services firms, 
to keep abreast of the methodologies necessary to achieve the most 
accurate valuations.430  The challenges would seem even greater for judges, 
the gatekeepers for expert testimony, whose primary concerns may lie 
elsewhere431 but who bear responsibility for applying—and in some cases 
developing—the legal criteria that will be used to sep
Expert testimony is increasingly necessary in a technical society in 
 
 425. Chamberlain & Hill, supra note 381, at 6. 
 426. See id. at 5 (discussing the effects of future liquidity events on valuation). 
 427. In the future, the courts may not face cases involving stock options only but also 
real options, because real options impact the value of companies with material amounts of 
intellectual capital, and traditional valuation methodologies do not fully capture the value 
intellectual capital contributes.  Sudy Sudarsanam et al., Real Options and Impact of 
Intellectual Capital on Corporate Value, 7 J. INTELL. CAP. 291 (2007).  For a discussion of 
real options with respect to patent damages, see Jerry Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Real 
Options and Patent Damages:  The Legal Treatment of Non-Infringing Alternatives, and 
Incentives to Innovate, 20 J. ECON. SURV. 493, (2006). 
 428. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1969. 
 429. Id.; see Victoria A. Platt, Research Tools that Valuation/Economic Damages 
Analysts Use in Commercial Litigation Matters, INSIGHTS (Autumn 2006) (describing how 
the inexorable march is also fueled, in part, by the increasing availability of data contained 
in database accessible via the internet that make rigorous analysis possible more frequently).  
But see Donald P. Wisehart, Dangers of Mixing Transaction Databases, FIN. VALUATION & 
LITIG. EXPERT 7, 7 (Aug.-Sept. 2006) (explaining that one hazard of using online databases 
such as BIZCOMPS and Pratt’s Stats for damages experts lies in improperly mixing 
transaction databases that measure financial phenomena in different ways). 
 430. Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 431. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1937. 
 432. Id. at 1965. 
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and independent expert testimony is critical to the functioning of the 
courts.433  Against a tapestry of federal and state admissibility rules and 
decisions about the reliability of damages testimony, growing complexity 
of business litigation, and increasing sophistication of valuation 
methodologies, a troublesome trend is complicating courts’ oversight of 
expert testimony.  This trend involves increasing partisanship by damages 
experts, a matter that has caused great frustration for the courts.434 
A. Recent Evidence of Damages Expert Partisanship 
It is widely understood that the current process of party-selected 
experts has serious flaws.435  Litigation itself is an inherently murky 
process, as evidenced in the following statement:  “The fact patterns that 
lead to litigation, and litigation itself, typically end up like Akira 
Kurosawa’s Rashomon, in that each party has his own story and the ‘real 
story’ often does not get told at trial.”436  Courts have long expressed 
concern that experts can muddy case waters,437 and that experts with 
excellent credentials will sometimes base their valuations on unrealistic 
assumptions.438  Recently, as a result of expert partisanship, the post-
Daubert percentage of times that expert testimony has been admitted 
without limitations in federal courts has fallen from 75% to 59%.439 In a 
1998 survey, judges ranked expert partisanship as the most frequent 
problem with expert testimony in civil cases.440  Consistent with the 
fundamental notions that third-party witnesses are more credible441 and that 
experts are independent of retaining counsel,442 experts are supposed to be 
 433. Krishna, supra note 167. 
 434. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3; Cimasi, supra note 7; Freed, supra 
note 7 (documenting increased partisanship by damages experts). 
 435. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 424; see Mnookin, supra note 164 (providing a detailed 
treatise on the history of concerns about expert testimony). 
 436. Lazar, supra note 170, at 6. 
 437. See, e.g., Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1859) (“Experience has 
shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained to any 
amount . . .  wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and 
perplexing, instead of elucidating, the questions involved in the issue.”) 
 438. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 402. 
 439. Jones, supra note 144. 
 440. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 21. 
 441. Lazar, supra note 170, at 6. 
 442. Brown, supra note 194. Consistent with being independent of clients' goals, experts 
owe no duty of loyalty to their clients.  ABA Formal Op. 97-407 (1997).  Attorneys will 
often be tempted to use accountants who are already familiar with their client's operations.  
Lloyd, supra note 25, at 390.  Astute opposing counsel will probe the relationship between 
attorney and/or client and the valuation expert in order to explore for inducements to 
advocacy. Frequent engagements involving the same parties can be suggestive of bias.  
Wiegand, supra note 110.  Attorneys whose experts are challenged on the basis of past or 
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unbiased and not partisan advocates for their clients instead of being 
advocates for the contributions being made by their expertise.443  The 
burden of proving a damages report reliable falls upon the party presenting 
the report,444 and “deliberate, manifest, pervasive and systematic bias” on 
the part of the expert is supposed to result in disqualification.445  
Historically, however, anxious pleas against partisanship have been 
ineffective,446 lack of damages expert objectivity appears to be on the 
rise,447 and courts are becoming more critical with respect to experts’ lack 
of objectivity.448 
ongoing client relationships may argue that familiarity with client operations and financial 
condition is likely to produce more accurate valuations, and sound working relationships 
developed over time can make for a better fit between the case and valuation expert 
testimony.  Such fit is highly important because an absence of fit can result in courts 
ignoring valuation testimony.  See, e.g., Rashedi v. McCue, No. A095215, A096717, 2004 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming a decision that plaintiff’s 
expert’s valuation was excessive because of a lack of fit between the evidence and the 
valuation estimate).  Consequently, concerns over attorney/client familiarity are more likely 
to go to the weight of the expert's testimony than to result in exclusion.  Wiegand, supra 
note 110. 
Moreover, experts can concurrently work for and against the same attorney on two 
independent cases, but experts may not switch sides in a case.  See Brown, supra note 194 
(discussing Koch Refining Co. v. Boudreaux (In re Boudreaux), 85 F.3d 1178 (5th Cir. 
1996)).  The court noted that 
[C]ourts have not adopted a 'bright line' rule for determining whether an expert 
should be disqualified from conflicting engagements which are factually 
related," preferring instead a two-part test.  Part one asks if it was reasonable for 
the first party retaining the expert to assume that a confidential relationship 
existed, and if so, part two asks whether the retaining party disclosed any 
confidential information.  Further, the majority opinion holds that expert 
contingency fees are not permitted in order to avoid experts' payment being 
dependent upon outcomes; flat fees, retainers, minimum fees, and lock-up fees 
(fees intended to forego retention by opposing parties) are ethically permitted, 
however, if reasonable. . . . 
 443. Alan H. Silberman, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Mohan Rao, Director, 
LECG, LLC, Phillip A. Beutel, Senior Vice President, NERA Economic Consulting, and 
John J. McDonnell, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berhoff LLP, Conference on Effective 
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:  Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, 
Moments of Truth:  A Discussion of Ways for Expert to Handle Unreasonable Lawyers, and 
Lawyers to Handle Unreasonable Experts (March 21, 2006) (conference notes and materials 
on file with authors).  A failure on the part of experts to deal with alternative information or 
data can be grounds for appeal.  Lloyd, supra note 25, at 413. 
 444. See Kay v. First Cont’l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (placing the 
burden of establishing reliability on the party providing the report). 
 445. Financial Valuation and the Litigation Expert, Daubert on the Docket, p. 1. 
 446. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 774. 
 447. Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., C.A. No.12207-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 108 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 448. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 282, at 82-83 (“[Experts] should not be, or be perceived 
as, a ‘hired gun.’”). 
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In Pabst Brewing v. Commissioner, the court rejected all the experts’ 
conclusions on the basis that expert testimony is not useful when it is mere 
advocacy for a client’s position.449 The court in Lane v. Cancer Treatment 
Centers termed the testimony of the opposing experts “unduly pessimistic” 
and “unreasonably optimistic.”450  In Finklestein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 
calling one expert’s analysis “simply incredible” and stating that it 
contained “so many problems that it is impossible to address them all,” the 
court noted: 
Men and [sic] women who purport to be applying sound, 
academically-validated valuation techniques come to this court 
and, through the neutral application of their expertise to the facts, 
come to widely disparate results, even when applying the same 
methodology.  These starkly contrasting presentations have, 
given the duties required of this court, imposed upon trial judges 
the responsibility to forge a responsible valuation from what is 
often ridiculously biased ‘expert’ input.451 
Whether expert bias is intentional or unintentional, court opinions 
sometimes suggest frustration with the failure of some experts to provide 
plausible valuations.  For example, the Henke v. Trilithic, Inc. court noted 
that “[t]he parties’ experts have presented remarkably divergent valuations.  
As is often the case in an appraisal action, the Court does not find either 
party to have fully satisfied its burden . . . .  The Court must therefore 
conduct its own independent valuation.”452  In Estate of Adams v. 
Commissioner, the tax court rejected both experts’ valuations and 
determined some of the quantitative parameters for valuation using its own 
judgment.453  Similarly, in Hess v. Commissioner, the tax court rejected 
both experts’ valuations.454  In Wagner Construction, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
the tax court found the testimony of the experts so dissimilar that it deemed 
the testimony biased.455 
 449. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (T.C.M. 1996). 
 450. Lane, supra note 447, at 131 n.174. 
 451. Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., C.A. No.19598, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 53, at *41 
(Del. Ch. 2005). 
 452. Henke v. Trilithic, Inc., Civil Action No. 13155, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *19 
(Ch. 2005). 
 453. Estate of Adams v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (T.C.M. 2002). 
 454. Hess v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 303 (T.C.M. 2003). 
 455. Wagner Constr., Inc. v. Comm’r. 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1869 (T.C.M. 2001). This 
occasional disdain for expert testimony is not always devoid of ironic humor, as suggested 
by the opinion in Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987): 
The jury pulled the figure of $ 100,000 out of a hat in which Isaksen’s expert 
witness had done the usual magic tricks; but as there was no evidence of how 
much the antitrust violation, as distinct from unrelated market forces, 
contributed to Isaksen’s losses, or of how much of the loss was an antitrust 
injury as distinct from being deprived of the opportunity to take a free ride on 
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It is not just the courts that are frustrated at times but also the experts.  
Recently, a damages expert with excellent credentials published what was, 
in effect, a rebuttal to a bankruptcy court’s exclusion of his testimony after 
the court followed a rather tortuous path that included first admitting the 
testimony and then reversing its position.  In this rebuttal, quoting from 
various statements made by the judge in hearing transcripts, the expert 
asserted that the judge “brought an expressed agenda to this case” that 
included not only decrying “established business valuation methodology 
and authoritative data, which the profession generally accepts as reliable,” 
competing dealers, the expert’s efforts to translate his losses into a present-value 
figure were irrelevant. . . . So the damage phase of the trial must be retried. 
In Chartwell, supra note 122, the judge’s irony is unmistakable in his disqualification of a 
health care valuation specialist: 
I have a discreet understanding of my limitations, but I also have an 
understanding of what my experience tells me in having listened for the past 30 
years to appraisers…I have yet to find an appraiser of value of non-real estate 
that ever says anything that’s cogent and persuasive.  Go ahead.  I’m always 
willing to be persuaded. 
In Gilbert v. MPM Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 666-67 (Del. Ch. 1997), aff’d, 731 A.2d 
790 (Del. 1999), court evidenced more disdain for experts: 
One might expect the experts’ desire to convince the Court of the 
reasonableness and validity of their assumptions . . . would produce a somewhat 
narrow range of values, clearly and concisely supported, despite individual 
parties’ obvious conflicting incentives.  Unfortunately, as this case and other 
cases most decidedly illustrate, one should not put much faith in that 
expectation, at least when faced with appraisal experts in this Court. . . . In sum, 
one report is submitted by Dr. Pangloss, and the other by Mr. Scrooge. 
Conflicts of interest involving expert witnesses probably arise more often in using technical 
experts.  See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 
2004); Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994); Paul v. 
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (demonstrating that such 
conflicts can sometimes present difficulties for the courts with business valuation experts as 
well); Johnson v. Johnson, No. 246484, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 3153 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that the trial court erroneously assumed that an expert, retained jointly by the 
husband and wife to determine the value of the business and by the husband only to 
determine the tax consequences of a succession plan, was retained by both parties for both 
purposes).   One judge has noted that being “too cozy” with one side will raise the court's 
skepticism, as in a case where the valuation expert was the spouse of an attorney on a case.  
BVR’s BVWire Central, http://www.bvresources.com.  However, despite the increase in 
court scrutiny of experts’ objectivity, some courts do not find bias in places one might 
expect.  For example, in Crabtree v. Metalworks & Hydra-Assembly, Inc., No. 02AP-450, 
2003 WL 42442 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), the appellate court affirmed a lower court’s 
valuation of goodwill based upon the sole expert’s testimony when the expert was the 
plaintiff’s son. In Marlar v. Daniel, 247 S.W.3d 473 (Ark. 2007), the state supreme court 
denied a negligence claim against an expert when the claim was based on the expert's 
relations to a party to the litigation. In Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014 
(5th Cir. 1993), the appellate court affirmed allowing a party to the litigation to testify as his 
own expert. 
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but also placing “the validity and credibility of business valuation on 
trial.”456  Regardless of the relative merits of the positions of the judge and 
the expert in this case, the obvious tension is both troublesome and 
indicative of what may be a growing rift between some courts and business 
damages experts arising from actual and/or perceived expert bias.457 
Aside from the obvious structural problem that experts are paid by the 
side for which they testify,458 what is driving this partisanship?  Perhaps a 
major driving factor is that the distinction between attorneys and experts is 
arguably not a compelling one in the first place.459  Damages experts can be 
valuable aides to attorneys in all phases of a case.460  In complex cases, the 
roles of attorneys and experts are similar in that experts are often called 
upon to act as investigators of the data from which conclusions can be 
drawn and to advise attorneys on whether there is a legitimate case from a 
scientific perspective.461  Moreover, science can be malleable, and 
maintenance of impartiality under a system wherein the experts become 
like “star players” with “attorneys acting as coaches”462 seems problematic 
at the onset.  Some have placed the blame on the prevalence of “hired gun” 
experts in this system, but others maintain this argument belies the greater 
incentives of professional experts to preserve their reputations by not 
rendering inadmissible opinions.463 
Despite expressed opposition to partisanship by some professional 
experts464 and assertions by some attorneys who maintain that experts 
should be unbiased and owners of their reports as opposed to advocates for 
their clients case,465 is this really what most attorneys seek in an expert?  
Although attorneys expect experts to state that they are unbiased,466 there is 
a growing expectation that experts will represent their parties’ interests.467  
The legal process has been described as adversarial rather than scientific in 
nature, with attorneys calling the shots and the goal not being greater 
understanding but rather winning.468  Although some attorneys claim that 
 456. Cimasi, supra note 7, at 20. 
 457. Apparently similar instances of partisanship exist in patent cases involving technical 
experts.  See, e.g., Schuurman & Stafford, supra note 148. 
 458. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 774 
 459. Randall G. Block, Disqualifying Expert Witnesses, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar. 
2005, at 14. 
 460. Vondra, supra note 331. 
 461. Block, supra note 459, at 14. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Lloyd, supra note 25, 385. 
 464. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 144. 
 465. Zimmerman, supra note 107. 
 466. See, e.g., STEVEN BABITSKY & JAMES J. MANGRAVITI, JR., HOW TO EXCEL DURING 
DEPOSITIONS:  TECHNIQUES FOR EXPERTS THAT WORK 113 (1999). 
 467. Fanon, supra note 252, at 13. 
 468. Mandel, supra note 150. 
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biased damages experts can be detrimental to their cases,469 one legal 
commentator has stated, “I would go into a lawsuit with an objective, 
uncommitted, independent expert . . . almost as willingly as I would occupy 
a foxhole with a couple of noncombatant soldiers.”470  Another 
commentator has stated that “[n]o one expects an expert chosen and paid 
by a plaintiff or defendant to present a balanced, unbiased analysis.”471  
Others have stated that there is no reason to hire experts if they are not 
advocates,472 and that research detrimental to their cases is not desired.473  
These opinions may reflect honest advocacy by attorneys for clients, but in 
a legal environment that increasingly utilizes professional damages experts 
for valid reasons, the message for many experts seems likely to be a clear 
call for client advocacy—and experts will not be successful over repeat 
engagements if they testify in a manner that supports opposing parties.474 
Attorneys expect damages experts to have a good “theory of the 
case.”475  In other words, attorneys expect damages experts to understand 
and support their story about the case.  Sometimes this has led attorneys to 
ghost write expert reports in detriment to their clients and experts alike.476  
Attorneys are said to strive for experts who will take ownership of their 
reports,477 and although damages experts are supposed to be advocates for 
their reports, not advocates for their clients,478 this seems far from being a 
bright-line distinction.479  It is perhaps telling of both a close working 
relationship and damages experts’ willingness to please attorneys that only 
 469. Jones, supra note 144. 
 470. See Jones, supra note 144 (quoting PETER N. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE:  JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM). 
 471. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 423. 
 472. Jones, supra note 144. 
 473. Zimmerman, supra note 107. 
 474. Block, supra note 459, at 14. 
 475. Elson, supra note 174. 
 476. Aspen, supra note 144; see Brown, supra note 194, (citing Solaia Technology LLC 
v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 362 F.Supp.2d 797 (N.D. Ill. 2005)) (noting that an expert's affidavit 
should not merely regurgitate an attorney's arguments); Manning v. Crockett, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16118, 1999 WL 342715 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (stating that ghost writing expert 
reports is not permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 
F.R.D. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Occulto v. Adamar of NJ, Inc., 125 F.R.F. 611 (D.N.J. 1989) 
(expressing concern over an expert report drafted by an attorney).  In one case, a Nobel 
Laureate economist's expert report was excluded because counsel redrafted his report.  Rao, 
supra note 191. 
 477. Jones, supra note 144. 
 478. Kinrich, supra note 250. 
 479. Babitsky & Mangraviti, supra note 466, at 112 (quoting ROBERT C. HABUSH, ART 
OF ADVOCACY:  CROSS-EXAM OF NON-MEDICAL EXPERTS § 300(2) (1998)) (saying that “an 
honest independent expert who would never dream of giving false testimony under any 
circumstances may nevertheless end up inadvertently doing just that.  His subconscious 
partiality for the side which has sought his services may color his evaluation of the facts of 
the case and his opinion.”). 
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a small percentage of attorneys cite problems with their own expert reports, 
whereas a larger number cite problems with opposing expert reports.480 
So, is the issue simply one of attorneys wanting damages experts to be 
biased but not be perceived as biased?  If so, is it asking too much of 
experts to successfully perform such a bipolar act given that attorneys have 
been accused historically by experts and some commentators of going 
beyond what is justifiable for their clients?481  Under the current trial 
regime, experts are, in effect, being asked to play their best for a team but 
simultaneously disavow any interest in whether the team wins or loses.  
Consequently, it is often difficult to draw a bright line where independence 
ends and advocacy begins.482  The implications of this conundrum are 
explored in Part VII. 
B. Legacy Remedies for Damages Expert Partisanship 
The foregoing examination of damages expert partisanship suggests 
first that it exists, second that it apparently always has existed, and third 
that it appears to be a growing problem for the courts despite the good 
wishes and admonitions of nobler members of the expert community.483  
The tendency of courts to lean toward admitting expert testimony in the 
expectation that cross-examination will reveal its flaws has been severely 
criticized as frequently ineffective in preventing biased testimony from 
reaching juries.484  As related below, historically, various possible remedies 
to the problems presented by partisanship in expert testimony have been 
proposed, and all have proven ineffective. 
Some commentators have called for tighter ethical and valuation 
standards485 as a solution to closing the distance between the fiction of 
unbiased damages expert testimony and the reality of partisanship.486  
Ongoing and proposed changes to business valuation standards,487 as well 
as accounting standards that move financial reporting toward fair value 
accounting, hold some promise for easing the burden imposed on damages 
 480. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 17. 
 481. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 782. 
 482. Krishna, supra note 167. 
 483. See supra text accompanying notes 433-82. 
 484. See, e.g., Fanon, supra note 252, at 13. 
 485. See, e.g., Getting S Corp. Valuates Clearly, Correctly, BUS. VALUATION 
RESOURCES:  BVWIRE (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.bvresources.com/BVWire/September 
2007Issue60-3.htm. 
 486. Mandel, supra note 150; Jim Hitchner, AICPA BV Standard Update, FIN. 
VALUATION AND LITIG. EXPERT, Dec. 06-Jan. 07, at 1-2. 
 487. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, VALUATION OF A 
BUSINESS, BUSINESS OWNERSHIP INTEREST, SECURITY, OR INTANGIBLE ASSET (2007), 
available at http://fvs.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/672E1DD4-2304-47CA-8F34-
8C5AA64CB008/0/SSVS_Full_Version.pdf. 
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experts by the current failure of financial reporting standards to capture the 
value of intellectual capital.488  These changes, though no doubt welcomed 
by many in the valuation profession, seem unlikely to close the gap 
completely between the actual value of the firm and the indicated value 
because much of the intellectual capital will still not be captured by 
financial reporting.489 
One leading expert in business valuation, citing a proliferation of 
standards promulgated by organizations such as the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, the American Society of Appraisers, the 
Institute of Business Appraisers, and the National Association of Certified 
Valuation Analysts, has stated that the problems faced by the courts with 
respect to business valuation do not stem from a lack of standards and 
guidance.490  Similarly, one commentator has listed no less than nine 
objectionable practices by damages experts that do not adhere to existing 
standards,491 raising the question of the value of additional standards if 
many experts are not adhering to existing standards.  Another commentator 
paraphrased the court in a case (not cited) in which he was a damages 
expert:  “It appears that objectivity and independence have a greater 
significance to those who set the accounting standards than to those who 
have to apply those standards in preparing financial statements.”492  Finally, 
examples of standards from the financial reporting environment suggest a 
tendency for standards to become increasingly rule-based as opposed to 
principle-based, thereby encouraging a check-the-box mentality and a 
proliferation of rules that attempt to contemplate every application of the 
standards.493  This is a logically impossible task, given the previously 
acknowledged subjectivity of expert testimony.  Consequently, the efficacy 
of tighter standards in reducing expert bias seems questionable at best. 
In the U.K., courts are allowed to impose fines upon experts who 
mislead the courts.  Although fining experts might intuitively seem to be a 
simple way in which to reduce partisanship in expert testimony, this has 
apparently not alleviated growing concerns of bias in the U.K. inasmuch as 
the Civil Justice Council recommended in September 2005 that experts in 
civil trials be prepared to give the same evidence no matter which side is 
 488. Largest Ever ASA BV Confab Tracks Progress of Profession, BUS. VALUATION 
RESOURCES:  BVWIRE (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.bvresources.com/BVWire 
/October2007Issue61-5.htm; Fair Value Measurements, DEFINING ISSUES (KPMG Int’l), 
Sept. 2006, at 1, 1-2. 
 489. See, e.g., New Statement Allows Fair-Value Measurements for Financial Assets and 
Liabilities, DEFINING ISSUES (KPMG Int’l), Feb. 2007, at 1, 1-4. 
 490. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3. 
 491. Freed, supra note 7. 
 492. Hosteny, supra note 331, at 5. 
 493. Robert K. Herdman, Testimony:  Are Current Financial Accounting Standards 
Protecting Investors?, Feb. 14, 2002, http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/021402tsrkh.htm. 
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paying them.494  Further, assuming a reasonably efficient market for expert 
services, the expected value of fines would ultimately be incorporated into 
experts’ fees, raising the costs of providing expert testimony and imposing 
a cost on clients.  Although it could be argued that clients are the 
appropriate parties to bear such costs, the apparent lack of efficacy in 
courts in the U.K. makes this potential remedy seem questionable at best.  
Finally, the mechanism of fining experts, if employed with sufficient 
frequency to represent a real threat, may have a dampening effect on the 
numbers of experts willing to testify and on the willingness of experts to 
press for new and better methodologies instead of taking the safest path, 
thereby raising litigation costs and impeding the progress of science in the 
courts. 
Judge Richard Posner once proposed a national registry of experts in 
which data could be recorded regarding each expert’s past testimony 
record.  Such a registry already exists for experts in the discipline of 
economics.495  Although obtaining information about experts more easily 
might assist attorneys,496 expanding this registry to include all damages 
experts would seem to be of limited additional value in reducing 
partisanship.  Aside from the obvious resources required to maintain a 
national registry of all damages experts containing the most current data on 
each expert, a more compelling reason to question this as a remedy for 
partisanship is that, despite the existence of databases containing experts 
now, attorneys rarely engage experts through such databases.497  Further, 
given the number of large professional firms with excellent repositories of 
expert talent, locating damages experts is not inordinately difficult.498  
Finally, some question whether various accreditation organizations would 
ever coalesce to agree upon one set of expert standards that would be 
needed to determine whether experts within an all-inclusive national 
registry were in compliance with professional standards.499  It is therefore 
difficult to conceive how a national registry would alone resolve the issue 
of partisanship.500 
There is evidence that judges appreciate the use of conservative 
assumptions in developing damages reports.501  One commentator has 
 494. John Markoff, A Boom in Expert-Witness Firms; The Idea Economy / Who Owns 
That?, INT’L. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 3, 2005, at 6. 
 495. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 385. 
 496. Id. at 386. 
 497. Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 498. These include a number of major public accounting firms and large expert 
boutiques. 
 499. Krishna, supra note 167 (citing a refusal of United Kingdom expert accrediting 
organizations to band together). 
 500. Hilton, supra note 223. 
 501. See, e.g., Kay v. First Cont’l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
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proposed that experts be required to provide several alternative damages 
scenarios based upon different assumptions, but he then partly impeaches 
this argument by noting an instance in which a court held that damages had 
not been proven because of the presentation of alternative scenarios.502  
Another difficulty with this proposal is that given the multitude of 
assumptions often necessary to produce damages reports, how would an 
expert choose which assumptions are the most critical and therefore the 
ones to vary, and what values would the expert assign for these 
assumptions?  Moreover, would juries simply become inundated with data 
instead of better understanding the nature of the damages, as suggested by 
the commentator?503 
Another proffered solution—albeit one that is certainly not new and 
has several negative implications—is to make greater use of consulting 
experts or special masters to assist judges in determining the admissibility 
of scientific evidence.  Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides 
judges with the power to appoint testifying experts, and Rule 53 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits appointments of special 
masters.504  Outside Rule 706, courts may appoint judicial tutors to aid in 
comprehension of expert testimony and assist with admissibility issues.505  
Court-appointed experts can provide independent analysis, critique experts 
hired by opposing parties, and tutor juries.506  Some have argued 
analytically that judges should appoint experts when damage estimates by 
opposing experts are extremely disparate and that developing a reputation 
for doing so will discourage such disparity.507 
Courts have been historically reluctant, however, to use their power to 
appoint independent experts, and judges who have used it consider their 
actions extraordinary.508  This reluctance to use court-appointed experts 
(explaining how an expert witness provided a worst case scenario). 
 502. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 418 (citing Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Am. Safety Prods., 
Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1987)).  Other courts have, however, allowed multiple 
damage scenarios to be presented by the same expert.  See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Utah 2001). 
 503. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 415. 
 504. Aspen, supra note 144. 
 505. Id.  To a partial extent, a methodological solution to the issue of alternative 
valuations may rest on the possibility of capturing the spirit of alternative scenarios through 
the use of simulations that distill these to a single value.  Two rather obvious difficulties 
with this proposal, however, are that sophisticated valuation models such as Monte Carlo 
simulations are very complex and difficult to understand, and have outcomes that are a 
function of probability estimates that experts will no doubt debate as vigorously as they 
currently do other assumptions. 
 506. Jones, supra note 144. 
 507. Jonathan T. Tomlin & David Cooper, When Should Judges Appoint Experts?  A 
Law and Economics Perspective 32-33 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1699, 
2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1699. 
 508. Jones, supra note 144. Attorney opposition is often credited for causing this 
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stems, in part, from concern that juries may perceive these experts as 
infallible.509  Their use is not increasing in spite of providing an easy route 
for discovery, education of the court, and more rapid settlement, and even 
though courts possess the ability to have both parties absorb the attendant 
fees.510  Other matters of concern with the use of special masters and court-
appointed experts include, but are not limited to, the belief that there can be 
honest disagreements over scientific matters that are best explored and 
exposed through the adversarial process and the belief that court-appointed 
experts can be biased.511  If such disagreements arise from “genuine 
uncertainty or differing theoretical perspectives,” there is concern that 
neutral experts would only suppress, not eliminate, the disagreements.512  
Finally, the cost of court-appointed experts, which must be borne by the 
parties to the lawsuit, may be another factor contributing to judges’ 
restraint in their use.513  Consequently, these long-noted concerns about 
court-appointed experts continue to loom large, making it doubtful that 
neutral experts alone are a complete solution to concerns about 
partisanship.514 
reluctance, but available data suggest that it is judges themselves who are limiting its use, 
perhaps out of concern about its effect on the adversarial process.  Ellen E. Deason, Court-
Appointed Expert Witnesses:  Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 59, 142 (1998).  Evidence of this reluctance can be found in McCormick v. Brevig, No. 
DV-95-86, 1996 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1004 (Mont. Dist. 1996), in which the court, rather than 
appointing a special master, instead ordered the parties to address the issue of whether a 
special master should be appointed and, absent such an appointment, whether complex 
accounting matter should be tried before a jury or the bench.  Id.  Moreover, the Seventh 
Circuit has warned against the overuse of special masters.  See Checkers Eight Ltd. P’ship  
v. Hawkins, No. 95 C 7708, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7936, at *45 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1997) 
(citing Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d. 698, 712 (7th Cir. 
1984)). 
 509. Jones, supra note 144. 
 510. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) addresses fees for expert discovery in federal courts.  Rules 
for fee recovery in state courts may differ across jurisdictions. 
 511. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 776. 
 512. Id. at 778. 
 513. See, e.g., Rispler v. Sol Spitz Co., NO. 04-CV-1323, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75840 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006), for a reported instance of "sticker shock" with respect to a court-
appointed expert. 
 514. Some commentators have suggested having both parties agree upon one common 
expert, but aside from the obvious issue of how to proceed if parties disagree over which 
expert, there is concern as to whether the disclosures required to make such an agreement 
workable might conflict with an attorney’s obligation of absolute loyalty to the client.  
Krishna, supra note 167.  Others might be tempted to argue for movement toward a 
specialized court system such as that used in appeals of patent cases.  As Judge Posner 
notes, however, such a specialized system would bring its own set of problems.  RICHARD A. 
POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 401 (2001).  For a discussion of these problems, see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM ch. 8 (1996).  One 
obvious difficulty would be in discerning what types of cases should go to the specialized 
courts, since business damages can arise in a variety of settings from commercial litigation 
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COURTS, EXPERTS, AND THE QUALITY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 
This part explores several concerns raised in the foregoing parts 
regarding case complexity and partisanship, and their effect on the quality 
of jurisprudence.  It then introduces a novel approach that we believe 
represents a material step in the direction of reducing courts’ difficulties in 
dealing with widely disparate valuation estimates that result from expert 
partisanship. 
A. Questions Regarding the Evolving Nature of Damages Expert 
Testimony 
Collectively, the prior parts raise troubling questions.  For example, 
will the trend toward greater and greater amounts of businesses’ values 
being vested in intellectual capital render extant valuation methodologies 
increasingly obsolete?  New, developing non-financial models hold some 
promise of providing better measures of intellectual capital.515  These non-
financial measures should link to the value of firms inasmuch as value is a 
leading barometer of the existence of intellectual capital.516  A challenge 
for damages experts will be integrating these models in some fashion with 
extant financial methodologies to increase valuation accuracy through a 
more integrated and holistic approach to intellectual asset measurement.  
This may well require the use of additional, sophisticated methodologies 
such as factor analysis and simultaneous equation modeling that have yet to 
be utilized by the business valuation community.517  Courts’ receptivity to 
this integrative process is likely to have a great deal to do with the pace of 
progress for the integrative process.  Complicating this issue, the expert 
market’s growing drift into commodity and differentiated segments may 
pose problems for the courts as differences in the quality of expert 
testimony across cases of different magnitudes become more pronounced.  
Issues will also arise concerning the affordability of experts capable of 
using cutting-edge methodologies in complex cases regardless of the 
potential magnitude of the damages. 
Will the complexity of damages estimation ensuing from the growing 
preeminence of intellectual capital become so great that a hodge-podge of 
to tax to divorce.   Another problem is that even if federal business damages cases were tried 
in specialized courts, there would still be an issue with those cases brought in state courts. 
 515. See, e.g., Kannan & Kannan & Aulbur, supra note 345, at § 1.3.1.  Examples of 
these new models include the intangible asset monitor, the skandia value scheme, and the 
knowledge capital scorecard. See id. 
 516. Abeysekera, supra note 4, at 426. 
 517. See, e.g., id. (calling for the development of an intellectual capital index); Marr, 
supra note 344, § 4.3 (noting the possibility of simultaneous equation modeling). 
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decisions stemming from judges’ confusion makes identification of 
acceptable methodologies a nightmare of experts?  Two notable cases 
illustrate the point that courts have not always dealt well with 
methodological complexity in business damages cases.  In both Estate of 
Dunn v. Commissioner and Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner, the court 
majorities knowingly opted for simplistic valuations while anticipating 
criticism from business damages experts for embracing unsophisticated 
methodologies.  The Jelke dissent said the court’s decision to take the less-
complicated road to damages estimation was “the judicial equivalent of the 
doctrine of ignoble ease,” a term taken from former President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s expressed disdain for living a sedentary life.518  The dissent 
went on to state that the more sophisticated valuation methodology would 
produce a more accurate valuation, suggesting that not taking the 
intellectually more difficult road impairs the quality of jurisprudence.519 
Will this increasing methodological complexity in combination with 
growing partisanship in expert testimony result in more and more extreme 
damages estimates, thereby making the “split the baby” heuristic, so often 
used when courts are in doubt, even less reliable?520  If increasing difficulty 
in surviving Daubert hearings is driving attorneys toward full-time, 
professional experts with a demonstrated ability to survive Daubert 
hearings, then these professionals whose living depends upon satisfying 
attorneys can be expected to want to please because recurrent business is, 
to a significant extent, dependent upon past attorney satisfaction. 
On the other hand, extreme valuations, no matter how favorable to a 
client from the standpoint of their magnitude, apparently carry an 
increasing risk of being rejected by the courts, given recent decisions.521  
The balancing act that an expert must seemingly maintain, then, is one of 
being biased enough to deliver a good result for the client while not 
providing a damages estimate that is so far apart from that of the opposing 
expert as to risk the court’s rejecting both valuations.  As long as these two 
forces of the pressure for bias and the cost of bias are in approximate 
equilibrium and there is symmetry of bias, then “splitting the baby” may 
not always deliver a poor result for the court.522  These bias issues 
 518. Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007); Estate of Dunn v. 
Comm’r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 519. See John J. Stockdale, Jr., Legal & Court Case Update, BUS. VALUATION UPDATE, 
Jan. 2008, at 14, 14-17, for a discussion of Dunn and Jelke. 
 520. Tomlin & Cooper, supra note 507, at 11. (noting that this practice becomes 
particularly unreliable when triers of fact split the difference between damage estimates 
provided by opposing experts even though only one expert renders a biased estimate). 
 521. See supra text accompanying notes 449-82. 
 522. See Tomlin & Cooper, supra note 507, at 12 (noting that opposing biases may not 
always be present and that asymmetry of bias nullifies the conclusion that courts will reach 
unbiased decisions based upon splitting biased estimates).  Further, another form of 
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essentially constitute a game theoretic problem,523 and indeed have been 
addressed by legal research in that vein with the unfortunate implication 
that disequilibrium exists.524  Given that allegations of partisanship are 
increasing despite the proliferation of exclusions of damages expert 
testimony,525 there is further reason to believe that disequilibrium exists 
and is growing wor
B. A Novel Approach to Addressing Expert Partisanship 
Given that the adversarial trial process was not designed for decisions 
about the complexities of valuation science526 and that the foregoing 
remedies for expert partisanship all seem at a minimum seriously flawed 
and more probably largely lacking in efficacy, it seems appropriate to ask 
some fundamental questions.  Does the major problem in damages expert 
testimony stem from partisanship in general, or is the major problem only 
one outcome of partisanship:  frequent, large disparities in experts’ 
damages estimates?  Is it really desirable that courts squelch disagreement 
in expert testimony to the extent perhaps implied in portions of the recent 
rhetoric lamenting bias?  Or is such disagreement a natural product of a 
highly structured, adversarial process combined with human nature, the 
changing of which is tantamount to swimming against an impossibly strong 
current?  Would the courts be better served instead to, analogously, adopt 
the strategy often espoused for those caught in rip tides and find a way to 
swim perpendicular to the current? 527  Given that a silver-bullet solution 
seems unlikely to kill the beast, would jurisprudence be best served by an 
examination of how multiple remedies might be coupled to reduce the 
disparity in damages estimates? 
asymmetry, a statistically non-normal distribution of the range of damages, makes a biased 
outcome almost certain in some cases because of the impossibility of negative damages.  
For example, suppose hypothetically that the true damages are $6 million, and the plaintiff's 
expert provides an estimate of $20 million.  The defense expert can only opine zero 
damages, not the negative $14 million required for a "split the baby" heuristic to yield $6 
million. 
 523. Hypothetical negotiation has been admitted as evidence in patent cases as a means 
of determining such matters as reasonable royalties.  See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, 
Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 524. Lloyd, supra note 25; Jonathon T. Tomlin & David Cooper, The Importance of 
Unbiased Expert Testimony (May 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).  
The authors note that two economists did precisely this in finding that expert bias works to 
the advantage of the expert's client and that equally biased testimony on the parts of all 
parties' experts does not result in a neutral solution. 
 525. See supra text accompanying notes 433-82. 
 526. Deason, supra note 508, at 141. 
 527. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 789 (“After all, ordinary witnesses, even eye 
witnesses to an event, frequently disagreed contradicting one another on points larger and 
small. . . .”). 
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Before attempting to answer these questions through our proposed 
solution, it is useful to consider some of the most salient points in Professor 
Kaye’s article on Daubert and the admissibility of scientific testimony.528  
In concluding that the Daubert-like screening of complex statistical 
methodologies is a positive development,529 Kaye raises two major 
concerns about Daubert’s legacy that bear directly upon our subsequent 
proposal:  a boundary problem and a usurpation problem with its attendant 
methodological puzzle.530  The boundary problem refers to the fact that 
Daubert’s criteria do not extend to identifying the type of evidence 
deserving of special scrutiny, and the usurpation problem arises because 
Daubert permits sufficient latitude for trial judges to exclude evidence that 
should be presented to a jury.531  Kaye’s conclusion is that Daubert 
requires the articulation of further legal standards by which these problems 
may be addressed by the co
The remainder of this subpart proposes a novel approach built upon 
three basic propositions that may aid courts in dealing with these issues 
while helping reverse concerns about the intersection of methodological 
complexity and expert partisanship, thereby reducing the variance in 
damages estimates provided by Drs. Pangloss and Scrooge.  This approach 
is admittedly neither a panacea for all the ills of expert partisanship nor the 
complete answer for dealing with concerns about boundary demarcation 
and usurpation.  However, it does seemingly hold promise for reducing 
these concerns while satisfying Kaye’s caveat that any approach to dealing 
with Daubert’s aforementioned deficiencies should be functional, as 
opposed to merely philosophical, in nature.533 
The environment of business damages “actively works to seek out a 
justification for a centrist view.”534  In light of this, consider the question of 
whether the disparity in damages estimates is the major issue.  Historically, 
it would appear that violent disagreements among experts over the 
magnitude of damages cause the most consternation.535  This makes both 
 528. See generally Kaye, supra note 109 (discussing the admissibility of scientific 
evidence). 
 529. Id. at 1937. 
 530. Id. at 1934. 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id. at 1937. 
 533. Id. at 1966. 
 534. Nancy Fannon, Fannon Valuation Group, Ethics on the Witness Stand, Presentation 
at AICPA Business Valuation Conference, New Orleans, La. (Dec. 2, 2007) (conference 
notes on file with authors). 
 535. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 775-76 (noting that the divergence of expert 
testimony was prompted by testimony not justified by expertise or science, but by partial, 
biased, or highly speculative conclusions); Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 328 (showing 
survey results from 1998 and 1999 indicating that conflict among experts that defies 
reasoned assessment was one of the top problems cited by judges and attorneys). 
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intuitive and scientific sense.  If a court is presented with two damages 
estimates of $10 million and $12 million, then the court might justifiably 
assume that a verdict of the mean of $11 million in damages will not be 
very far off the mark.  On the other hand, if that same court is presented 
with estimates of $1 million and $21 million, then the mean of $11 million 
carries far less assurance of being accurate.  As one source has noted, 
“[w]hile bias might well ‘average out,’ variance does not.”536  This can 
result in court making gross errors that produce “who-knows-what 
result[s].”537  Given that courts are not supposed to permit a jury to award a 
greater amount of damages than that reasonably supported by the 
evidence,538 the problem, then, would seem to rest with the variance in 
estimates.539 Science idealists may find comfort in that the negative 
association between confidence in decisions and the magnitude of the 
underlying variance has its roots in statistics.540  This leads to our first 
proposition: 
Proposition 1:  A major step in reducing the effects of the 
problem of expert partisanship is to reduce the variance in 
estimates supplied by opposing experts. 
Now consider whether it is realistic to ask damages experts to behave 
in a manner that is contrary to the logic of the structure of the legal 
process541 and game theory of human behavior.542  Given that such 
admonitions aimed toward reducing expert partisanship have historically 
 536. David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, Econometrics and the Truth-Seeking 
Assumption:  Ethics and Research Independence, Presentation at the Southern Economic 
Association (Nov. 12, 2001) (transcript available at http://edwardmcphail.com/dismal_ 
science/truth_seeking_assumption_4.pdf, at 12). 
 537. Fannon, supra note 534 (citing Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 383 (7th Cir. 1986)) (finding no rational basis for the lower 
court’s reduction of damages from $54 million to $12 million). 
 538. See Montage Group, Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., Inc., No. 2D03-2026, 2004 
Fla. App. LEXIS 14973, at *42 (Fla. App. October 14, 2004) (stating that a jury may not 
award a greater amount of damages than what is reasonably supported by the evidence at 
trial). 
 539. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra note 514, at 406 
(noting that the greatest difficulties with expert testimony arise when there is an absence of 
common ground among the experts, giving triers of fact little assurance in their decisions). 
 540. See, e.g., RICHARD M. JAEGER, STATISTICS:  A SPECTATOR SPORT, 50-58 (2d ed. 
1993) (giving an intuitive presentation of the role of variance in uncertainty and discussion 
of uncertainty in the role of expert testimony); Sam L. Savage & Marc Van Allen, The Law 
of Averages in Law and Accounting, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK 10.1-10.11 (Roman 
L. Weil, et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (discussing the flaw of averages in law and accounting). 
 541. See supra text accompanying notes 433-82 (discussing recent evidence of expert 
partisanship). 
 542. See generally Lloyd, supra note 25 (recommending certain questions to be asked of 
the testifying expert). 
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fallen upon deaf ears543 and that ethical and valuation standards likewise 
have apparently failed to show substantive efficacy,544 the notion of a 
materially changing human nature seems, at best, idealistic, and, more 
realistically, a vehicle for self-deception.  Moreover, assuming one agrees 
with Proposition 1 above, writing standards that would somehow narrow 
these spreads seems hopelessly problematic given the subjective nature of 
the inputs to the estimates.  This is not to say that standards may not have 
some positive effect and should not be strengthened, but rather to explicitly 
acknowledge their spotty history of success in causing experts to behave 
against their self interests.  Consequently, our second proposition is as 
follows: 
Proposition 2:  Admonishing damages experts to behave as we 
might like and revising standards to better encourage them to do 
so are alone insufficient to result in a solution to the real problem 
facing courts in damages estimation. 
Finally, consider that simple solutions to complex problems are 
seldom available, or, quite logically, the problems would be unlikely to 
exist.  Certainly the longevity and severity of the issue of expert 
partisanship in the current trial process545 suggests that the problem is a 
complex one and that a fresh approach is needed.  To continue with the 
previous analogy, when caught in a rip tide, it is foolhardy and 
counterproductive to expend energy by attempting to swim in the most 
direct manner toward the beach.  Instead, swimming parallel to the beach 
can allow the swimmer to escape the grasp of the tide and eventually reach 
the shore.  Similarly, we believe that it is time to recognize that the sour 
fruits of expert partisanship may best be minimized by some trial-process 
reconfiguration augmented by the judicious and limited use of some of the 
legacy remedies. 
Proposition 3:  The best hope for a substantive reduction in the 
disparity between opposing experts’ damages estimates rests in 
trial process reconfiguration augmented by the judicious and 
limited use of some of the legacy remedies. 
Also, in addressing this issue, amidst all of the discordant rhetoric of 
what one legal commentator has termed the “failed romance between law 
and science,”546 we should not lose sight that the leading reason for the 
exclusion of expert testimony under Daubert is the validity of the facts and 
 543. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 774 (stating that the impassioned pleas of 
attorneys and judges were easily outweighed by the hard cash given by a party to an expert). 
 544. See Herdman, supra note 493 (discussing problems with the financial reporting 
system that were made more evident with the Enron scandal); Hitchner, supra note 486, at 1 
(addressing valuation issues pertaining to public companies and their stock prices). 
 545. See generally Mnookin, supra note 164 (discussing the history of expert testimony). 
 546. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 801. 
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the data.547  As previously noted, damages experts are often at the mercy of 
their clients,548 attorneys, and available data,549 and often the great 
differences in value estimates proffered by experts for opposing parties550 
result from their assumptions about these facts and data that represent the 
inputs into valuation models.551  Consequently, if the specific goal is to 
narrow the range of values proffered by opposing experts, and if 
assumptions are the leading cause of these differences, then focusing on 
ways to achieve a greater degree of consensus on assumptions may hold 
some promise of meaningful change.  Interviews with leading experts 
suggest two important points:  first, that the methods experts use to produce 
a value are very often the same;552 and second, that frequently the critical 
assumptions creating large differences in value estimates are relatively few, 
but their import is often lost in the rancor of cross-examination.553  As one 
expert notes, counsel with a weak case, the facts of which do not refute 
critical assumptions in expert testimony, will often attempt to confuse 
juries by prolonged argumentation regarding complicated but less material 
matters.554 
Based upon the premise that “[t]he factors enumerated in Daubert 
work reasonably well with some aspects of the expert’s work, but these 
factors are less well adapted to other aspects,”555 the cornerstone of our 
proposed remedy rests in bifurcating the trial process into two segments.556 
 547. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 31 (stating that lack of reliability is 
the top reason financial experts are excluded). 
 548. See March 2007 Court Case:  In re Nellson Nutraceutical, BUS. VALUATION RES. 
(Mar. 2007), at 1, (citing In re Nellson Nutraceutical, No. 06-10072, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 
99, *61 (Del. Bnkr. January 18, 2007)) (discussing how damages experts were “left in the 
dark” by deliberately manipulated management projections), available at 
http://www.bvlibrary.com. 
 549. See discussion of assumptions supra at Part III. 
 550. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 385 (analyzing the problems of biased expert 
testimony). 
 551. See, e.g., Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., C.A. No. 12207-NC, 2004 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *34-56 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2004). 
 552. See Hilton, supra note 223 (discussing expert testimony and financial matters). 
 553. See Seigneur, supra note 166 (discussing how the interviewee noted that this rancor, 
and that of the trial process in general, is so intimidating at times that it is difficult to induce 
young valuation experts to become testifying experts). 
 554. See Hilton, supra note 223 (discussing expert testimony and financial matters). 
 555. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1937. 
 556. Bifurcation of trials is one of the case management tools permitted courts in 
damages cases. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 
141 (2nd Cir. 2001) (where bifurcation occurred under FED. R. CIV. P. 23).  Business 
damages trials have been bifurcated on occasion, see, e.g., Imaging Int’l v. Hell Graphic 
Sys., Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 696, 704 (N.Y. 2006) (stating that defendants had consented to 
bifurcate the liability and damages phases of the trial), and decisions to bifurcate have been 
upheld on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Mandeville v. Quinstar 
Corp., 109 Fed. Appx. 191, 194 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming the lower court’s decision to 
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The first segment would deal with the appropriate methodologies to use in 
producing a value, a matter often prescribed by theory and requiring 
sophisticated thought.557  The second segment would pertain to the inputs 
to the methodology, often a factual matter.558  Methodological issues are 
usually the most technical in nature and frequently the ones least 
understood by judges, attorneys, and juries.559  Perhaps even more 
importantly, they are the place where pure science and valuation meet most 
closely and the opportunity for objective demarcation between them is the 
greatest.  This line of demarcation also has the important effect of 
preserving the spirit under which the seminal cases on admissibility have 
rested.  As Kaye notes, “Daubert works no change in the principle, clearly 
established by Frye that the heightened scrutiny [of expert evidence] 
pertain[s] strictly to methodology.”560  He also observes that “[w]hen 
heightened scrutiny is confined to methodology, the usurpation problem is 
manageable.”561 
Moreover, the arena of methodology is one of two points in the 
process where neutral experts,562 as an adjunct to opposing experts, might 
be employed to greatest benefit in the role of advising judges in situations 
where opposing experts disagree about complex methodologies.563  Further, 
some courts may be becoming more amenable to neutral experts,564 as 
evidenced by one federal judge’s suggestion that courts should make 
innovative use of special masters.565  Using neutral experts at this juncture 
bifurcate a trial because the issues were logically separable). 
 557. See Kaye, supra note 109, at 1937 (describing the difficulties of identifying 
methodological defects in statistical assessments). 
 558. It is noteworthy that bifurcation of proceedings is an increasingly frequent aspect of 
trials involving patent cases in which infringement issues are separated from damages.  
Goldscheider, supra note 6, at 56. 
 559. See Seigneur, supra note 166 (discussing the interviewee’s expert witness 
experience). 
 560. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1975. 
 561. Id. at 1972. 
 562. Judge Posner has noted the prospect of using neutral experts as a means of dealing 
with the problem of intelligibility in expert testimony.  POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL 
THEORY, supra note 514, at 405. 
 563. See McCormick v. Brevig, No. DV-95-86, 1996 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1004 (Mont. 
Dist. 1996) (citing cases supporting the appointment of special masters when accounting 
issues are involved); Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Sierra Pac. 
Ins. Co. v. Am. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1206 (2d Cir. 2004); Horn 
v. McQueen, 353 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (appointing special referees to sort out 
complex damages issues in the presence of conflicting expert testimony). 
 564. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, CA03-738, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 114, at *26-7(Ark. 
App. February 4, 2004) (accepting the report of a court-appointed damages expert over that 
of another expert). 
 565. See Aspen, supra note 144 and Deason, supra note 508, at 98-136, for a detailed 
and thoughtful explanation of the potential problems and abuses that the use of court-
appointed experts could create for courts and opposing parties. 
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would have several benefits.  First, if there were a substantive question 
regarding the most appropriate methodologies, both sides would receive a 
hearing attended by the neutral expert, who could assist the bench in 
deciding whether there exists a question of fact that would dictate jury 
involvement.566 
Second, if advised by neutral experts, judges would be far more likely 
to be properly informed about the pros and cons of competing 
methodologies and would better understand the ramifications of choosing 
some over others without the necessity of educating themselves in order to 
separate rhetoric from methodological appropriateness.567  There would 
also be less risk of overstepping Kumho’s intellectual rigor standard by 
excluding expert testimony that is less than ideal but still scientifically 
valid.568  Third, the difficulty of neutral experts radiating an aura of 
infallibility to a jury would be eliminated because the neutral expert would 
testify only before the judge, not the jury.569 
Despite these benefits, care would be needed to avoid due process 
usurpation and other arguments levied against the use of neutral experts.570  
For this reason, even though our thesis point of bifurcating trials does not 
strictly depend upon the use of court-appointed experts, we foresee the use 
of such experts to be a salutary adjunct to this trial bifurcation only if 
properly controlled.  Controls should at a minimum include what we 
outline in the following paragraph. 
Independent expert advice and testimony should be confined only to 
appropriate methodologies in the first segment of the bifurcated process, 
and only if the methodological complexity is sufficient to warrant such 
 566. Courts have, on occasion, appointed experts for the purpose of assessing the 
reliability of opposing experts' reports.  See, e.g., Horn v. McQueen, 353 F. Supp. 2d 785, 
791 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (instructing the special master to consider the reports and testimony of 
the experts). 
 567. There is empirical evidence that judges have difficulty resolving technical issues 
associated with complex patent cases, and alternative methods of trial-level resolution and 
neutral experts have been proposed as possible solutions.  Kimberly A. Moore, Are District 
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2001). 
 568. See Deason, supra note 508, at 134 (noting that the possible difficulty of judicial 
deference to independent experts becomes greater where judges struggle to adapt existing 
law to new technologies).  In this context, judges must be careful to confine independent 
experts' role to that of proffering opinion on appropriate methodologies and not on the 
application of such methodologies to law. 
 569. Another potentially efficacious aspect of this first component could be to get 
opposing parties to stipulate to as many assumptions as possible before proceeding to the 
second component.  This would have the salubrious effect of reducing the amount of noise 
in arguments the jury hears. 
 570. See generally Deason, supra note 508, for a thorough analysis of court-appointed 
expert witnesses in which Professor Deason raises many concerns about the use of such 
witnesses and offers several ways of partially mitigating these concerns. 
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advice.571  Conflicting expert testimony alone should not be sufficient to 
require an independent expert.572  In keeping with Judge Posner’s 
proposal,573 there should be a voluntary national registry of independent 
experts that includes a complete disclosure of areas of expertise, 
credentials, and all prior testimony experience.574  A high set of standards, 
to which all independent experts would be held accountable, should be 
developed.575  Conflicts of interest through prior or existing financial and 
other associations with any of the parties or their experts should be reasons 
for disqualification.576  Unless opposing parties agree otherwise, 
independent experts should be used only in addition to experts hired by 
opposing parties, and opposing parties should have the opportunity not only 
to comment upon the qualifications of independent experts prior to 
appointment, but also to examine independent experts under oath.577  
Opposing parties and their experts should not be allowed to communicate 
ex parte with independent experts, and vice-versa.578  Although these 
controls, even if properly and consistently applied, may not be foolproof, 
they do hold the promise of allowing independent expertise to inform 
judges without undue risk to the adversarial process.579 
The second segment of our novel approach deals with the inputs to the 
valuation models chosen during the first component.  It is in this far more 
subjective arena that judges and jurors are most comfortable580 and also 
where the spirit of evidentiary truth embodied in both Daubert and Frye is 
maintained.  In this segment, opposing parties should be first asked to 
stipulate to as many of the inputs to the selected valuation model(s) as 
possible.  Stipulating to inputs is nothing new, and courts typically 
appreciate opposing parties stipulating to as much as possible.581  What is 
different, however, is our recommended use of consulting experts to assist 
 571. This is intended to address concerns about independent experts crossing the line and 
intruding upon judicial prerogatives by providing advice on the law.  See Deason, supra 
note 508, at 134.  Moreover, various sources counsel against the use of court-appointed 
experts in simple matters. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 706.02, 53.10 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C)); William W. Schwarzer & Joel S. Cecil, Management of 
Expert Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 61 (2d ed. 2000). 
 572. See Deason, supra note 508, at 133. 
 573. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 385-86. 
 574. See Deason, supra note 508, at 148. 
 575. See id. 
 576. See id. at 143-47. 
 577. This control would substantively mitigate several concerns that include even 
unbiased experts having disagreements about scientific knowledge.  See id. at 118, 153. 
 578. See id. at 151-52. 
 579. An additional advantage of court-appointed experts is that they enjoy absolute 
immunity from liability.  See, e.g., Riemers v. O’Halloran, 678 N.W.2d 547, 550-51 (N.D. 
2004). 
 580. See supra text accompanying notes 555-61. 
 581. Aspen, supra note 146. 
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judges in identifying those inputs which ultimately matter most and least at 
the margin in the estimation of damages.582  Since the valuation 
methodology would have already been agreed upon, an independent expert 
could likely, without undue difficulty, vary the inputs to the selected 
model(s) and perform a sensitivity analysis to identify those assumptions 
that make any appreciable difference in the damages outcome, thereby 
providing a check on the inclinations of opposing parties not to stipulate to 
inputs of minimal import for reasons of partisanship.583 
Of course, an opposing party could still refuse to stipulate and proceed 
to trial with inputs of minimal import, but absent some compelling reason, 
probably not without risking the judge’s ire.584  Thus, what would 
ultimately be presented to the jury as questions of fact would be most often 
those issues related to valuation model inputs that actually affect damage 
estimates in some material way.  Such screening would, as Kaye puts it, 
“prevent[] the jury from relying on a legislative fact” as opposed to 
“adjudicative facts.”585  The distinction between these categories of “facts” 
is important.  Legislative facts are those that can be asserted across cases as 
opposed to adjudicative facts, which are case-specific.  For example, a 
legislative fact might be whether or not closed-form option-pricing models 
may be appropriately applied in valuing options if the options have certain 
special characteristics such as reload features.  An adjudicative fact might 
be whether or not option holders surrender at the optimal time or earlier 
than optimal, as some studies have indicated.586  Thus, legislative facts lend 
themselves more generally to methodological issues, whereas adjudicative 
facts generally fall into the category of inputs to methodology.  Adopting 
Kaye’s distinction between the types of facts helps to make a clearer 
 582. Neutral experts have sometimes been used to recalculate damages, but this is rarely 
done.  See Lloyd, supra note 25. 
 583. Court-appointed experts have also been utilized by courts to deal with post-trial 
matters involving detailed financial issues.  See, e.g., Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17922 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2003). 
 584. Hilton, supra note 223.  The interviewee notes that greatest differences by far in 
how expert testimony is handled, and the ones that cause the most problem for experts, 
result from differences among judges as opposed to across jurisdictions.  He also notes that 
one judge in whose court he has testified on multiple occasions routinely holds pretrial 
conferences in which he has the experts appear before him in person and asks direct 
questions regarding the important differences in their reports.  In an effort to reduce the 
variance in experts' estimates of damages, this judge sometimes advises the experts 
regarding assumptions that he feels are out of line, with the implication that he wants more 
conservative estimates in one direction or the other.  Such informal coercion of experts 
reinforces our recommendation for a new process that will accomplish the ends sought by 
this particular judge and will help ensure more homogeneity of process across courts. 
 585. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1975. 
 586. Jaksa Cvitanic, et al., Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options, REV. FIN. 
STUDIES, Dec. 2007, at 1, available at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content 
/full/hhm065v1. 
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demarcation between the respective issues to be decided in each segment of 
the bifurcated process much clearer. 
Extending our previous example of option valuation may assist in 
better understanding this proposal.  Assume, again, a divorce action in 
which the asset of interest is the marital appreciation in stock options 
containing reload features granted to one spouse by her employer.587  Any 
valuation method that does not take into account the additional value of the 
reloads would result in a low value estimate.  Consequently, binomial 
models and Monte Carlo simulations might be appropriately proposed as 
suitable methodologies, whereas a closed-form model that does not value 
the reloads would clearly be inappropriate.  Once the models are decided 
upon, two inputs into such models would be the price volatility of the 
underlying security (the stock) and the amount of time the option holder 
takes to sell or convert “in-the-money” options once they are vested.588  
Suppose the opposing parties offer volatility estimates of 18% and 19%589 
and also differ on the issue of whether to assume the option holder would 
have held the options until the optimal surrender time.  The differences in 
volatility estimates may have little effect on the damages and might be 
stipulated, whereas the assumed surrender behavior could have a 
potentially large effect.  Under the proposed trial regime, jurors would not 
need to hear expert testimony regarding complex binomial models and 
determination of stock price volatility, but instead would hear testimony 
focused on such matters as past option surrender behaviors of executives 
having similar options. 
To summarize, there are several benefits of this approach.  Heightened 
scrutiny of expert testimony would be reserved for methodological issues, 
as Kaye stipulates.590  This approach might be applied in both Daubert and 
Frye jurisdictions, given that the complexities of valuation methodologies 
certainly justify heightened scrutiny under both standards.591  Trials would 
be materially shortened in length and costs reduced concomitantly.  Juries 
could focus on those aspects of business damages cases that matter most in 
terms of outcomes and those about which they are likely to be most 
comfortable.  Materially relevant information would be less likely to be lost 
in the smoke of methodological rhetoric and jargon.  Judges would be 
relieved of some of the responsibility to become educated on the intricacies 
 587. See supra note 422. 
 588. An in-the-money option is one in which the option holder could extract a positive 
value by immediately exercising the option.  FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, 
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 812 (8th ed. 2006). 
 589. Such differences might arise, for example, because experts disagree over the period 
over which to measure stock price volatility.  For a discussion about measuring stock price 
volatility, see id. at 915-18. 
 590. Kaye, supra note 109, at 2014. 
 591. Id. 
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of increasingly complex valuation methodology.  The trend toward greater 
and greater discovery requirements that interfere with attorney/expert 
communication might be reversed as the number of issues subject to debate 
during trial—especially those related to objective science—would be 
reduced.  Perhaps most importantly, however, the opportunity for 
partisanship would be materially reduced.  Attorneys harboring fears of 
limitations upon their degrees of freedom and purists who object on the 
basis of denial of due process would need to confront the reality that judges 
strongly prefer for parties to stipulate to matters that are not really in 
question or make minimal difference in consequence. 592 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the end, when considering the considerable dissatisfaction that 
attends the use of expert witnesses,593 we are left with the following 
conclusions.  First, there is a particular need to scrutinize scientific 
evidence because it is often impenetrable yet more impressive than non-
scientific evidence, and the usual safeguards in the trial process are 
inadequate to always ensure that juries will see only good science.594  
Second, from a practical perspective, the demarcation separating art and 
science in damages estimation is hazy at best; yet, in this regard, Daubert 
and its progeny, as well as Daubert’s predecessor, Frye, are largely silent.  
Third, Daubert has had a far-reaching effect on damages expert testimony 
in several ways, most notably for damages experts by increasing their risk.  
Fourth, at the same time the demand for expert testimony and numbers of 
experts are increasing, the complexity of business damages cases is also 
increasing as a result of fundamental changes in the business environment.  
This increased complexity is in turn leading to the use of more 
sophisticated methodologies, which makes it even more difficult for courts 
to decipher what has been already a confusing mix of art and science.  
Fifth, against this backdrop are alarming allegations of burgeoning 
partisanship on the part of experts, which is resulting in highly disparate 
damages estimates and creating uncomfortable uncertainty about the real 
magnitude of damages.  Finally, infused in this already vexatious mixture is 
a trend toward increasingly expansive discovery that inhibits 
attorney/expert communication. 
Allegations of expert bias, though growing in intensity, are nothing 
new historically, and none of the legacy remedies that have been proffered 
have alone proven efficacious in addressing the problem.  Perhaps foremost 
among the reasons for persistent expert partisanship is a trial regime in 
 592. Seigneur, supra note 166. 
 593. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra note 514, at 401. 
 594. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1967. 
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which experts are expected to perform as effective players on a litigation 
team, but simultaneously are supposed to be immune from developing any 
conscious or subconscious allegiance to that team—and must be willing to 
so testify.  It might as well be decreed that professional baseball players in 
a year prior to free agency should have no interest in their present team’s 
winning because they might be playing for the opposition next year. 
If real progress is to be made in culling the worst of the sour fruits of 
partisanship—highly disparate damage estimates—it is time to declare this 
charade as such and take a fresh approach to addressing underlying 
structural problems based upon a modified trial regime, analogous in some 
respects to that used in complex patent cases.  This regime involves the 
bifurcation of trials:  dividing damages estimation into two components in a 
manner that augments expert testimony in complex business damages cases 
by incorporating independent experts in a limited, yet productive and 
economical way.  Such an approach would enable jurors to focus on 
material questions of fact that produce much of the real difference in 
damage estimates.  Although we do not maintain that this proposed 
modification is the silver bullet that will kill the beast of partisanship, we 
believe that it would greatly reduce opportunities for partisanship to bear 
bad fruit and that it represents a workable alternative far preferable to the 
present lament. 
